9. Financial soundness indicators for the big three domestic banks remained strongduring the global and European crises. Singapore banks are among the highest rated in the world,with higher capital ratios and lower leverage than peer banks. Profitability is high and diversified.Asset quality is good and NPLs are low and well provisioned (Table 5 and Figure 4).10. Stress tests suggest that banks are resilient to adverse macroeconomic scenarios. Theirhigh capitalization could offset potential losses, including from large exposures to real estate. Thescenarios described in Box 1 and Table 6 entail large declines in domestic and regional economicactivity, falling asset prices, rising interest rates, and rapidly rising unemployment. Both the bottomup (BU) and top down (TD) stress tests conducted by MAS suggest that capitalization ratios wouldstill remain above the domestic minimum regulatory capital ratio of 10 percent. Trading losseswould be limited owing to the absence of significant proprietary trading and the fact that tradingbooks mostly comprise domestic sovereign bonds.10 Credit losses, distributed between corporateloans and residential mortgages, would erode the capital base, while increased probabilities of10 Losses from sovereign exposures are less than 1 percent of RWA. Interest rate risks are negligible due to theprevalence of floating rate loans (including mortgages). SINGAPOREINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 13default (PDs) would be reflected in an increase of risk-weighted assets, magnified by the initial lowPD levels. All these factors would drive capitalization ratios down by almost one third. IMF TDsolvency stress tests broadly confirm the results obtained by MAS, with balance sheet stress testshighlighting the resilience of domestic banks even if residential loan defaults were to reach thelevels observed in the United States in the aftermath of the 2007-09 subprime crisis.11. Despite banks’ overall resilience to credit risk, country concentrations require closemonitoring. From a systemic perspective, exposures outside Singapore are heavily concentrated inthe region. MAS is fully cognizant of the growing regional linkages, follows these exposures closely,and considers that they are within safe limits. Even so, regional exposures need to be monitoredclosely in view of the possibility of a sharp or prolonged regional slowdown. Furthermore, given thelow level of NPLs, small increases in NPLs could quickly erode provision coverage.12. More generally, MAS should give more attention to onsite inspections of banks’ creditrisks. The philosophy of MAS is to place significant emphasis on holding bank managementaccountable for the quality of underwriting and credit quality. While bank management, bank riskmanagement systems, and prudent internal risk cultures are the first line of defense against weakloan and asset portfolios, strong onsite inspections are a necessary complement.13. Liquidity shortages in foreign currency could affect some banks. When consolidatedacross all currencies, the LCRs of most banks and foreign branches, calculated using the parametersrecommended in Basel III, exceed 100 percent, but the coverage for U.S. dollar exposures is lower.Stress tests suggest that if banks’ ratings were downgraded by several notches, some banks wouldfind it difficult to continue to close their U.S. dollar funding gaps using the FX swap market. Over aone-year horizon, banks could require as much as U.S. $50 billion (about one fifth of foreignreserves). Given the possibility that liquidity conditions could tighten globally once U.S. dollarinterest rates begin to increase, this illustrates the potential for pressure on Singapore’s foreignexchange position.B. Banks—Interconnectedness14. Foreign banks in Singapore mainly operate as branches, which by definition are closelyinterconnected with their much larger parent institutions. While branching facilitates an efficientallocation of capital and liquidity within the overall bank, and may contribute to stability when theparent is sound, instability in the parent may give rise to risks for the country hosting the branch.Branches pose special challenges for supervision and resolution. MAS is aware of these risks and hastaken measures to mitigate them (Box 2). MAS has also advocated in international groupings forgreater sharing of supervisory information, including on the G-SIFIs active in Singapore. SINGAPORE14 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND15. The FSAP examined whether branches pose material threats to financial stability.11 Itassessed the ability of branches to maintain sufficient assets vis-à-vis local liabilities through theAsset Maintenance Ratios (AMRs) imposed by MAS. It also assessed potential spillovers from directand indirect exposures in the domestic and cross-border interbank markets.
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