perhaps strengthening themexcessively, if the actual losses caused by the breach are only v −u. On the otherhand, if v − u actually understates the buyer’s losses—say, because some of thebenefits from performance are hard to measure, and have therefore been omittedfrom the court’s measure of v—then increasing the remedy to f could improvethe seller’s incentives in some respects (see Muris, 1983, for a discussion of botheffects). Even then, much would depend on the exact nature of the benefits thatwere excluded, as was also discussed in preceding subsections. For example, ifbuyers differ in the extent to which they would realize certain benefits, excludingthose benefits from the damage measure could reduce any cross-subsidizationthat might otherwise result (see §5.2.8).
đang được dịch, vui lòng đợi..