p. 160). His most persuasive example was body parts. We do not need a general social justifi cation for the rule that my kidneys belong to me. They just do, and any acceptable theory of property had better respect that fact. But it is doubtful whether this particular-ist approach can be extended to land or other external objects. The best - known attempt is that of John Locke ( [1690] 1988 , pp. 285 – 302), but, as we shall see, even Locke found it necessary to complement his theory of particular entitlements with more
general considerations of social utility.
General j ustifying a ims
The most common form of justifi catory argument is that people are better off when a given class of resources is governed by a private property regime than by any alterna-tive system. Under private property, it is said, the resources will be more wisely used, or used to satisfy a wider (and perhaps more varied) set of wants than under any alter- native system, so that the overall enjoyment that humans derive from a given stock of resources will be increased.
The most persuasive argument of this kind is sometimes referred to as “ the tragedy
of the commons ” (Hardin, 1968 ). If everyone is entitled to use a given piece of land,
then no one has much of an incentive to see that crops are planted or that the land is
not overused. Or if anyone does take on this responsibility, they themselves are likely
to bear all the costs of doing so (the costs of planting or the costs of their own self- restraint), while the benefi ts (if there are any) will accrue to all subsequent users. In
many cases, there are unlikely to be any benefi ts, since one individual ’ s planning or
restraint will be futile unless the others cooperate. Instead, under common property,
each commoner has an incentive to get as much as possible from the land as quickly
as possible, since the benefi ts of doing this are in the short term concentrated and
ensured, while the long - term benefi ts of self - restraint are uncertain and diffused.
However, if a piece of hitherto common land is divided into parcels and each parcel is
assigned to a particular individual who can control what happens there, then planning
and self - restraint will have an opportunity to assert themselves. For now, the person
who bears the cost of restraint is in a position to reap all the benefi ts, so that if people
are rational and if restraint (or some other form of forward - looking activity) is in fact
cost - effective, there will be an overall increase in the amount of utility derived.
Arguments of this sort are familiar and important, but like all utilitarian arguments,
they need to be treated with caution. In most private property systems, there are some
individuals who own little or nothing, and who are entirely at the mercy of others. So
when it is said that “ people ” are better off under private property arrangements, we
have to ask: “ Which people? Everyone? The majority? Or just a small class of owners
whose prosperity is so great as to offset the consequent immiseration of the others in
an aggregative utilitarian calculus? ”
John Locke hazarded the suggestion that everyone would be better off. Comparing
England, whose commons were swiftly being enclosed by private owners, to pre -
colonial America, where the natives continued to enjoy universal common access to
land, Locke speculated that “ a King of a large and fruitful Territory there [that is, in
America] feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day Labourer in England ” (Locke,
[1690] 1988 , p. 297). The laborer may not own anything, but his standard of living
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