There are clear parallels here with

There are clear parallels here with the ideas already considered when we briefly
discussed the views of Grey and Dales (Extract 6.1 and section 6.1.2.3 above).
Hargreaves’ point is simply a reiteration of the idea that, as lawyers, we are, in any
given situation, only interested in the specific rights which may or may not exist in
relation to a thing. In deciding whether A or B can rightfully possess Blackacre, we
do not ask ‘Who owns the land?’ but rather ‘Who has the right to possess the land?’.
A might have the fee simple which would normally carry with it the right to possess
but not if B had an unexpired term of years absolute which would give her the right.
So what implications does this have for the notion of ownership? In essence, there
are three possible responses. Grey took the view that focusing on specific rights
tended towards the very disintegration of the concept of ownership. In contrast,
Dales implicitly argued, not that ownership disintegrated, but that it multiplied with
each particular rights holder in the thing being viewed as an owner of the thing in
respect of the right (or rights) held. Hargreaves’ position is more subtle than either of
these approaches. As the above quotation makes clear, he does not suggest that the
concept of ownership has disintegrated, for he clearly regards the notion of ownership
as an important (although non-legal) concept. Later in the same article, he
similarly rejects the multiplication of ownerships approach, calling it a ‘venial
misuse of words ... to speak of ‘‘ownership’’ of an estate, of an ‘‘estate owner’’ and
the like ... [for] ... [o]ne can no more ‘‘own’’ an estate than one can ‘‘own’’ a right’.
Compelling as this argument is, it is perhaps worth noting, if only in passing, that it
is a misuse of words to which the Law of Property Act 1925 itself subscribes,
repeatedly using the phrase ‘estate owner’ which it defines, not surprisingly, as ‘the
owner of a legal estate’ (section 205(1)(v)).