movements and exchanges in their co

movements and exchanges in their communities. Since they define the “border” as their social group, they assert their right to determine and engage inthe passage of goods and people through their midst. No one should pass through their communities without their cooperation and mediation, and nothing should be carried from one side of their transnational territory to the other without their express involvement and agreement. This in itself is not unique. Small independent communities throughout Africa have used roadblocks and tolls to control traffic through their towns since precolonial times (Clapperton 1829; Hallen 1965) and continue to do so today. The unique aspect is that this community spans the juncture of two nation-states, so that their declaration of authority over who and what passes through them brings them into direct conflict with the authority of those states.
Many tensions between border residents and the states revolve around the central cross-bor- der road that serves as the conduit of transborder traffic. As the passageway for trade movements that brings economic opportunity to the Shabe border region, the main cross-border road is viewed as a route away from rural underdevelopment and toward urban “modernity.” ' But this is not so in a literal sense, for it is not so much that the road is the border residents’ pathway to the city—although many young men and women do leave the border region for cities throughout West Africa—as that it is the city’spathway to the border. It is the source of economic expectation, the future highway to wealth and opportunity, in that it holds all hope for increased transborder trade traffic through their region, bringing with it greater economic opportunity and development. Indeed, popular anitudes in the borderland hold that the current economic recession would be instantly reversed if only the road were paved and a bridge built across the Okpara. Border residents hold both the Nigerian and Béninois states responsible for failing to construct this interstate-highway answer to the peripheral borderland’s poverty. Consequently, tensions between the “border” and the Nigerian and Béninois states are played out partly through contested authorities and competing controls over the flow of commodities and persons through the region. By exacting their own controls on goods and people who cross the border within their transnational territory, border residents defiantly assert their independence from state structures while simu Itaneously establishing their separateness from the nonlocal, often urban, transborder traders.
Igor Kopytoff’s work on the biographies of things (1 986) is useful for understanding the relationship between Shabe border residents and the goods passing through their region. Kopytoff argues that the way in which societies construct individuals is analogous to the way in which they construct things, and that the nature of social identities tends to mirror the nature of classified commodities in any society. Commodities in the borderland are characterized by ambiguous values because they are being exchanged between two different national economic systems, often illegally. Their exchange involves different currencies and their value in the border region is always subject to debate, depending on their point of origin, their destination, and the parties involved, as they have differing values for customs guards, traders, and local residents. Commodities that move across the border are powerful and form the center of political struggles between social groups precisely because they are bridging two national economies.
Likewise, border residents draw their economic and political power from their positions in the interstices of the borderland. They bridge two national economies and two political systems and manipulate their marginal situation to their own economic advantage by wedging them- selves between traders and the state. By asserting their right to control all goods and movement through their territory, they construct their political power around their claim to bethe “border.” In other words, they emphasize their “deep placement” and “deep territorialization” in the border region as justification for their mandatory political and economic involvement in transborder trade. Political negotiations and relations between border residents, traders, and customs guards revolve around the transborder exchange of commodities and determine the ever-changing values of such commodities (e.g., Appadurai 1 986). This brings us to the very

Kết quả (Việt) 1:

phong trào và trao đổi trong các cộng đồng. Kể từ khi họ xác định "biên giới" là nhóm xã hội của họ, họ khẳng định quyền của mình để xác định và tham gia trong đoạn văn của hàng hoá và mọi người thông qua giữa họ. Không ai nên đi qua cộng đồng của họ mà không có sự hợp tác và hòa giải của họ, và không có gì nên được thực hiện từ một bên của lãnh thổ xuyên quốc gia của họ để khác mà không có sự tham gia nhận và thỏa thuận của họ. Điều này tự nó không phải là duy nhất. Nhỏ độc lập cộng đồng trên toàn châu Phi đã sử dụng các rào chắn và lệ phí cầu đường để kiểm soát lưu lượng truy cập thông qua các thị trấn của họ từ thời tiền (Clapperton 1829; Hall 1965) và tiếp tục làm như vậy ngày hôm nay. Các khía cạnh độc đáo là cộng đồng này kéo dài thời điểm của hai quốc, do đó của tuyên bố của các cơ quan trên những người và những gì đi qua chúng mang lại cho họ vào cuộc xung đột trực tiếp với các cơ quan của những tiểu bang.Many tensions between border residents and the states revolve around the central cross-bor- der road that serves as the conduit of transborder traffic. As the passageway for trade movements that brings economic opportunity to the Shabe border region, the main cross-border road is viewed as a route away from rural underdevelopment and toward urban “modernity.” ' But this is not so in a literal sense, for it is not so much that the road is the border residents’ pathway to the city—although many young men and women do leave the border region for cities throughout West Africa—as that it is the city’spathway to the border. It is the source of economic expectation, the future highway to wealth and opportunity, in that it holds all hope for increased transborder trade traffic through their region, bringing with it greater economic opportunity and development. Indeed, popular anitudes in the borderland hold that the current economic recession would be instantly reversed if only the road were paved and a bridge built across the Okpara. Border residents hold both the Nigerian and Béninois states responsible for failing to construct this interstate-highway answer to the peripheral borderland’s poverty. Consequently, tensions between the “border” and the Nigerian and Béninois states are played out partly through contested authorities and competing controls over the flow of commodities and persons through the region. By exacting their own controls on goods and people who cross the border within their transnational territory, border residents defiantly assert their independence from state structures while simu Itaneously establishing their separateness from the nonlocal, often urban, transborder traders.Igor Kopytoff’s work on the biographies of things (1 986) is useful for understanding the relationship between Shabe border residents and the goods passing through their region. Kopytoff argues that the way in which societies construct individuals is analogous to the way in which they construct things, and that the nature of social identities tends to mirror the nature of classified commodities in any society. Commodities in the borderland are characterized by ambiguous values because they are being exchanged between two different national economic systems, often illegally. Their exchange involves different currencies and their value in the border region is always subject to debate, depending on their point of origin, their destination, and the parties involved, as they have differing values for customs guards, traders, and local residents. Commodities that move across the border are powerful and form the center of political struggles between social groups precisely because they are bridging two national economies.Likewise, border residents draw their economic and political power from their positions in the interstices of the borderland. They bridge two national economies and two political systems and manipulate their marginal situation to their own economic advantage by wedging them- selves between traders and the state. By asserting their right to control all goods and movement through their territory, they construct their political power around their claim to bethe “border.” In other words, they emphasize their “deep placement” and “deep territorialization” in the border region as justification for their mandatory political and economic involvement in transborder trade. Political negotiations and relations between border residents, traders, and customs guards revolve around the transborder exchange of commodities and determine the ever-changing values of such commodities (e.g., Appadurai 1 986). This brings us to the very