Throughout the trial, U.S. District

Throughout the trial, U.S. District Judge Melinda Harmon showed prejudice, siding with the prosecution in 96 percent of her rulings (Morrison 2005: 39). At one point, defense counselor Rusty Hardin attempted to introduce new evidence. Judge Harmon called that “the most underhanded thing I have ever seen” which touched off a heated debate with the defense (Fowler). Acrimonious debate surrounded the jury instructions. Among the issues:
 whether previous administrative settlements with the SEC by Arthur Andersen could be considered by the jury
 whether Fifth Amendment pleadings by government witness could be considered by the jury
 the definition of the word “corrupt”
 whether knowledge by one or more persons constitutes knowledge “by the
firm”
 whether previous SEC investigations in to Enron‟s financial statements could be considered relevant (Flood).
Ultimately, Judge Harmon‟s instructions to the jury proved to be faulty and the cause of the reversal.
The original jury needed ten days to review the evidence and find the facts. They sent repeated queries to the judge. In one, June 13, after eight days of deliberation, they asked if the firm could be convicted if they disagree about who at the firm is guilty. Unable to answer that seemingly basic question from corporate law, U.S. District Judge Melinda Harmon left the bench to find out (Girion). Finally, Judge Harmon ruled that the jury did not need to find Andersen guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict (Morrison 2005: 39).
The appeal went against the defendant.
Andersen asks this court to reverse its conviction, urging errors in four evidentiary rulings, misconduct by the prosecutor in his rebuttal jury summation, and two legal contentions regarding the required proof under § 1512(b)(2). The evidentiary rulings include admitting extensive evidence regarding two unrelated SEC enforcement actions against Andersen, excluding evidence of the volume of documents Andersen did not destroy, and excluding impeachment evidence. Regarding the proof required by § 1512(b)(2), Andersen urges that given its element of “corruption,” the government had to prove more than that it acted with an intent to impede the SEC. Finally, Andersen asserts that the government had to prove that Andersen intended to interfere with a “particular” proceeding.
We are not persuaded that this conviction is flawed by reversible error and we affirm the judgment of conviction. (Higginbotham: 2-3)
The case went to the Supreme Court of the United States. SCOTUS found many problems with the jury instructions, reversed the ruling and remanded the case. The entire document is in Appendix C. Among the many points made:
The outer limits of this element need not be explored here because the jury instructions at issue simply failed to convey the requisite consciousness of wrongdoing. Indeed, it is striking how little culpability the instructions required. For example, the jury was told that, "even if [petitioner] honestly and sincerely believed that its conduct was lawful, you may find [petitioner] guilty." App. JA-213. The instructions also diluted the meaning of "corruptly" so that it covered innocent conduct. Id., at JA-212.