Coherence and the a prioriThis resp

Coherence and the a priori
This response by way of associating the coherence of beliefs with their causal
basis is more plausible for perceptual beliefs than for beliefs of simple selfevident
a priori truths, at least if coherence is construed as more than
consistency and as related to explanation, probability, and justification. For
notice that, unlike the proposition that there is a green field before me, the
proposition that if some dogs are pets, then some pets are dogs apparently
need not explain, render probable, or justify anything else I believe. Nor is it
obvious that anything else I believe need explain, render probable, or justify
my believing this proposition. Where is the need for coherence as a requirement
for my justification? I may haveother beliefs that cohere with this one,
but my justification for it does not seem to derive from such coherence. Yet
my belief of this proposition is justified to about as high a degree as is any
belief I have.
By contrast, the proposition that there is a green field before me perhaps
does cohere, in a way that might serve coherentism, with other things I
believe: that there is grass there, that I am on my front porch, and so on; and
there appear to be some explanatory and probability relations among these
propositions. For instance, the proposition that there is a green field before
me adds to the probability that I am on my porch; and that I am on that
porch partly explains why I see a green field.
A coherentist might respond to the difference just indicated by qualifying
the coherence view, applying it only to beliefs of empirical, rather than
a priori, propositions.? This move could be defended on the assumption that
propositions known a priori are necessarily true and hence are not appropriately
said to be made probable by other propositions, or to be explained by
them in the same way empirical propositions are explained. In support of
this it might be argued that although we can explain the basis of a necessary
202 Structure of justification and knowledge
truth and thereby show that it holds, still, since it cannot fail to hold, there
is no explaining why it, as opposed to something else, holds.
This is plausible but inconclusive reasoning. We may just as reasonably say
that we can sometimes explain why a necessary truth holds and in doing so
explain why a contrasting proposition is false. Imagine that someone mistakenly
takes a certain false proposition to be a theorem of logic and cannot see
why a closely similar, true proposition is a theorem. If we now prove the
correct one step by step, with accompanying examples, we might thereby
explain why this theorem, as opposed to the other proposition, is true.
So far as explanation is central to coherence, then, coherentism apparently
owes us an account of knowledge of at least some necessary truths. But
suppose that it can account for knowledge of some necessary truths. There
remain others, such as simple, luminously self-evident ones, for which it
cannot offer anything plausibly said to explain why they hold, or any other
way of accounting for knowledge of them as grounded in coherence.
Consider how one might explain why, if it is true that Jane Austen wrote
Persuasion, then it is not false that she did. If someone did not see this, it
would probably not help to point out that no proposition is both true and
false. For if one needs to have the truth of such a clear and simple instance of
this general truth explained, one presumably cannot understand the general
truth either. But suppose this is not so, and that one's grasp of the general
truth is somehow the basis of one's seeing the particular truth that instantiates
it. Then the same point would apply to the general truth: there would
apparently be nothing plausibly said to explain to one why it is true.
Coherence and the mutually explanatory
It might now be objected that the general truth that no proposition is both
true and false, and the instances of it, are mutually explanatory: its truth
explains why they hold, and their truth explains why it holds; and this is the
chief basis of their coherence with one another. But is it really possible for
one proposition to explain another and the other to explain it? If what
explains why the grass is wet is that there is dew on it, then the same proposition
- that there is dew on it - is not explained by the proposition that the
grass is wet (instead, condensation explains why it is wet).
Reflection on other purported examples of murual explanation also
suggests that twOpropositions cannot explain each other. It might seem th~t
a man could say something because his wife did, and that she could say It
because he did. But notice how this has to go to make good sense. One of
them would have to say it first to cause the other to. But then we would
have a case in which something like this occurs: her saying it explains why
he says it, later (this could be so even if her saying it is explained by her
believing he thinks it). His saying it earlier than she does might still explain
her saying it. But then the fact that he says it at a given time does not both
exnlain and get exolained by her saying it at some particular time.
The architecture of knowledge 203
When we carefully specify what explains something, we seem to find that
the latter, carefully specified, does not explain the former. In the case where
she says something because he did, earlier, and he says it because she did,
earlier than he did, we would have a kind of reciprocal explanation, wherein a
kind of thing, here spousal affirmation, explains and is explained by another
thing of the same kind. But this is not a mutual explanation, wherein the
very same thing explains and is explained by a second thing. The first may
look like the second, but it is quite different. lO
Perhaps murual explanation of the kind the coherentist apparently needs
- as opposed to reciprocal explanation and other sorts involving two-way
relations - is somehow possible. But until a good argument for it is given,
we should conclude that even if an explanatory relation between propositions
is sufficient for a belief of one of the propositions to cohere with a
belief of the other, coherentism does not in general provide a good account
of knowledge of self-evident truths.
If coherentism applies only to empirical beliefs, however, and not to
beliefs of a priori propositions, then it is not a general theory of justification
or knowledge and leaves us in need of a non-coherentist account of a priori
justification (and knowledge). In any case, it would be premature to
conclude that coherentism does account for empirical justification. Let us
return to the perceptual case.
Epistemological versus conceptual coherentism
It might seem that we could decisively refute the coherence theory of justification
by noting that one might have only a single belief, say that there is a
green field before one, and that this lone belief might still be justified. For
there would be a justified belief that coheres with no other beliefs one has.
But could one have just a single belief? Could one, for instance, believe that
there is a green field before one, yet not believe, say, that it has any vegetation?
It is not clear that one could; and foundationalism does not assume
this possibility, though the theory may easily be wrongly criticized for
implying it.
Foundationalism is in fact consistent with one kind of coherentism, namely,
a coherence theory of the acquisition and function of concepts - for short, the
coherence theory of concepts. According to this theory, concepts are what they are
partly in relation to one another, and a person acquires concepts, say of (physical)
objects and shapes, and of music and sounds, only in relation to one
another and must acquire an entire set of related concepts in order to acquire
any concept. The concept of an object in some way includes that of shape (if
only the notion of something bounded), as that of music includes the concept
of sound. This may be why any object must have some shape or other, and
why anything that makes music produces some sound. One cannot (fully)
acquire object concepts without acquiring some shape concepts, or (fully)
acquire the concept of music without acquiring that of sound.
204 Structure of justification and knowledge
If the coherence theory of concepts is sound, foundationalists must
explain how it squares with their epistemology. The central point they may
appeal to is a distinction between grounding conditions for belief and possession
conditions for it. What grounds a belief in such a way as to justify it or render
it an item of knowledge is largely independent of what other beliefs one
must have, and what concepts one must have, to be able to hold the first
belief. Perhaps I cannot believe that music is playing if I do not have a
concept of sound; I may even have to believe sounds with a certain structure
to be occurring. And perhaps I could not have acquired these and other relevant
concepts one at a time. Indeed, it may be (as suggested in Chapter 5)
that at least normally we cannot acquire concepts without acquiring some
knowledge or justified belief. Still, what it is that justifies a belief can be a
matter of how the belief is grounded; it need not be a marter of the coherence
conditions required for having the belief.
If, however, coherence relations are essential for holding a belief at all,
they are on that ground necessary for, and - in ways that will soon be
apparent - important in understanding, the beliefs being justified. The
point here is simply that we cannot treat conditions for having a belief at all
as doing the more specific job of grounding its justification. By and large
beliefs can be possessed without being justified, and there is commonly a
good distance between meeting the conditions for simply having beliefs and
meeting the standards for justification in holding them.
Coherence, incoherence, and defeasibility

Kết quả (Việt) 1:

Sự gắn kết và một tiên nghiệmPhản ứng này bằng cách gắn sự gắn kết của niềm tin với causal củacơ sở là chính đáng cho perceptual niềm tin hơn cho niềm tin của đơn giản selfevidenttiên nghiệm sự thật, ít nếu tính mạch lạc hiểu là nhiều hơnnhất quán và liên quan để giải thích, xác suất, và biện minh. Chonhận thấy rằng, không giống như các đề xuất rằng có là một lĩnh vực màu xanh lá cây trước khi tôi, cácđề xuất rằng nếu một số con chó là vật nuôi, sau đó một số vật nuôi là con chó dường nhưcần không giải thích, khiến có thể xảy ra, hoặc biện minh cho bất cứ điều gì khác mà tôi tin rằng. Cũng không phải là nórõ ràng rằng bất cứ điều gì khác mà tôi tin rằng cần giải thích, khiến có thể xảy ra, hoặc biện minh chotin tưởng tôi đề xuất này. Sự cần thiết cho sự gắn kết như là một yêu cầu ở đâuđể biện minh của tôi? Tôi có niềm tin haveother cohere với một,nhưng tôi biện minh cho nó không có vẻ để lấy được từ sự gắn kết như vậy. Đượcniềm tin của tôi của đề xuất này là hợp lý để một mức độ khoảng như cao như bất kỳTôi có niềm tin.Ngược lại, các đề xuất rằng có là một lĩnh vực màu xanh lá cây trước khi tôi có lẽcohere, trong một cách mà có thể phục vụ coherentism, với những thứ khác tôitin: là cỏ có, tôi đang trên mái hiên nhà của tôi, và vv.; vàdường như có là một số quan hệ giải thích và xác suất trong số nàymệnh đề. Ví dụ, các đề xuất rằng có một lĩnh vực màu xanh lá cây trước khitôi thêm vào khả năng mà tôi đang trên hiên của tôi; và rằng tôi là về điều đóporch partly explains why I see a green field.A coherentist might respond to the difference just indicated by qualifyingthe coherence view, applying it only to beliefs of empirical, rather thana priori, propositions.? This move could be defended on the assumption thatpropositions known a priori are necessarily true and hence are not appropriatelysaid to be made probable by other propositions, or to be explained bythem in the same way empirical propositions are explained. In support ofthis it might be argued that although we can explain the basis of a necessary202 Structure of justification and knowledgetruth and thereby show that it holds, still, since it cannot fail to hold, thereis no explaining why it, as opposed to something else, holds.This is plausible but inconclusive reasoning. We may just as reasonably saythat we can sometimes explain why a necessary truth holds and in doing soexplain why a contrasting proposition is false. Imagine that someone mistakenlytakes a certain false proposition to be a theorem of logic and cannot seewhy a closely similar, true proposition is a theorem. If we now prove thecorrect one step by step, with accompanying examples, we might therebyexplain why this theorem, as opposed to the other proposition, is true.So far as explanation is central to coherence, then, coherentism apparentlyowes us an account of knowledge of at least some necessary truths. Butsuppose that it can account for knowledge of some necessary truths. There
remain others, such as simple, luminously self-evident ones, for which it
cannot offer anything plausibly said to explain why they hold, or any other
way of accounting for knowledge of them as grounded in coherence.
Consider how one might explain why, if it is true that Jane Austen wrote
Persuasion, then it is not false that she did. If someone did not see this, it
would probably not help to point out that no proposition is both true and
false. For if one needs to have the truth of such a clear and simple instance of
this general truth explained, one presumably cannot understand the general
truth either. But suppose this is not so, and that one's grasp of the general
truth is somehow the basis of one's seeing the particular truth that instantiates
it. Then the same point would apply to the general truth: there would
apparently be nothing plausibly said to explain to one why it is true.
Coherence and the mutually explanatory
It might now be objected that the general truth that no proposition is both
true and false, and the instances of it, are mutually explanatory: its truth
explains why they hold, and their truth explains why it holds; and this is the
chief basis of their coherence with one another. But is it really possible for
one proposition to explain another and the other to explain it? If what
explains why the grass is wet is that there is dew on it, then the same proposition
- that there is dew on it - is not explained by the proposition that the
grass is wet (instead, condensation explains why it is wet).
Reflection on other purported examples of murual explanation also
suggests that twOpropositions cannot explain each other. It might seem th~t
a man could say something because his wife did, and that she could say It
because he did. But notice how this has to go to make good sense. One of
them would have to say it first to cause the other to. But then we would
have a case in which something like this occurs: her saying it explains why
he says it, later (this could be so even if her saying it is explained by her
believing he thinks it). His saying it earlier than she does might still explain
her saying it. But then the fact that he says it at a given time does not both
exnlain and get exolained by her saying it at some particular time.
The architecture of knowledge 203
When we carefully specify what explains something, we seem to find that
the latter, carefully specified, does not explain the former. In the case where
she says something because he did, earlier, and he says it because she did,
earlier than he did, we would have a kind of reciprocal explanation, wherein a
kind of thing, here spousal affirmation, explains and is explained by another
thing of the same kind. But this is not a mutual explanation, wherein the
very same thing explains and is explained by a second thing. The first may
look like the second, but it is quite different. lO
Perhaps murual explanation of the kind the coherentist apparently needs
- as opposed to reciprocal explanation and other sorts involving two-way
relations - is somehow possible. But until a good argument for it is given,
we should conclude that even if an explanatory relation between propositions
is sufficient for a belief of one of the propositions to cohere with a
belief of the other, coherentism does not in general provide a good account
of knowledge of self-evident truths.
If coherentism applies only to empirical beliefs, however, and not to
beliefs of a priori propositions, then it is not a general theory of justification
or knowledge and leaves us in need of a non-coherentist account of a priori
justification (and knowledge). In any case, it would be premature to
conclude that coherentism does account for empirical justification. Let us
return to the perceptual case.
Epistemological versus conceptual coherentism
It might seem that we could decisively refute the coherence theory of justification
by noting that one might have only a single belief, say that there is a
green field before one, and that this lone belief might still be justified. For
there would be a justified belief that coheres with no other beliefs one has.
But could one have just a single belief? Could one, for instance, believe that
there is a green field before one, yet not believe, say, that it has any vegetation?
It is not clear that one could; and foundationalism does not assume
this possibility, though the theory may easily be wrongly criticized for
implying it.
Foundationalism is in fact consistent with one kind of coherentism, namely,
a coherence theory of the acquisition and function of concepts - for short, the
coherence theory of concepts. According to this theory, concepts are what they are
partly in relation to one another, and a person acquires concepts, say of (physical)
objects and shapes, and of music and sounds, only in relation to one
another and must acquire an entire set of related concepts in order to acquire
any concept. The concept of an object in some way includes that of shape (if
only the notion of something bounded), as that of music includes the concept
of sound. This may be why any object must have some shape or other, and
why anything that makes music produces some sound. One cannot (fully)
acquire object concepts without acquiring some shape concepts, or (fully)
acquire the concept of music without acquiring that of sound.
204 Structure of justification and knowledge
If the coherence theory of concepts is sound, foundationalists must
explain how it squares with their epistemology. The central point they may
appeal to is a distinction between grounding conditions for belief and possession
conditions for it. What grounds a belief in such a way as to justify it or render
it an item of knowledge is largely independent of what other beliefs one
must have, and what concepts one must have, to be able to hold the first
belief. Perhaps I cannot believe that music is playing if I do not have a
concept of sound; I may even have to believe sounds with a certain structure
to be occurring. And perhaps I could not have acquired these and other relevant
concepts one at a time. Indeed, it may be (as suggested in Chapter 5)
that at least normally we cannot acquire concepts without acquiring some
knowledge or justified belief. Still, what it is that justifies a belief can be a
matter of how the belief is grounded; it need not be a marter of the coherence
conditions required for having the belief.
If, however, coherence relations are essential for holding a belief at all,
they are on that ground necessary for, and - in ways that will soon be
apparent - important in understanding, the beliefs being justified. The
point here is simply that we cannot treat conditions for having a belief at all
as doing the more specific job of grounding its justification. By and large
beliefs can be possessed without being justified, and there is commonly a
good distance between meeting the conditions for simply having beliefs and
meeting the standards for justification in holding them.
Coherence, incoherence, and defeasibility