Dividend smoothing remains a puzzle

Dividend smoothing remains a puzzle for Önancial economists. We present a model in
which smoothing of dividends arises as an equilibrium outcome. A manager who cares
about the intrinsic value of the Örm as well as its current stock price has to decide
how to allocate earnings between investments and dividends. Since the stock price is
determined by uninformed investors, the manager has an incentive to ináate dividends
and lower investment relative to the Örst best. We show that there is a continuum of
equilibria in which the dividend is constant for a range of realized earnings. Compared
to the standard separating equilibrium, this partial pooling induces higher Örm value,
lower average dividends, and lower deviation from the Örst-best investment. We argue
that the previous yearís dividend can serve as a ìfocal point,îallowing managers and
investors to coordinate on just one in a continuum of equilibria. We conclude that
dividend smoothing provides a partial remedy to underinvestment resulting from
information asymmetries. We also o§er several new testable predictions relating
dividend smoothing to investorsímix, managerial incentives, and investment.

Kết quả (Hmong) 1:

Dividend smoothing tshua ib puzzle rau Önancial economists. Tuaj ib tug qauv rau pebtwg smoothing ntawm dividends haum raws li ib lub equilibrium lawm. Ib tug neeg saib xyuas uas zovhais txog cov nqi ntawm cov Örm thiab raws li nws npaj tam sim no nqe intrinsic tau txiav txim rauyuav ua li cas rau allocate koj tau txais nyiaj ntawm kev nqis peev uas thiab dividends. Vim tus nqi npajmuab raws uninformed investors, tus neeg saib xyuas muaj kev kub siab rau ináate dividendsthiab txo peev ntu lub Örst zoo tshaj plaws. Peb pom tias yog ib pab uasequilibria uas cov dividend yog qhov kev khwv yees li pom tau hais khwv nyiaj. Pivrau tus txheej txheem nkauj nraug equilibrium, no ib nrab pooling induces ntau Örm nqi,sab nruab nrab dividends, thiab txo cov sib txawv ntawm tus Örst-zoo peev. Peb sib ceguas dhau los yearís dividend tswj tau ib ìfocal taw tes, îallowing tswj thiabinvestors ua hauj lwm rau cia ib tug rau ib pab ntawm equilibria. Peb xaus ntawddividend smoothing muab ib feem khwv rau underinvestment los ntawmlus asymmetries. Peb kuj o§er ntau tshiab testable txoj hau kev yuav hais txogdividend smoothing, investorsímix, managerial incentives, thiab peev.

Kết quả (Hmong) 2:

Nqi smoothing tseem yog ib tug puzzle rau Önancial economists. Peb muaj ib cov qauv nyob rau hauv
uas smoothing ntawm dividends tshwm sim raws li ib tug equilibrium tshwm sim. Ib tug neeg saib xyuas uas zov
txog lub tseem ceeb muaj nuj nqis ntawm cov ORM raws li nws tam sim no Tshuag nqi tau txiav txim
yuav ua li cas faib cov nyiaj tau ntawm kev nqis peev uas thiab dividends. Txij li thaum lub Tshuag nqi yog
txiav txim los ntawm uninformed tub ua lag luam, tus neeg saib xyuas muaj kev kub siab rau ináate dividends
thiab qis peev txheeb ze mus rau lub Örst zoo tshaj plaws. Peb qhia hais tias muaj yog ib tug pab ntawm
equilibria nyob rau hauv uas lub nqi yog qhov rau ib tug ntau ntawm pom tau hais cov nyiaj tau. Piv
rau tus qauv nkauj nraug equilibrium, qhov no ib nrab pooling induces siab ORM nqi,
nqi nruab nrab dividends, thiab txo txawv los ntawm cov Örst-zoo peev. Peb sib cav
hais tias lub yav dhau los yearís nqi yuav pab tau raws li ib tug ìfocal point, îallowing managers thiab
tub ua lag luam los saib rau ib tug nyob rau hauv ib tug pab ntawm equilibria. Peb xaus hais tias
tawn smoothing muab ib tug ib nrab khwv rau underinvestment uas ua los ntawm
cov lus qhia asymmetries. Peb kuj o§er ob peb tshiab testable txoj hau kev hais txog
nqi smoothing rau investorsímix, managerial incentives, thiab peev.