The present research on auditorecli

The present research on auditoreclient identification is important for at least two reasons. First, while previous studies examine the effects of such identification on auditor objectivity (Bamber & Iyer, 2002, 2007; Stefaniak, Houston, & Cornell, 2012), there is no evidence that auditors' client identification is a problemfor non-Big 4 auditors. Previous research appears to assume that auditors' identification with their clients is a problem that exists only when audit clients are large, making research on non-Big 4 auditors less relevant.
We examine themerits of such an assumption since there are reasons to suspect that non-Big 4 auditors also identify with their clients. The organizational cultures of non-Big 4 firms are suggested to be relatively less competitive (Anderson-Gough, Grey, & Robson, 2001; Otley & Pierce,1996b), providing the potential for stronger relationshipswith clients than in Big 4 firms
with their higher employee turnover rates (Herbohn, 2004). If the employee turnover is lower in non-Big 4 firms, auditors have more opportunities to develop close client relationships and this may impair auditor objectivity. Second, studies of the effect of client identification on RAQ acts connect the research on auditor objectivity with previous studies of TBP and audit quality, developing a more comprehensive view of the causes of quality problems in auditing. Since research indicates that non-Big 4 firms conduct lower-quality audits than do Big 4 firms (e.g., Francis, 2004; Sundgren, 2009), there are reasons to believe that the threat to objectivity from RAQ acts may be serious in non-Big 4 firms.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section we review the literature and present the hy- potheses.We then outline the researchmethod and sample selection. This is followed by the findings, and the discussion and conclusions end the paper.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1. Auditoreclient identification and auditors' client acquiescence
Previous research has focused mostly on financial incentives (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2008; Hackenbrack & Nelson, 1996; Haynes, Jenkins, & Nutt, 1998; Hollingsworth & Li, 2012; Kadous, Kennedy, & Peecher, 2003; Mayhew, Schatzberg, & Sevcik, 2001; Salterio, 1996), paying little attention to the bonds caused by social forces such as cognitive-based per- sonal relationships with clients. Social identity theory offers a theoretical framework for examining non-financial dependence, claiming that individuals' social identity is the result of a self-categorization process. Individuals group themselves with others and internalize traits that they perceive as typical of the group (van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, De Cremer, & Hogg, 2004). When people develop a social identity, they classify themselves according to occupation, organization, family, nationality, or age, and it is possible to have many such identities simultaneously (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Accounting firm alumni (Iyer, Bamber, & Barefield, 1997) and auditors (Bamber & Iyer, 2002, 2007) are examples of social identities.
Social identities govern how people think and act, increasing the likelihood of a person internalizing a group's norms and values (Lembke &Wilson, 1998). Defining the self in collective terms leads to experience of collective interest as self-interest (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; Hogg & Terry, 2000; van
Knippenberg, 2000). Therefore, an auditor identifying with a client is inclined to act in the interest of that client. Confirm-ing these findings, Bamber and Iyer (2007) found that auditors identifying with their clients tend to acquiesce to the client's preferred treatment, and Stefaniak et al. (2012) found further evidence of this effect. This suggests that these auditors attain a client-inspired perception of the client's internal control and accounting (Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Wan-Huggins, Riordan, & Griffeth, 1998). These studies examined auditors in Big 4 firms who typically have large clients with whom auditors may be likely to identify.
The important differences between Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms provide the motivation for the present study. Big 4 firms need to protect their reputation (Sundgren, 2009) and are therefore suggested to be less likely to compromise their inde-pendence than are their smaller competitors. Moreover, audit firm size is used as a proxy for audit quality (e.g., DeAngelo, 1981), and larger audit firms have better training programs, develop standardized audit methods and have better audit programs (Blokdijk, Drieenhuizen, Simunic, & Stein, 2006). Larger audit firms usually deal with larger clients froma variety of industries, which enhances their auditors' skills (O'Keefe &Westort, 1992). All in all, these arguments suggest that Big 4 firms conduct higher-quality audits than do non-Big 4 firms, and empirical evidence supports this contention (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; Chen, Lin, & Zhou, 2005; Zhou & Elder, 2008).
The difference in market position between Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms is manifested by the discussion of inappropriate market dominance that has occurred in Europe and elsewhere. The House of Lords in Great Britain issued a call for evidence regarding the consequences of the Big 4 market concentration (House of Lords, 2010). Their concern was the extent to which adverse effects on audit quality could result from lack of competition. The European Commission has expressed similarconcerns (European Commission, 2010). However, there is no empirical support for such a concern. Instead, Francis, Michas, and Seavey (2013) found that the Big 4 market share has a positive impact on audit quality as long as themarket is evenly split between the Big 4 firms. This seems to further support the contention that audit firms with weak market positions have relatively more problems achieving high audit quality.
In non-Big 4 firms, the culture is less competitive, the auditors tend to feel more job satisfaction and like their workingconditions better than in Big 4 firms (Patten, 1995). Individuals who place more emphasis on prestige and less on work-life balance are more likely to fitinatBig4 firms (Bagley, Dalton, & Ortegren, 2012). This situation provides good opportunities in non-Big 4 firms for long relationships with clients, a factor that in itself is fertile soil for strong client relationships and may contribute to auditors' development of client identification and impaired objectivity. Furthermore, previous evidence indicates that clients’ bargaining power is an important factor affecting auditors’ reporting decisions (Lai, 2013). Because non-Big 4 firms are smaller than the Big 4 firms, clients are more likely to exert influence on the non- Big 4 firms, and non-Big 4 auditors are less able to withstand client pressure than are Big 4 auditors (Boone, Khurana, & Raman, 2010; Lai, 2013).
Previous research on financial dependence has measured client importance as the proportion of client non-audit service fees, audit fees, or total fees to the total audit office revenue (Hollingsworth & Li, 2012), which means that small clients may be important for small audit firms. Consequently, the fact that non-Big 4 firms have smaller average clients does not necessarily mean that the clients are perceived as less important to the auditor. For these reasons, we expected to find that auditors in non-Big 4 firms identify with their clients to an extent comparable to that previously found for Big 4 auditors, and that the non-Big 4 auditors would be likely to acquiesce to client-preferred accounting positions. We state the hypothesis as follows:
H1 Non-Big 4 auditors' acquiescence to client-preferred treatment increases with increasing client identification.

Kết quả (Việt) 1:

Nghiên cứu hiện nay trên auditoreclient identification là quan trọng vì hai lý do. Đầu tiên, trong khi nghiên cứu trước đây kiểm tra những ảnh hưởng của identification như vậy khách quan kiểm toán (Bamber & Iyer, 2002, 2007; Stefaniak, Houston, & Cornell, 2012), có là không có bằng chứng rằng kiểm toán viên khách hàng identification là một kiểm toán viên phòng không - Big 4 problemfor. Nghiên cứu trước đây xuất hiện để giả định rằng kiểm toán viên identification với khách hàng của họ là một vấn đề tồn tại chỉ khi khách hàng kiểm toán được lớn, làm nghiên cứu trên không - Big 4 kiểm toán viên ít có liên quan.Chúng tôi kiểm tra themerits của một giả định như vậy kể từ khi có lý do để nghi ngờ rằng phòng không - Big 4 kiểm toán viên cũng xác định với khách hàng của họ. Các nền văn hóa tổ chức của phòng không - Big 4 phong được đề nghị để là tương đối ít cạnh tranh (Anderson-Gough, xám, & Robson, năm 2001; Otley & Pierce, 1996b), cung cấp tiềm năng cho khách hàng relationshipswith mạnh hơn trong Big 4 phongvới doanh thu nhân viên cao của tỷ giá (Herbohn, 2004). Nếu doanh thu nhân viên là thấp hơn trong không - Big 4 phong, kiểm toán viên có nhiều cơ hội để phát triển mối quan hệ khách hàng gần và điều này có thể làm giảm tính khách quan kiểm toán. Thứ hai, nghiên cứu về hiệu quả của khách hàng identification trên RAQ hành vi kết nối nghiên cứu về kiểm toán viên khách quan với các nghiên cứu trước đây của TBP và kiểm định chất lượng, phát triển một cái nhìn toàn diện hơn của những nguyên nhân của vấn đề chất lượng trong kiểm toán. Kể từ khi nghiên cứu chỉ ra rằng phòng không - Big 4 phong tiến hành kiểm tra chất lượng thấp hơn so với Big 4 phong (ví dụ như, Francis, năm 2004; Sundgren, 2009), có những lý do để tin rằng mối đe dọa cho khách quan từ RAQ hành vi có thể nghiêm trọng trong không - Big 4 phong.Phần còn lại của giấy có cấu trúc như sau: trong phần tiếp theo chúng tôi xem xét các tài liệu và trình bày hy-potheses. Sau đó chúng tôi phác thảo sự lựa chọn researchmethod và mẫu. Điều này được theo sau bởi các findings, và các cuộc thảo luận và kết luận chỉ giấy.2. tài liệu xem xét và giả thuyết phát triển2.1. Auditoreclient identification và kiểm toán viên khách hàng acquiescencePrevious research has focused mostly on financial incentives (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2008; Hackenbrack & Nelson, 1996; Haynes, Jenkins, & Nutt, 1998; Hollingsworth & Li, 2012; Kadous, Kennedy, & Peecher, 2003; Mayhew, Schatzberg, & Sevcik, 2001; Salterio, 1996), paying little attention to the bonds caused by social forces such as cognitive-based per- sonal relationships with clients. Social identity theory offers a theoretical framework for examining non-financial dependence, claiming that individuals' social identity is the result of a self-categorization process. Individuals group themselves with others and internalize traits that they perceive as typical of the group (van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, De Cremer, & Hogg, 2004). When people develop a social identity, they classify themselves according to occupation, organization, family, nationality, or age, and it is possible to have many such identities simultaneously (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Accounting firm alumni (Iyer, Bamber, & Barefield, 1997) and auditors (Bamber & Iyer, 2002, 2007) are examples of social identities.Social identities govern how people think and act, increasing the likelihood of a person internalizing a group's norms and values (Lembke &Wilson, 1998). Defining the self in collective terms leads to experience of collective interest as self-interest (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; Hogg & Terry, 2000; vanKnippenberg, 2000). Therefore, an auditor identifying with a client is inclined to act in the interest of that client. Confirm-ing these findings, Bamber and Iyer (2007) found that auditors identifying with their clients tend to acquiesce to the client's preferred treatment, and Stefaniak et al. (2012) found further evidence of this effect. This suggests that these auditors attain a client-inspired perception of the client's internal control and accounting (Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Wan-Huggins, Riordan, & Griffeth, 1998). These studies examined auditors in Big 4 firms who typically have large clients with whom auditors may be likely to identify.The important differences between Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms provide the motivation for the present study. Big 4 firms need to protect their reputation (Sundgren, 2009) and are therefore suggested to be less likely to compromise their inde-pendence than are their smaller competitors. Moreover, audit firm size is used as a proxy for audit quality (e.g., DeAngelo, 1981), and larger audit firms have better training programs, develop standardized audit methods and have better audit programs (Blokdijk, Drieenhuizen, Simunic, & Stein, 2006). Larger audit firms usually deal with larger clients froma variety of industries, which enhances their auditors' skills (O'Keefe &Westort, 1992). All in all, these arguments suggest that Big 4 firms conduct higher-quality audits than do non-Big 4 firms, and empirical evidence supports this contention (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; Chen, Lin, & Zhou, 2005; Zhou & Elder, 2008).The difference in market position between Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms is manifested by the discussion of inappropriate market dominance that has occurred in Europe and elsewhere. The House of Lords in Great Britain issued a call for evidence regarding the consequences of the Big 4 market concentration (House of Lords, 2010). Their concern was the extent to which adverse effects on audit quality could result from lack of competition. The European Commission has expressed similarconcerns (European Commission, 2010). However, there is no empirical support for such a concern. Instead, Francis, Michas, and Seavey (2013) found that the Big 4 market share has a positive impact on audit quality as long as themarket is evenly split between the Big 4 firms. This seems to further support the contention that audit firms with weak market positions have relatively more problems achieving high audit quality.
In non-Big 4 firms, the culture is less competitive, the auditors tend to feel more job satisfaction and like their workingconditions better than in Big 4 firms (Patten, 1995). Individuals who place more emphasis on prestige and less on work-life balance are more likely to fitinatBig4 firms (Bagley, Dalton, & Ortegren, 2012). This situation provides good opportunities in non-Big 4 firms for long relationships with clients, a factor that in itself is fertile soil for strong client relationships and may contribute to auditors' development of client identification and impaired objectivity. Furthermore, previous evidence indicates that clients’ bargaining power is an important factor affecting auditors’ reporting decisions (Lai, 2013). Because non-Big 4 firms are smaller than the Big 4 firms, clients are more likely to exert influence on the non- Big 4 firms, and non-Big 4 auditors are less able to withstand client pressure than are Big 4 auditors (Boone, Khurana, & Raman, 2010; Lai, 2013).
Previous research on financial dependence has measured client importance as the proportion of client non-audit service fees, audit fees, or total fees to the total audit office revenue (Hollingsworth & Li, 2012), which means that small clients may be important for small audit firms. Consequently, the fact that non-Big 4 firms have smaller average clients does not necessarily mean that the clients are perceived as less important to the auditor. For these reasons, we expected to find that auditors in non-Big 4 firms identify with their clients to an extent comparable to that previously found for Big 4 auditors, and that the non-Big 4 auditors would be likely to acquiesce to client-preferred accounting positions. We state the hypothesis as follows:
H1 Non-Big 4 auditors' acquiescence to client-preferred treatment increases with increasing client identification.