CHAPTER NO. 7
In chapter seven politics of development, initially the first priority to be discussed is that, there are three types of policies and each type of policy is tailored and molded by the different set of economic and social factors and characteristically performed by different level of local government for the benefit of the city as a whole.
Developmental policies are those that contribute in civic improvement, economic growth, expansion and wellbeing of society and yield economic benefits projected by autonomous agencies that operate on those businessman who generate income from their own projects and are free from usual political constraint (groups and entities outside the main stream of local politics).
Allocation policies have minimal and unpredictable impact on city interests.
Redistributive policies have negative impact on community’s economic growth because it supports the needy members of society. Some degree of redistribution can be made. Redistributive policies are politically popular in low income residents but adverse in economic interest of the city. The policy making does not consent on these three policies only the powerful members of society(like powerful and bigwigs) are also the part of policy making, but the relation between reputation and reality does not mean their efforts are likely to succeed. In developmental arena if the policy made by local government is much-admired in city interest then there is less need to build public support for the proposal, Instead of getting public support check the feasibility of the policy so that false hopes and expectations are not aroused.
Policy formation is consensual political and technical feasibility is fairly well determined and closed to broader public but the successful accomplishment of policy objectives revolves around the reputation of decision makers.
Developmental policies come at the expense of other communities, and the local leadership can secure the benefit only if it wins a competition for resources if the formal governmental leadership also provides legitimacy for the policy. Its authority allows for a long-term commitment of local resources, and it usually has more administrative capacities available for projects. The consensual quality does not persist because of community leaders and separate groups overreaching interests. Specially people of small communities and suburban areas where economic and status interest is divided into growth and no growth factions and yield bitter conflicts. In the developmental arena, power is not best understood as a "zero-sum" game, where one person or group wins at the expense of another. Instead, power is better understood in systemic terms; it is the capacity of the community as a whole to realize its objectives. What is needed is not so much the capacity to enforce one's will over others as the leadership ability that can persuade others to contribute to a common cause. There is equally a huge advantage of having able servant then inefficient slave. In the end the city of any size developmental policies remain largely consensual.
CHAPTER NO. 8
In chapter eight, the politics of allocation addressed majority of the issues and conflicts of policies and its impact on economic interest of the city. Majority of the political controversies fall within the allocation field and involves the allocation of government resources to one or another part of the city for instance where school building sited should be sited, route of a badly need roadway to name the few.
The local conflict which got heated up during the allocation policies are the terms and conditions of public employment jobs which are divided into smaller packages and dispersed to specific segments of the community. Policies that control their distribution to public sector also varied from sector to another.
Cities needed to recruit the most talented individuals with appropriated skills that could work with their full potential to get the best out in the interest of city as a whole, but there is a certain school of thought that claims certainly specified educational experience for performance of certain public services. Some researchers found a negative correlation between educational performance and job performance results have always been uncertain and shows negative relation between test performance and actual class effectiveness. Moreover, the point of argument is between political machine and good government reformers. There is a battle between machine politicians who are from low income ethnic communities adjacent to commercial and industrial part of the city who used their political influence to enhance their economic well-being. Whereas, the reformers are middle-class resident consisted of professionals and broad-minded businessman from reputed universities. Reformers are always successful at structural thann social reform on the other hand machine politicians need a chunk of reward that came from economic growth. Reformers argued that through nonpartisan, at-large elections, leaders would be chosen who would guard the overarching interests of the city. Although the machine politicians were less articulate, scholarly defenders of the machine have argued that back-room deals and corrupt politics reduced legal impediments to local capital investment. But machine-reform differences involved conflicts in style and technique, not in the goal to be pursued. For urban governance honesty, competency and adaptability three values are highly valued to shape the performance of urban governance.
Ethnic the politics of racial minorities also have conflicts in employment issues. Ethnic group wants legitimacy of their language, race, culture and nationality to be affirmed. On the other side visibility of minorities group is much larger. Like black Americans have slave experience left them with social wounds and loads of discrimination their state of deprivation and distribution of public resources and allocation of the particular funds for the minorities and equality of opportunity and reallocation of nation’s wealth. In contrast with this, in recent years municipal employees have become powerful direct participants in local policy formation and they also have influence on local politics. Citizens are even less involved in local than national affairs, relatively small groups of citizens from a particular ethnic group or working for a specific public bureaucracy can exercise undue political weight. Their leverage is generally restricted to allocational issues, but for small groups this may be a profitable enough arenas for political action within the nation local conflicts and controversiesoccurs. In the end allocational issues are tend to be exercised by small groups because larger public don’t show any interest in local policies.
CHAPTER NO.9
In chapter nine the politics of redistribution is the significant aspect of local government. Redistribution is the process of distributing similar services in all parts of the city but it is presumed that at the local level, power of elite keeps those issues at arm’s length and off political agendas. Policies of redistribution are usually perceived that they are at odd with the economic interest of the city so for this very reason certain strategies like forestall, delay, preclude are implemented to get rid of to surpass the need or the issue of redistribution.
Threats of economic reprisal and social banishment are thought to be powerful enough to keep deprived groups from exercising their rights of expression and organization even in case of non-liberal democracies. Redistributive policies in local politics are considered to cast negative consequences on economy. The most powerful set of organization for redistributive policies are trade unions. Joining together also has a strong, demonstrated interest in securing redistribution policies for their working-class constituents.
Although much is made of the so-called conservatism of trade union leaders, the welfare state is difficult to conceive apart from union power. Redistributive demands, which create class conflicts in-national politics, have little place in local politics. Significantly, the limits on what the city can do often work to the advantage of local union leaders. It has also been claimed that the very structure of local governing institutions discourages local groups from raising redistributive issues, that these institutions are so structured that there is little hope there will ever be a response to redistributive demands.
Put in these terms, the claim that the local political system is "biased" is more persuasive. The political organizations are profoundly depend upon working class votes and are also likely proponents of redistributive policies especially incentral cities where the working class constitutes an overwhelmingmajority of the population; these parties may feel compelled to pursue a redistributive approach to urban problems simply to sustain their working-class support. On the other hand, trade unions or big city politicians there are very few interest groups are also there to propose major schemes for redistribution they demanded for rehousing, rehabilitation for minorities, construction of new housing for low income residents, allocation of public funds to bring properties up to standard.
Moreover to curtail these situation and demands for redistribution local political leaders specify range of techniques available and forcefully expressed like delay substantive response, thereby allowing the demanding group to become discouraged; convert the redistributive issue into an allocational one; and convert an economically redistributive issue into a political one. The best among all is delay strategy most convenient and easiest to implement at inception leaders simply ignore demand and pretend that they do not have the resource to grant. While ignoring is the concern is not viable option all
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