- Văn bản
- Lịch sử
III. HypothesesBased on the aforeme
III. Hypotheses
Based on the aforementioned agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama 1980 and Fama and Jensen 1983), we are interested in examining how corporate governance affects firm performance and valuation in China. We use ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q as our dependent variables in our regression analyses because ROA and ROE are commonly used measures for operating performance and Tobin’s Q is the widely used proxy for firm valuation in prior research. The independent variables include single-dimension measures of corporate governance, such as ownership structure and the characteristics of the board, and a multiple-dimension measurement of corporate governance as a separate approach.
Agency theory suggests that a company is better governed when it has concentrated ownership. Large shareholders have incentives and ability to monitor the management of the company more effectively. Some empirical findings support this theory. Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) find the ownership concentration is positively related to firms’ financial performance in Japan. Joh (2003) finds low ownership concentration is related to low firm profitability for Korean firms. These findings indicate that there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance and firm value. Hence, our first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: Firms with higher ownership concentration have better firm performance and higher firm value.
Besides ownership concentration, prior literature suggests the identity of the largest owner also affects firms’ profitability. In particular, the presence of larger institutional shareholders and foreign investors is associated with higher profitability, and large state ownership is associated with lower profitability. Xu and Wang (1999) find the presence of large institutional investors is positively associated with profitability. Bai et al. (2004) find the largest shareholder being the government has a negative impact on market valuation. Patibandla (2006) finds that foreign investors have a larger positive effect on firms’ profitability than do government-owned local financial institutions. These results indicate that the largest shareholder ’s identity could affect the performance of a firm and its market value. Hence, our second, third, and forth hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 2: Firms with an institutional investor being the largest shareholder have better firm performance and higher firm value.
Hypothesis 3: Firms with a foreign investor being the largest shareholder have better firm performance and higher firm value.
Hypothesis 4: Firms with the state being the largest shareholder have lower firm performance and firm value.
Agency theory suggests the role of the board of directors is to monitor the managers and assure the company is operated in the shareholders’ best interest. Through effective monitoring, the presence of the board of directors is deemed to reduce agency costs. A typical board includes both inside and outside directors. It is generally believed that outside directors are elected because they provide more independent judgments on the firm’s business decisions than inside directors. Bonn (2004) finds the portion of outside directors has a positive impact on ROE. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that the appointment of the additional outside director increases firm value. These results indicate
that the portion of independent directors could affect operating performance and firm value. Hence, our fifth hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 5: Firms with higher proportion of independent directors on the board have better firm performance and higher firm value.
In addition to the independent directors on the board, it is widely believed that the CEO being the chairman of the board of directors could compromise the independence and the effectiveness of its monitoring function. Some studies on dual leadership support this argument. Both Yermack (1996) and Bai et al. (2004) find that firms are more valuable when the CEO and the chairman of the board are separate. These results indicate that dual leadership might affect firm performance and firm value. Hence, our sixth hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 6: Firms with a segregation of CEO and Chairman of board of directors have better firm performance and higher firm value.
Overall, agency theory suggests that firms with better corporate governance standards perform better because of lower agency costs and more effective monitoring mechanisms. This prediction is supported by empirical studies. Brown and Caylor (2006a;
2006b) find that better-governed U.S. firms have higher ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that corporate governance has a substantial positive impact on U.S. firms’ value. In addition, Gompers et al. (2003) find that better-governed US firms during the 1990s have higher ROE and Tobin’s Q. These results indicate that good overall corporate governance is associated with better operating performance and higher firm value. Hence, our seventh and most important hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 7: Firms with better overall corporate governance have better firm performance and higher firm value.
IV. Research Design
In this paper, we examine companies listed on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the period of 2001 to 2004. The data on corporate governance measures are collected or calculated from China Listed Firm Corporate Governance Research Database (CLFCG). The data on firms’ performance measures, including ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q, are obtained or derived by using the data from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database.
Measuring corporate governance is difficult because it cannot be directly observed and it usually involves multiple dimensions. While there is no consensus on how corporate governance can be measured, prior literature suggests several different ways to proxy for corporate governance. For instance, Bai et al. (2004) use both internal single dimensions, such as ownership structure, executive compensation, board of directors and financial disclosure, and external single dimensions, such as external takeover market, legal infrastructure, and product market competition. Gompers et al. (2003) create a 24-factor G-index to measure corporate governance and Brown and Caylor (2006a; 2006b) use 51 corporate governance provisions to create a broader measure. Other empirical studies examine the impact of a single dimension of corporate governance, such as ownership concentration and the separation of CEO and the chairman of the board. In this study, we use both approaches to measure corporate governance.
4.1 Single-Dimension Corporate Governance Measures
To test Hypotheses 1 through 6, we estimate the following equation based on the framework provided by Bai et al. (2003).
ROA/ROE/Tobin’s Q = α0 + α1*TOP1 + α2*TOP2_10 + α3*INSTITUTION + α4*FOREIGN + α5*STATE + α6*INDEPENDENT + α7*DUAL + α8* LASSETS + α9* CSRATIO + α10* ISRATIO + α11* LEVERAGE + ε (1)
Where ROA = return on asset, net income divided by total assets; ROE = return on equity, net income divided by equity; Tobin’s Q = measure of firm valuation3;
TOP1 = percentage of the shares owned by the largest shareholder;
TOP2_10 = log of the sum of squares of the percent ownership by the second to the tenth largest shareholders;
INSTITUTION = 1 if the largest shareholder is an institutional investor and 0 otherwise;
FOREIGN = 1 if the largest shareholder is a foreign investor and 0 otherwise; STATE = 1 if the largest shareholder is the State and 0 otherwise;
INDEPENDENT = percentage of independent directors serving on the board; DUAL = 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board of directors are separate and
0 otherwise;
LASSETS = log of total assets;
CSRATIO = capital (book value of total tangible assets) to sales ratio; ISRATIO = operating income to sales ratio;
LEVERAGE = total debt to total assets ratio; and
ε = the error term.
We expect a positive sign for the coefficient of TOP1, a measure of ownership concentration, since earlier studies (e.g., Gedajlovic and Shapiro 2002; Joh 2003) find that ownership concentration is positively associated with firm performance and valuation. The coefficient of TOP2_10 is expected to be positive since high concentration of non-controlling shareholders has a positive impact on performance and valuation as evidenced by Bai et al. (2003).
Ownership variables, INSTITUTION, FOREIGN, and STATE, are dummy
variables that are coded as one if the largest shareholder is institutional investors, foreign
3 We follow Chung and Pruitt (1994) and Bai et al. (2004) where Tobin’s Q is calculated using Tobin’s Q = (MVCS+BVPS+BVLTD+BVINV+BVCL-BVCA)/BVTA, where MVCS = market value of the common stock; BVPS = book value of the preferred stock; BVLTD = book value of the long term debt; BVINV = book value of the inventory; BVCL = book value of the current liabilities; BVCA = book value of the current assets; and BVTA = book value of the total assets. All variables are measured using year-end values).
investors, or the local government, respectively, and zero otherwise. The coefficients of INSTITUTION and FOREIGN ownership variables are expected to be positive while the coefficient of STATE ownership is expected to be negative as predicted in Hypotheses 2 through 4. We expect the coefficient of INDEPENDENT to be positive to validate Hypothesis 5. To test Hypothesis 6, the dummy variable, DUAL, indicates whether the CEO and the chairman of the board of directors are separate. The coefficient of DUAL is expected to be positive if separate leadership is positively associated with performance as hypothesized. Based on prior literature (Bai et al. 2004; Joh 2003; Cho 1998), we include four control variables: LASSETS is a proxy for firm size; CSRATIO is a proxy
Based on the aforementioned agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama 1980 and Fama and Jensen 1983), we are interested in examining how corporate governance affects firm performance and valuation in China. We use ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q as our dependent variables in our regression analyses because ROA and ROE are commonly used measures for operating performance and Tobin’s Q is the widely used proxy for firm valuation in prior research. The independent variables include single-dimension measures of corporate governance, such as ownership structure and the characteristics of the board, and a multiple-dimension measurement of corporate governance as a separate approach.
Agency theory suggests that a company is better governed when it has concentrated ownership. Large shareholders have incentives and ability to monitor the management of the company more effectively. Some empirical findings support this theory. Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) find the ownership concentration is positively related to firms’ financial performance in Japan. Joh (2003) finds low ownership concentration is related to low firm profitability for Korean firms. These findings indicate that there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance and firm value. Hence, our first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: Firms with higher ownership concentration have better firm performance and higher firm value.
Besides ownership concentration, prior literature suggests the identity of the largest owner also affects firms’ profitability. In particular, the presence of larger institutional shareholders and foreign investors is associated with higher profitability, and large state ownership is associated with lower profitability. Xu and Wang (1999) find the presence of large institutional investors is positively associated with profitability. Bai et al. (2004) find the largest shareholder being the government has a negative impact on market valuation. Patibandla (2006) finds that foreign investors have a larger positive effect on firms’ profitability than do government-owned local financial institutions. These results indicate that the largest shareholder ’s identity could affect the performance of a firm and its market value. Hence, our second, third, and forth hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 2: Firms with an institutional investor being the largest shareholder have better firm performance and higher firm value.
Hypothesis 3: Firms with a foreign investor being the largest shareholder have better firm performance and higher firm value.
Hypothesis 4: Firms with the state being the largest shareholder have lower firm performance and firm value.
Agency theory suggests the role of the board of directors is to monitor the managers and assure the company is operated in the shareholders’ best interest. Through effective monitoring, the presence of the board of directors is deemed to reduce agency costs. A typical board includes both inside and outside directors. It is generally believed that outside directors are elected because they provide more independent judgments on the firm’s business decisions than inside directors. Bonn (2004) finds the portion of outside directors has a positive impact on ROE. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that the appointment of the additional outside director increases firm value. These results indicate
that the portion of independent directors could affect operating performance and firm value. Hence, our fifth hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 5: Firms with higher proportion of independent directors on the board have better firm performance and higher firm value.
In addition to the independent directors on the board, it is widely believed that the CEO being the chairman of the board of directors could compromise the independence and the effectiveness of its monitoring function. Some studies on dual leadership support this argument. Both Yermack (1996) and Bai et al. (2004) find that firms are more valuable when the CEO and the chairman of the board are separate. These results indicate that dual leadership might affect firm performance and firm value. Hence, our sixth hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 6: Firms with a segregation of CEO and Chairman of board of directors have better firm performance and higher firm value.
Overall, agency theory suggests that firms with better corporate governance standards perform better because of lower agency costs and more effective monitoring mechanisms. This prediction is supported by empirical studies. Brown and Caylor (2006a;
2006b) find that better-governed U.S. firms have higher ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that corporate governance has a substantial positive impact on U.S. firms’ value. In addition, Gompers et al. (2003) find that better-governed US firms during the 1990s have higher ROE and Tobin’s Q. These results indicate that good overall corporate governance is associated with better operating performance and higher firm value. Hence, our seventh and most important hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 7: Firms with better overall corporate governance have better firm performance and higher firm value.
IV. Research Design
In this paper, we examine companies listed on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the period of 2001 to 2004. The data on corporate governance measures are collected or calculated from China Listed Firm Corporate Governance Research Database (CLFCG). The data on firms’ performance measures, including ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q, are obtained or derived by using the data from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database.
Measuring corporate governance is difficult because it cannot be directly observed and it usually involves multiple dimensions. While there is no consensus on how corporate governance can be measured, prior literature suggests several different ways to proxy for corporate governance. For instance, Bai et al. (2004) use both internal single dimensions, such as ownership structure, executive compensation, board of directors and financial disclosure, and external single dimensions, such as external takeover market, legal infrastructure, and product market competition. Gompers et al. (2003) create a 24-factor G-index to measure corporate governance and Brown and Caylor (2006a; 2006b) use 51 corporate governance provisions to create a broader measure. Other empirical studies examine the impact of a single dimension of corporate governance, such as ownership concentration and the separation of CEO and the chairman of the board. In this study, we use both approaches to measure corporate governance.
4.1 Single-Dimension Corporate Governance Measures
To test Hypotheses 1 through 6, we estimate the following equation based on the framework provided by Bai et al. (2003).
ROA/ROE/Tobin’s Q = α0 + α1*TOP1 + α2*TOP2_10 + α3*INSTITUTION + α4*FOREIGN + α5*STATE + α6*INDEPENDENT + α7*DUAL + α8* LASSETS + α9* CSRATIO + α10* ISRATIO + α11* LEVERAGE + ε (1)
Where ROA = return on asset, net income divided by total assets; ROE = return on equity, net income divided by equity; Tobin’s Q = measure of firm valuation3;
TOP1 = percentage of the shares owned by the largest shareholder;
TOP2_10 = log of the sum of squares of the percent ownership by the second to the tenth largest shareholders;
INSTITUTION = 1 if the largest shareholder is an institutional investor and 0 otherwise;
FOREIGN = 1 if the largest shareholder is a foreign investor and 0 otherwise; STATE = 1 if the largest shareholder is the State and 0 otherwise;
INDEPENDENT = percentage of independent directors serving on the board; DUAL = 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board of directors are separate and
0 otherwise;
LASSETS = log of total assets;
CSRATIO = capital (book value of total tangible assets) to sales ratio; ISRATIO = operating income to sales ratio;
LEVERAGE = total debt to total assets ratio; and
ε = the error term.
We expect a positive sign for the coefficient of TOP1, a measure of ownership concentration, since earlier studies (e.g., Gedajlovic and Shapiro 2002; Joh 2003) find that ownership concentration is positively associated with firm performance and valuation. The coefficient of TOP2_10 is expected to be positive since high concentration of non-controlling shareholders has a positive impact on performance and valuation as evidenced by Bai et al. (2003).
Ownership variables, INSTITUTION, FOREIGN, and STATE, are dummy
variables that are coded as one if the largest shareholder is institutional investors, foreign
3 We follow Chung and Pruitt (1994) and Bai et al. (2004) where Tobin’s Q is calculated using Tobin’s Q = (MVCS+BVPS+BVLTD+BVINV+BVCL-BVCA)/BVTA, where MVCS = market value of the common stock; BVPS = book value of the preferred stock; BVLTD = book value of the long term debt; BVINV = book value of the inventory; BVCL = book value of the current liabilities; BVCA = book value of the current assets; and BVTA = book value of the total assets. All variables are measured using year-end values).
investors, or the local government, respectively, and zero otherwise. The coefficients of INSTITUTION and FOREIGN ownership variables are expected to be positive while the coefficient of STATE ownership is expected to be negative as predicted in Hypotheses 2 through 4. We expect the coefficient of INDEPENDENT to be positive to validate Hypothesis 5. To test Hypothesis 6, the dummy variable, DUAL, indicates whether the CEO and the chairman of the board of directors are separate. The coefficient of DUAL is expected to be positive if separate leadership is positively associated with performance as hypothesized. Based on prior literature (Bai et al. 2004; Joh 2003; Cho 1998), we include four control variables: LASSETS is a proxy for firm size; CSRATIO is a proxy
0/5000
III. giả thuyếtDựa trên lý thuyết cơ quan nói trên (Jensen và Meckling năm 1976, Fama 1980 và Fama và Jensen 1983), chúng tôi đang quan tâm đến việc kiểm tra làm thế nào quản trị doanh nghiệp ảnh hưởng đến hiệu suất công ty và đánh giá tại Trung Quốc. Chúng tôi sử dụng ROA, trứng và của Tobin Q là của chúng tôi phụ thuộc vào biến trong chúng tôi phân tích hồi quy vì ROA và ROE là các biện pháp thường được sử dụng cho hoạt động hiệu suất và Q của Tobin là proxy được sử dụng rộng rãi cho công ty định giá trong các nghiên cứu trước. Biến độc lập bao gồm các biện pháp kích thước đĩa đơn của quản trị doanh nghiệp, chẳng hạn như cơ cấu sở hữu và các đặc tính của Hội đồng quản trị, và một thước đo kích thước nhiều của các quản trị doanh nghiệp như là một phương pháp riêng biệt.Cơ quan lý thuyết cho thấy rằng một công ty được quản lý tốt hơn khi nó đã tập trung quyền sở hữu. Cổ đông lớn có ưu đãi và khả năng giám sát việc quản lý của công ty có hiệu quả hơn. Một số kết quả thực nghiệm hỗ trợ lý thuyết này. Gedajlovic và Shapiro (2002) tìm thấy tập trung quyền sở hữu tích cực liên quan đến hiệu suất tài chính công ty tại Nhật bản. Joh (2003) tìm thấy nồng độ thấp quyền sở hữu liên quan đến lợi nhuận công ty thấp cho các công ty Hàn Quốc. Những phát hiện này cho biết là có một mối quan hệ tích cực giữa quyền sở hữu tập trung và hiệu suất công ty và giá trị công ty. Do đó, chúng tôi giả thuyết đầu tiên là:Giả thuyết 1: Công ty với cao quyền sở hữu tập trung có hiệu suất công ty tốt hơn và cao hơn giá trị công ty. Bên cạnh đó tập trung quyền sở hữu, trước khi văn học cho thấy danh tính của chủ sở hữu lớn nhất cũng ảnh hưởng đến lợi nhuận của công ty. Đặc biệt, sự hiện diện của cổ đông tổ chức lớn hơn và các nhà đầu tư nước ngoài kết hợp với lợi nhuận cao, và quyền sở hữu nhà nước lớn là liên kết với lợi nhuận thấp hơn. Xu và Wang (1999) tìm thấy sự hiện diện của các nhà đầu tư tổ chức lớn là tích cực liên quan đến lợi nhuận. Bai et al. (2004) tìm thấy các cổ đông là chính phủ có tác động tiêu cực về định giá thị trường. Patibandla (2006) tìm thấy rằng các nhà đầu tư nước ngoài có một lớn hơn tác động tích cực công ty lợi nhuận hơn làm thuộc sở hữu của chính phủ địa phương tổ chức tài chính. Những kết quả này chỉ ra rằng các cổ đông của danh tính có thể ảnh hưởng đến hiệu suất của một công ty và giá trị thị trường của nó. Do đó, chúng tôi thứ hai, thứ ba, và ra giả thuyết là:Giả thuyết 2: Công ty với một nhà đầu tư thể chế là các cổ đông có hiệu suất công ty tốt hơn và cao hơn giá trị công ty.Giả thuyết 3: Công ty với một nhà đầu tư nước ngoài đang là các cổ đông có hiệu suất công ty tốt hơn và cao hơn giá trị công ty.Giả thuyết 4: Công ty với nhà nước đang là các cổ đông có hiệu suất công ty thấp và giá trị công ty.Lý thuyết cơ quan cho thấy vai trò của Hội đồng quản trị là để theo dõi các nhà quản lý và bảo đảm công ty được điều hành trong lợi ích tốt nhất của các cổ đông. Thông qua giám sát hiệu quả, sự hiện diện của Hội đồng quản trị được coi là để giảm chi phí cơ quan. Một hội đồng quản trị điển hình bao gồm cả bên trong và bên ngoài giám đốc. Nói chung người ta tin rằng bên ngoài giám đốc được bầu bởi vì họ cung cấp độc lập hơn bản án về quyết định kinh doanh của công ty hơn bên trong giám đốc. Bon (2004) tìm thấy phần bên ngoài giám đốc có một tác động tích cực trên ROE. Rosenstein và Wyatt (1990) tìm thấy rằng việc bổ nhiệm thêm bên ngoài giám đốc làm tăng giá trị công ty. Các kết quả cho thấy phần giám đốc độc lập có thể ảnh hưởng đến giá trị công ty và hiệu suất hoạt động. Do đó, chúng tôi giả thuyết thứ năm là:Giả thuyết 5: Công ty với các tỷ lệ cao của các giám đốc độc lập trên diễn đàn có hiệu suất công ty tốt hơn và cao hơn giá trị công ty.Ngoài các giám đốc độc lập trên diễn đàn, nó rộng rãi tin CEO là chủ tịch Hội đồng quản trị có thể thỏa hiệp sự độc lập và hiệu quả của các chức năng giám sát của nó. Một số nghiên cứu về lãnh đạo kép hỗ trợ các đối số này. Yermack (1996) và bài et al. (2004) tìm thấy rằng công ty có giá trị hơn khi Tổng Giám đốc và chủ tịch Hội đồng quản trị riêng biệt. Những kết quả này chỉ ra rằng hai lãnh đạo có thể ảnh hưởng đến hiệu suất công ty và giá trị công ty. Do đó, chúng tôi giả thuyết thứ sáu là:Giả thuyết 6: Công ty với một sự phân biệt của Tổng Giám đốc và chủ tịch của ban giám đốc có hiệu suất công ty tốt hơn và cao hơn giá trị công ty.Nhìn chung, cơ quan lý thuyết cho thấy rằng các công ty với tiêu chuẩn quản trị doanh nghiệp tốt hơn thực hiện tốt hơn bởi vì chi phí cơ quan thấp hơn và hiệu quả hơn giám sát cơ chế. Dự đoán này được hỗ trợ bởi các nghiên cứu thực nghiệm. Brown và Caylor (2006a;2006b) tìm thấy rằng nhiều quản lý Hoa Kỳ công ty có cao ROE, ROA và của Tobin Q. Dittmar và Mahrt-Smith (2007) tìm thấy quản trị doanh nghiệp có một tác động đáng kể tích cực trên giá trị công ty Hoa Kỳ. Ngoài ra, Gompers et al. (2003) thấy rằng nhiều quản lý công ty Hoa Kỳ trong thập niên 1990 có cao Q của Tobin và trứng. Những kết quả này chỉ ra rằng tốt quản trị doanh nghiệp nói chung được kết hợp với hiệu suất hoạt động tốt hơn và cao hơn giá trị công ty. Do đó, chúng tôi giả thuyết thứ bảy và quan trọng nhất là:Giả thuyết 7: Công ty với tốt hơn quản trị doanh nghiệp nói chung có hiệu suất công ty tốt hơn và cao hơn giá trị công ty. IV. nghiên cứu thiết kếTrong bài này, chúng ta xem xét công ty niêm yết trên sở giao dịch chứng khoán Thượng Hải hoặc sở giao dịch chứng khoán Shenzhen trong giai đoạn 2001 đến 2004. Dữ liệu về các biện pháp quản trị doanh nghiệp được thu thập hoặc tính từ Trung Quốc liệt kê công ty công ty quản trị nghiên cứu cơ sở dữ liệu (CLFCG). Dữ liệu về các biện pháp hiệu suất của công ty, bao gồm cả ROA, trứng và Q của Tobin, được thu được hay bắt nguồn bằng cách sử dụng dữ liệu từ cơ sở dữ liệu tạp chí kinh tế Đài Loan (TEJ).Đo lường quản trị doanh nghiệp là khó khăn bởi vì nó không thể trực tiếp quan sát và nó thường liên quan đến nhiều kích thước. Trong khi có là không có sự đồng thuận về quản trị doanh nghiệp như thế nào có thể được đo, văn học trước đó cho thấy một số cách khác nhau để proxy cho quản trị doanh nghiệp. Ví dụ, bài et al. (2004) sử dụng cả hai kích thước duy nhất nội bộ, chẳng hạn như cơ cấu sở hữu, chấp hành bồi thường, Ban Giám đốc và tiết lộ tài chính, và bên ngoài kích thước duy nhất, chẳng hạn như thị trường bên ngoài tiếp quản, cơ sở hạ tầng quy phạm pháp luật, và sản phẩm thị trường cạnh tranh. Gompers et al. (2003) tạo ra một yếu tố 24 G-index để đo quản trị doanh nghiệp và Brown và Caylor (2006a; 2006b) sử dụng 51 quản trị doanh nghiệp quy định để tạo ra một biện pháp rộng hơn. Các nghiên cứu thực nghiệm kiểm tra tác động của một kích thước duy nhất của quản trị doanh nghiệp, chẳng hạn như quyền sở hữu tập trung và sự chia tách của CEO và chủ tịch Hội đồng quản trị. Trong nghiên cứu này, chúng tôi sử dụng cả hai phương pháp tiếp cận để đo quản trị doanh nghiệp.4.1 các biện pháp quản trị doanh nghiệp đĩa đơn kích thướcĐể thử nghiệm giả thuyết 1 đến 6, chúng tôi ước tính phương trình sau đây dựa trên khung được cung cấp bởi Bai et al. (2003). ROA/trứng/Tobin của Q = α0 + α1 * TOP1 + α2 * TOP2_10 + α3 * viện + α4 * nước ngoài + α5 * bang + α6 * độc lập + α7 * DUAL + α8 * LASSETS + α9 * CSRATIO + α10 * ISRATIO + α11 * đòn bẩy + ε (1)Nơi ROA = lợi nhuận trên tài sản, thu nhập ròng chia tổng tài sản; ROE = lợi nhuận trên vốn chủ sở hữu, thu nhập ròng chia cho vốn chủ sở hữu; Q của Tobin = các biện pháp của công ty valuation3;TOP1 = tỷ lệ phần trăm cổ phần thuộc sở hữu của các cổ đông;TOP2_10 = đăng nhập số tiền của các hình vuông của các quyền sở hữu phần trăm do thứ hai cho các cổ đông lớn nhất thứ 10;Cơ sở giáo dục = 1 nếu là cổ đông lớn nhất là một nhà đầu tư thể chế và các 0 khác;Nước ngoài = 1 nếu là cổ đông lớn nhất là một nhà đầu tư nước ngoài và các 0 khác; BANG = 1 nếu là cổ đông lớn nhất là nhà nước và các 0 khác;Độc lập = tỷ lệ phần trăm của độc lập giám đốc phục vụ trên tàu; KÉP = 1 nếu tổng giám đốc và chủ tịch Hội đồng quản trị riêng biệt và0 nếu không;LASSETS = bản ghi của tất cả tài sản;CSRATIO = vốn (cuốn sách giá trị của tất cả các tài sản hữu hình) để bán hàng tỷ lệ; ISRATIO = thu nhập điều hành bán hàng tỷ lệ;Đòn bẩy = tổng số nợ để tỷ lệ tổng tài sản; vàΕ = thuật ngữ lỗi.Chúng tôi mong đợi một dấu hiệu tích cực cho hệ số của TOP1, một biện pháp của quyền sở hữu tập trung, kể từ khi nghiên cứu trước đó (ví dụ như, Gedajlovic và Shapiro 2002; Joh 2003) tìm thấy rằng quyền sở hữu tập trung là tích cực liên quan đến hiệu suất công ty và xác định giá trị. Hệ số TOP2_10 dự kiến sẽ được tích cực từ các nồng độ cao của phòng không kiểm soát cổ đông có một tác động tích cực về hiệu suất và xác định giá trị được minh chứng bởi Bai et al. (2003).Quyền sở hữu biến, cơ sở giáo dục, nước ngoài và nhà nước, được giảCác biến được mã hoá là một nếu là cổ đông lớn nhất là nhà đầu tư thể chế, nước ngoài3 chúng tôi làm theo Chung và Pruitt (1994) và bài et al. (2004) nơi Q của Tobin được tính bằng cách sử dụng Q của Tobin = (MVCS + BVPS + BVLTD + BVINV + BVCL-BVCA) / BVTA, nơi MVCS = thị trường giá trị của cổ phiếu phổ thông; BVPS = cuốn sách giá trị của cổ phiếu ưu đãi; BVLTD = cuốn sách giá trị của các khoản nợ dài hạn; BVINV = cuốn sách giá trị của hàng tồn kho; BVCL = cuốn sách giá trị của trách nhiệm pháp lý hiện tại; BVCA = cuốn sách giá trị của tài sản hiện tại; và BVTA = cuốn sách giá trị của Tổng tài sản. Tất cả các biến được đo bằng cách sử dụng cuối năm giá trị). nhà đầu tư, hoặc chính quyền địa phương, tương ứng, và không khác. Hệ số biến quyền sở hữu cơ sở giáo dục và nước ngoài dự kiến sẽ được tích cực trong khi hệ số của quyền sở hữu nhà nước dự kiến sẽ được tiêu cực theo dự đoán trong giả thuyết 2 đến 4. Chúng tôi hy vọng hệ số của độc lập để được tích cực để xác nhận giả thuyết 5. Để thử nghiệm giả thuyết 6, biến giả, DUAL, chỉ ra cho dù tổng giám đốc và chủ tịch Hội đồng quản trị là riêng biệt. Hệ số kép sẽ được tích cực nếu lãnh đạo riêng biệt là tích cực liên kết với hiệu suất như đưa ra giả thuyết. Dựa trên văn học trước (Bai et al. năm 2004; Joh 2003; Cho năm 1998), chúng tôi bao gồm bốn điều khiển biến: LASSETS là một proxy cho công ty kích thước; CSRATIO là một proxy
đang được dịch, vui lòng đợi..
III. Hypotheses
Based on the aforementioned agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama 1980 and Fama and Jensen 1983), we are interested in examining how corporate governance affects firm performance and valuation in China. We use ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q as our dependent variables in our regression analyses because ROA and ROE are commonly used measures for operating performance and Tobin’s Q is the widely used proxy for firm valuation in prior research. The independent variables include single-dimension measures of corporate governance, such as ownership structure and the characteristics of the board, and a multiple-dimension measurement of corporate governance as a separate approach.
Agency theory suggests that a company is better governed when it has concentrated ownership. Large shareholders have incentives and ability to monitor the management of the company more effectively. Some empirical findings support this theory. Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) find the ownership concentration is positively related to firms’ financial performance in Japan. Joh (2003) finds low ownership concentration is related to low firm profitability for Korean firms. These findings indicate that there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance and firm value. Hence, our first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: Firms with higher ownership concentration have better firm performance and higher firm value.
Besides ownership concentration, prior literature suggests the identity of the largest owner also affects firms’ profitability. In particular, the presence of larger institutional shareholders and foreign investors is associated with higher profitability, and large state ownership is associated with lower profitability. Xu and Wang (1999) find the presence of large institutional investors is positively associated with profitability. Bai et al. (2004) find the largest shareholder being the government has a negative impact on market valuation. Patibandla (2006) finds that foreign investors have a larger positive effect on firms’ profitability than do government-owned local financial institutions. These results indicate that the largest shareholder ’s identity could affect the performance of a firm and its market value. Hence, our second, third, and forth hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 2: Firms with an institutional investor being the largest shareholder have better firm performance and higher firm value.
Hypothesis 3: Firms with a foreign investor being the largest shareholder have better firm performance and higher firm value.
Hypothesis 4: Firms with the state being the largest shareholder have lower firm performance and firm value.
Agency theory suggests the role of the board of directors is to monitor the managers and assure the company is operated in the shareholders’ best interest. Through effective monitoring, the presence of the board of directors is deemed to reduce agency costs. A typical board includes both inside and outside directors. It is generally believed that outside directors are elected because they provide more independent judgments on the firm’s business decisions than inside directors. Bonn (2004) finds the portion of outside directors has a positive impact on ROE. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that the appointment of the additional outside director increases firm value. These results indicate
that the portion of independent directors could affect operating performance and firm value. Hence, our fifth hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 5: Firms with higher proportion of independent directors on the board have better firm performance and higher firm value.
In addition to the independent directors on the board, it is widely believed that the CEO being the chairman of the board of directors could compromise the independence and the effectiveness of its monitoring function. Some studies on dual leadership support this argument. Both Yermack (1996) and Bai et al. (2004) find that firms are more valuable when the CEO and the chairman of the board are separate. These results indicate that dual leadership might affect firm performance and firm value. Hence, our sixth hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 6: Firms with a segregation of CEO and Chairman of board of directors have better firm performance and higher firm value.
Overall, agency theory suggests that firms with better corporate governance standards perform better because of lower agency costs and more effective monitoring mechanisms. This prediction is supported by empirical studies. Brown and Caylor (2006a;
2006b) find that better-governed U.S. firms have higher ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that corporate governance has a substantial positive impact on U.S. firms’ value. In addition, Gompers et al. (2003) find that better-governed US firms during the 1990s have higher ROE and Tobin’s Q. These results indicate that good overall corporate governance is associated with better operating performance and higher firm value. Hence, our seventh and most important hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 7: Firms with better overall corporate governance have better firm performance and higher firm value.
IV. Research Design
In this paper, we examine companies listed on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the period of 2001 to 2004. The data on corporate governance measures are collected or calculated from China Listed Firm Corporate Governance Research Database (CLFCG). The data on firms’ performance measures, including ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q, are obtained or derived by using the data from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database.
Measuring corporate governance is difficult because it cannot be directly observed and it usually involves multiple dimensions. While there is no consensus on how corporate governance can be measured, prior literature suggests several different ways to proxy for corporate governance. For instance, Bai et al. (2004) use both internal single dimensions, such as ownership structure, executive compensation, board of directors and financial disclosure, and external single dimensions, such as external takeover market, legal infrastructure, and product market competition. Gompers et al. (2003) create a 24-factor G-index to measure corporate governance and Brown and Caylor (2006a; 2006b) use 51 corporate governance provisions to create a broader measure. Other empirical studies examine the impact of a single dimension of corporate governance, such as ownership concentration and the separation of CEO and the chairman of the board. In this study, we use both approaches to measure corporate governance.
4.1 Single-Dimension Corporate Governance Measures
To test Hypotheses 1 through 6, we estimate the following equation based on the framework provided by Bai et al. (2003).
ROA/ROE/Tobin’s Q = α0 + α1*TOP1 + α2*TOP2_10 + α3*INSTITUTION + α4*FOREIGN + α5*STATE + α6*INDEPENDENT + α7*DUAL + α8* LASSETS + α9* CSRATIO + α10* ISRATIO + α11* LEVERAGE + ε (1)
Where ROA = return on asset, net income divided by total assets; ROE = return on equity, net income divided by equity; Tobin’s Q = measure of firm valuation3;
TOP1 = percentage of the shares owned by the largest shareholder;
TOP2_10 = log of the sum of squares of the percent ownership by the second to the tenth largest shareholders;
INSTITUTION = 1 if the largest shareholder is an institutional investor and 0 otherwise;
FOREIGN = 1 if the largest shareholder is a foreign investor and 0 otherwise; STATE = 1 if the largest shareholder is the State and 0 otherwise;
INDEPENDENT = percentage of independent directors serving on the board; DUAL = 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board of directors are separate and
0 otherwise;
LASSETS = log of total assets;
CSRATIO = capital (book value of total tangible assets) to sales ratio; ISRATIO = operating income to sales ratio;
LEVERAGE = total debt to total assets ratio; and
ε = the error term.
We expect a positive sign for the coefficient of TOP1, a measure of ownership concentration, since earlier studies (e.g., Gedajlovic and Shapiro 2002; Joh 2003) find that ownership concentration is positively associated with firm performance and valuation. The coefficient of TOP2_10 is expected to be positive since high concentration of non-controlling shareholders has a positive impact on performance and valuation as evidenced by Bai et al. (2003).
Ownership variables, INSTITUTION, FOREIGN, and STATE, are dummy
variables that are coded as one if the largest shareholder is institutional investors, foreign
3 We follow Chung and Pruitt (1994) and Bai et al. (2004) where Tobin’s Q is calculated using Tobin’s Q = (MVCS+BVPS+BVLTD+BVINV+BVCL-BVCA)/BVTA, where MVCS = market value of the common stock; BVPS = book value of the preferred stock; BVLTD = book value of the long term debt; BVINV = book value of the inventory; BVCL = book value of the current liabilities; BVCA = book value of the current assets; and BVTA = book value of the total assets. All variables are measured using year-end values).
investors, or the local government, respectively, and zero otherwise. The coefficients of INSTITUTION and FOREIGN ownership variables are expected to be positive while the coefficient of STATE ownership is expected to be negative as predicted in Hypotheses 2 through 4. We expect the coefficient of INDEPENDENT to be positive to validate Hypothesis 5. To test Hypothesis 6, the dummy variable, DUAL, indicates whether the CEO and the chairman of the board of directors are separate. The coefficient of DUAL is expected to be positive if separate leadership is positively associated with performance as hypothesized. Based on prior literature (Bai et al. 2004; Joh 2003; Cho 1998), we include four control variables: LASSETS is a proxy for firm size; CSRATIO is a proxy
Based on the aforementioned agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama 1980 and Fama and Jensen 1983), we are interested in examining how corporate governance affects firm performance and valuation in China. We use ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q as our dependent variables in our regression analyses because ROA and ROE are commonly used measures for operating performance and Tobin’s Q is the widely used proxy for firm valuation in prior research. The independent variables include single-dimension measures of corporate governance, such as ownership structure and the characteristics of the board, and a multiple-dimension measurement of corporate governance as a separate approach.
Agency theory suggests that a company is better governed when it has concentrated ownership. Large shareholders have incentives and ability to monitor the management of the company more effectively. Some empirical findings support this theory. Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) find the ownership concentration is positively related to firms’ financial performance in Japan. Joh (2003) finds low ownership concentration is related to low firm profitability for Korean firms. These findings indicate that there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance and firm value. Hence, our first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: Firms with higher ownership concentration have better firm performance and higher firm value.
Besides ownership concentration, prior literature suggests the identity of the largest owner also affects firms’ profitability. In particular, the presence of larger institutional shareholders and foreign investors is associated with higher profitability, and large state ownership is associated with lower profitability. Xu and Wang (1999) find the presence of large institutional investors is positively associated with profitability. Bai et al. (2004) find the largest shareholder being the government has a negative impact on market valuation. Patibandla (2006) finds that foreign investors have a larger positive effect on firms’ profitability than do government-owned local financial institutions. These results indicate that the largest shareholder ’s identity could affect the performance of a firm and its market value. Hence, our second, third, and forth hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 2: Firms with an institutional investor being the largest shareholder have better firm performance and higher firm value.
Hypothesis 3: Firms with a foreign investor being the largest shareholder have better firm performance and higher firm value.
Hypothesis 4: Firms with the state being the largest shareholder have lower firm performance and firm value.
Agency theory suggests the role of the board of directors is to monitor the managers and assure the company is operated in the shareholders’ best interest. Through effective monitoring, the presence of the board of directors is deemed to reduce agency costs. A typical board includes both inside and outside directors. It is generally believed that outside directors are elected because they provide more independent judgments on the firm’s business decisions than inside directors. Bonn (2004) finds the portion of outside directors has a positive impact on ROE. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that the appointment of the additional outside director increases firm value. These results indicate
that the portion of independent directors could affect operating performance and firm value. Hence, our fifth hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 5: Firms with higher proportion of independent directors on the board have better firm performance and higher firm value.
In addition to the independent directors on the board, it is widely believed that the CEO being the chairman of the board of directors could compromise the independence and the effectiveness of its monitoring function. Some studies on dual leadership support this argument. Both Yermack (1996) and Bai et al. (2004) find that firms are more valuable when the CEO and the chairman of the board are separate. These results indicate that dual leadership might affect firm performance and firm value. Hence, our sixth hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 6: Firms with a segregation of CEO and Chairman of board of directors have better firm performance and higher firm value.
Overall, agency theory suggests that firms with better corporate governance standards perform better because of lower agency costs and more effective monitoring mechanisms. This prediction is supported by empirical studies. Brown and Caylor (2006a;
2006b) find that better-governed U.S. firms have higher ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that corporate governance has a substantial positive impact on U.S. firms’ value. In addition, Gompers et al. (2003) find that better-governed US firms during the 1990s have higher ROE and Tobin’s Q. These results indicate that good overall corporate governance is associated with better operating performance and higher firm value. Hence, our seventh and most important hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 7: Firms with better overall corporate governance have better firm performance and higher firm value.
IV. Research Design
In this paper, we examine companies listed on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the period of 2001 to 2004. The data on corporate governance measures are collected or calculated from China Listed Firm Corporate Governance Research Database (CLFCG). The data on firms’ performance measures, including ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q, are obtained or derived by using the data from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database.
Measuring corporate governance is difficult because it cannot be directly observed and it usually involves multiple dimensions. While there is no consensus on how corporate governance can be measured, prior literature suggests several different ways to proxy for corporate governance. For instance, Bai et al. (2004) use both internal single dimensions, such as ownership structure, executive compensation, board of directors and financial disclosure, and external single dimensions, such as external takeover market, legal infrastructure, and product market competition. Gompers et al. (2003) create a 24-factor G-index to measure corporate governance and Brown and Caylor (2006a; 2006b) use 51 corporate governance provisions to create a broader measure. Other empirical studies examine the impact of a single dimension of corporate governance, such as ownership concentration and the separation of CEO and the chairman of the board. In this study, we use both approaches to measure corporate governance.
4.1 Single-Dimension Corporate Governance Measures
To test Hypotheses 1 through 6, we estimate the following equation based on the framework provided by Bai et al. (2003).
ROA/ROE/Tobin’s Q = α0 + α1*TOP1 + α2*TOP2_10 + α3*INSTITUTION + α4*FOREIGN + α5*STATE + α6*INDEPENDENT + α7*DUAL + α8* LASSETS + α9* CSRATIO + α10* ISRATIO + α11* LEVERAGE + ε (1)
Where ROA = return on asset, net income divided by total assets; ROE = return on equity, net income divided by equity; Tobin’s Q = measure of firm valuation3;
TOP1 = percentage of the shares owned by the largest shareholder;
TOP2_10 = log of the sum of squares of the percent ownership by the second to the tenth largest shareholders;
INSTITUTION = 1 if the largest shareholder is an institutional investor and 0 otherwise;
FOREIGN = 1 if the largest shareholder is a foreign investor and 0 otherwise; STATE = 1 if the largest shareholder is the State and 0 otherwise;
INDEPENDENT = percentage of independent directors serving on the board; DUAL = 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board of directors are separate and
0 otherwise;
LASSETS = log of total assets;
CSRATIO = capital (book value of total tangible assets) to sales ratio; ISRATIO = operating income to sales ratio;
LEVERAGE = total debt to total assets ratio; and
ε = the error term.
We expect a positive sign for the coefficient of TOP1, a measure of ownership concentration, since earlier studies (e.g., Gedajlovic and Shapiro 2002; Joh 2003) find that ownership concentration is positively associated with firm performance and valuation. The coefficient of TOP2_10 is expected to be positive since high concentration of non-controlling shareholders has a positive impact on performance and valuation as evidenced by Bai et al. (2003).
Ownership variables, INSTITUTION, FOREIGN, and STATE, are dummy
variables that are coded as one if the largest shareholder is institutional investors, foreign
3 We follow Chung and Pruitt (1994) and Bai et al. (2004) where Tobin’s Q is calculated using Tobin’s Q = (MVCS+BVPS+BVLTD+BVINV+BVCL-BVCA)/BVTA, where MVCS = market value of the common stock; BVPS = book value of the preferred stock; BVLTD = book value of the long term debt; BVINV = book value of the inventory; BVCL = book value of the current liabilities; BVCA = book value of the current assets; and BVTA = book value of the total assets. All variables are measured using year-end values).
investors, or the local government, respectively, and zero otherwise. The coefficients of INSTITUTION and FOREIGN ownership variables are expected to be positive while the coefficient of STATE ownership is expected to be negative as predicted in Hypotheses 2 through 4. We expect the coefficient of INDEPENDENT to be positive to validate Hypothesis 5. To test Hypothesis 6, the dummy variable, DUAL, indicates whether the CEO and the chairman of the board of directors are separate. The coefficient of DUAL is expected to be positive if separate leadership is positively associated with performance as hypothesized. Based on prior literature (Bai et al. 2004; Joh 2003; Cho 1998), we include four control variables: LASSETS is a proxy for firm size; CSRATIO is a proxy
đang được dịch, vui lòng đợi..
Các ngôn ngữ khác
Hỗ trợ công cụ dịch thuật: Albania, Amharic, Anh, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ba Lan, Ba Tư, Bantu, Basque, Belarus, Bengal, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Bồ Đào Nha, Catalan, Cebuano, Chichewa, Corsi, Creole (Haiti), Croatia, Do Thái, Estonia, Filipino, Frisia, Gael Scotland, Galicia, George, Gujarat, Hausa, Hawaii, Hindi, Hmong, Hungary, Hy Lạp, Hà Lan, Hà Lan (Nam Phi), Hàn, Iceland, Igbo, Ireland, Java, Kannada, Kazakh, Khmer, Kinyarwanda, Klingon, Kurd, Kyrgyz, Latinh, Latvia, Litva, Luxembourg, Lào, Macedonia, Malagasy, Malayalam, Malta, Maori, Marathi, Myanmar, Mã Lai, Mông Cổ, Na Uy, Nepal, Nga, Nhật, Odia (Oriya), Pashto, Pháp, Phát hiện ngôn ngữ, Phần Lan, Punjab, Quốc tế ngữ, Rumani, Samoa, Serbia, Sesotho, Shona, Sindhi, Sinhala, Slovak, Slovenia, Somali, Sunda, Swahili, Séc, Tajik, Tamil, Tatar, Telugu, Thái, Thổ Nhĩ Kỳ, Thụy Điển, Tiếng Indonesia, Tiếng Ý, Trung, Trung (Phồn thể), Turkmen, Tây Ban Nha, Ukraina, Urdu, Uyghur, Uzbek, Việt, Xứ Wales, Yiddish, Yoruba, Zulu, Đan Mạch, Đức, Ả Rập, dịch ngôn ngữ.
- ô nhiễm phóng xạ:
- error
- So sad
- Kế toán kiểm toán
- So sad
- 키 수 해 주 세 요
- ô nhiễm ánh sáng
- Vietnam bay Gio ban Ngay
- Mechanic
- Pleural effusion that is usually sterile
- My father away from me I
- “Usou. (It’s a lie)” She said and chuckl
- chậm
- Cảm ơn em về tất cả , anh yêu em
- Tôi song tu lap 1 Minh
- Tôi học lớp 12dkt
- Thanks for your response. We'd like to c
- “Usou. (It’s a lie)” She said and chuckl
- he said he didn't want to offer to work
- “What’s that?”
- ô nhiễm phóng xạ
- lạnh lùngnồng nhiệtkhông cần
- [10:05:49 AM] Mr Mac: Yes, please remove
- “Himitsu! (Secret)” then she stuck out h
