Altogether, these results support t

Altogether, these results support the judicial self-restraint theory, in the sense that Justices are more reluctant to censor the more they have censored in the past. These results seem to confirm Schnapper’s theory about the existence of a “censorship quota” (i.e. a maximum number of censorship decisions).

Opportunistic Independence We now turn to the analysis of the two variables related to opportunistic independence: cohabitation and senate.

First, regarding cohabitation, we find that cohabitation periods are associated with more censorship: the coefficient associated to cohabitation is indeed positive and significant in specifications 4 to 7 (1995-2013). It is also weakly significant in specifications 2 and 3 (1974-2013). This result is in alignment with the opportunistic independence theory.

Second, as far as the senate variable is concerned, the picture is more complex. It is indeed associated with a positive impact on the censorship likelihood in almost all specifications of table 6. This result would entail that, when the majority of the National Assembly and the majority of the Senate are aligned, the government faces a higher censorship probability. In other words, when both Chambers support the government, the CC is more likely to invalidate a law. This result would not support the opportunistic independence theory, but could be explained by the fact that the government passes less consensual -and therefore less constitutional- laws when it controls both Chambers.