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INTP442Essay topic: “Countries rely
INTP442
Essay topic: “Countries relying on the United States to balance China’s power are bound to be disappointed in the long run”. Discuss.
Since the initial years of the 21st century onwards, nothing has rattled countries in Asia more than the rise of China. From the South and East China Seas to the remote China - India borders, mounting tensions have recently led many countries in the region to seek some form of balancing against a revisionist and increasingly assertive China. Understandably, as the United States pivots itself to Asia in the past two years, it has found that strategy openly or tacitly embraced by many countries in the region, not least those mired in territorial and maritime disputes with China. While the concept and practice of balancing is as old as the world, the inevitable rise of China and the relative decline of the United States have raised serious questions as to whether this strategy will work in the long run or not. In this essay, I will argue that while it may not be in any country’s best interest to use a far-away and declining power to balance against a resident and rising one, the opposite option of allowing China to establish hegemony in the Asia-Pacific would be equally catastrophic. And the answer for countries seeking a viable strategy and a sustainable and stable regional security architecture may lie somewhere between those two extremes.
Balancing as a natural behavior in power politics
Balancing is the most practised policy option for countries facing a security dilemma. According to traditional realism, in an anarchic world, countries often feel threatened by the prospect of hegemony imposed by a fast rising power. As a policy, balance of power suggests that states counter any threat to their security by allying with other threatened states (external balancing) or increasing their own military capabilities (internal balancing). In Waltz’s words, “hegemony leads to balance… through all of the centuries we can contemplate”. In many cases, balance of power has helped the threatened states prevent a great power from becoming a hegemon. The defeat of Athens by an alliance led by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War, the fall of the Habsburg Empire driven by a coalition of Sweden, England, France and the Netherlands in the Thirty Years’s War, the defeat of Germany and Japan in WWII by the Allies, and the fall of the Soviet Union after the Cold War are striking examples, to name but a few. China itself also followed the strategy of balancing in the 1970s: it colluded with the U.S. to balance against the Soviet Union. In sum, “great powers that seek hegemony are always opposed – and defeated – by the countering efforts of other states”.
The rationale for balancing in the Asia-Pacific
Aaron Friedberg pointed out an inevitable rule: “the external expansion of the UK and France, Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States coincided with phases of intense industrialization and economic development”. In Asia, China’s very name (the Middle Kingdom), its expansionist history and new-found strength after three decades of double-digit economic growth suggest that if left unchecked, China would settle for nothing less than a regional, if not global, hegemony in the upcoming decades. According to John Mearsheimer, as China’s power continues to grow, “China, like all previous potential hegemons, will be strongly inclined to become a real hegemon”. China is the only great power in the Asia-Pacific that possesses both the capability and the will to unseat the U.S. as the regional hegemon. From the EP-3 incident in 2001, the Impeccable incident in 2009 and the most recent announcement by China on November 27th 2012 that from January 1st 2013 onwards, Hainan coast guards will board or seize foreign ships that China considers illegally entering its territorial waters of the islands within the “nine-dashed lines”, China has sent unmistakably strong signals that it wants to kick the U.S. out of the Western Pacific and exercise China’s Monroe Doctrine in Asia.
Whither the United States?
While balancing the U.S. against China seems to be the most natural choice for countries threatened by the rise of China, it is necessary to look into Asia’s contemporary history and the prospective correlation of power between the U.S. and China to predict whether this strategy will work in the long run or not.
Firstly, the balancing strategy only works in the manipulator’s best interest in a state of a controlled strategic competition between the balancer and the balanced. In the other two extreme scenarios of conflict/confrontation or concession/collusion between the balancer and the balanced, it is very detrimental to the interest of the manipulator. In 1978, Vietnam signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. Yet the Soviet Union failed to come to Vietnam’s rescue when the latter was attacked by China in the 1979 border war. As the Chinese saying goes, “distant waters cannot put out a nearby fire”. In the same year, the decade-long collusion between the U.S. and China to contain the Soviet Union culminated in the U.S.’s decision to cut its diplomatic ties with Taiwan and establish diplomatic relations with communist China. These are bitter lessons for (small) countries balancing one great power against another. As the overall interests of the great powers in their relations with each other often outweigh those in their relations with the smaller states, the possibility of a sell-out is always present.
History has also shown that a much weaker and isolated China without nuclear weapons still decided to confront the U.S. militarily in the 1950-1953 Korean War when it felt its security or buffer zone breached. Today’s powerful China may be less hesitant. Fueled by the pride in its magnificent civilization, the resentment towards the West accumulated in “the century of humiliation” and the new-found strength after three decades of breakneck economic growth, China’s nationalism has been on the rise, which makes it much harder for Chinese leaders to make concessions or pursue a rational foreign policy, especially on territorial and maritime issues. This is exactly the dilemma facing the U.S.: the more the U.S. tries to contain China and prevent it from becoming a regional hegemon, the more determined and hard-line China becomes to protect its perceived security interests. That is why the China-Philippines standoff over the Scarborough shoal ended with China’s de facto control of the shoal despite the Philippines’ outcry and repeated calls for the U.S.’s assistance.
Secondly, in both economic and military power, the U.S. is in relative decline as compared with China and the rest of the world. After the WWII, The U.S.’s GDP accounted for nearly %50 of the world economy. Today, it stands at a meager %23, and will continue to fall further in tandem with China’s rise. Although the U.S.’s current defense budget still equals that of 14 next biggest spenders combined, the USD 500 billion cut by the Pentagon in the next 10 years will make serious dents in the U.S.’s power projection capability. On the contrary, China’s defence spending is expected to overtake that of the U.S. in 2030. The coming end of the American Era as Stephen Walt predicted means that the U.S. will be no longer capable of exercising hegemony in the Asia-Pacific as it did. While President Clinton could send two aircraft carrier groups to the Taiwan Straits in 1996 when China intimidated Taiwan during the island’s elections, such an act is today unimaginable in view of the changing correlation of power between China and the U.S. China may not yet be able to confront the U.S. directly, but its state-of-the-art military hardware and anti-access and area-denial (AA/AD) strategy can surely inflict some unacceptable costs on the U.S should it intervene militarily in China’s sphere of influence. The ongoing standoff between the United States threatens eventually to shift in China's favor in East Asia, largely due to China's geographical centrality to the region. It is therefore inevitable that China will try to revise the norms and rules of the game in the Asia-Pacific instead of accepting an order imposed by the U.S.
Thirdly, China has surpassed the U.S. to become the largest trading partner of almost every country in the Asia-Pacific (including U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia), with 124 countries in the world now considering China their largest trading partner and only 76 having that relationship with the U.S. As their economic interdependence with (or dependence on) China grows, countries in the region will find it harder and harder to accommodate the U.S’s strategic interests at the expense of their much needed economic relations with China. Highly nationalistic and indignant with the Chinese heavy-handed measures as it is, Japan still has to bite the bullet, tiptoeing between defending its sovereignty over the Senkakus and keeping China’s huge market. Within ASEAN, this reality also explains why Thailand, a non-NATO treaty ally of the U.S., has tilted more towards China over the past few years and Cambodia almost sold out its 2012 ASEAN Chairmanship to China over the South China Sea issue.
Finally, the U.S. is by no means ready for a conflict in Asia. Faced by the “fiscal cliff” and a highly divisive partisan politics, the gap between the U.S.’s regional commitments and its ability to deliver is widening to a dangerous extent. It would be very hard for the U.S. to intervene militarily in the region or come to the rescue of the U.S.’s allies if its vital and strategic interests are not (believed to be) at stake. A decade of costly and unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has made the tired American public allergic to foreign intervention, thus further complicating politicians’ ability to stand up to China on foreign p
Essay topic: “Countries relying on the United States to balance China’s power are bound to be disappointed in the long run”. Discuss.
Since the initial years of the 21st century onwards, nothing has rattled countries in Asia more than the rise of China. From the South and East China Seas to the remote China - India borders, mounting tensions have recently led many countries in the region to seek some form of balancing against a revisionist and increasingly assertive China. Understandably, as the United States pivots itself to Asia in the past two years, it has found that strategy openly or tacitly embraced by many countries in the region, not least those mired in territorial and maritime disputes with China. While the concept and practice of balancing is as old as the world, the inevitable rise of China and the relative decline of the United States have raised serious questions as to whether this strategy will work in the long run or not. In this essay, I will argue that while it may not be in any country’s best interest to use a far-away and declining power to balance against a resident and rising one, the opposite option of allowing China to establish hegemony in the Asia-Pacific would be equally catastrophic. And the answer for countries seeking a viable strategy and a sustainable and stable regional security architecture may lie somewhere between those two extremes.
Balancing as a natural behavior in power politics
Balancing is the most practised policy option for countries facing a security dilemma. According to traditional realism, in an anarchic world, countries often feel threatened by the prospect of hegemony imposed by a fast rising power. As a policy, balance of power suggests that states counter any threat to their security by allying with other threatened states (external balancing) or increasing their own military capabilities (internal balancing). In Waltz’s words, “hegemony leads to balance… through all of the centuries we can contemplate”. In many cases, balance of power has helped the threatened states prevent a great power from becoming a hegemon. The defeat of Athens by an alliance led by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War, the fall of the Habsburg Empire driven by a coalition of Sweden, England, France and the Netherlands in the Thirty Years’s War, the defeat of Germany and Japan in WWII by the Allies, and the fall of the Soviet Union after the Cold War are striking examples, to name but a few. China itself also followed the strategy of balancing in the 1970s: it colluded with the U.S. to balance against the Soviet Union. In sum, “great powers that seek hegemony are always opposed – and defeated – by the countering efforts of other states”.
The rationale for balancing in the Asia-Pacific
Aaron Friedberg pointed out an inevitable rule: “the external expansion of the UK and France, Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States coincided with phases of intense industrialization and economic development”. In Asia, China’s very name (the Middle Kingdom), its expansionist history and new-found strength after three decades of double-digit economic growth suggest that if left unchecked, China would settle for nothing less than a regional, if not global, hegemony in the upcoming decades. According to John Mearsheimer, as China’s power continues to grow, “China, like all previous potential hegemons, will be strongly inclined to become a real hegemon”. China is the only great power in the Asia-Pacific that possesses both the capability and the will to unseat the U.S. as the regional hegemon. From the EP-3 incident in 2001, the Impeccable incident in 2009 and the most recent announcement by China on November 27th 2012 that from January 1st 2013 onwards, Hainan coast guards will board or seize foreign ships that China considers illegally entering its territorial waters of the islands within the “nine-dashed lines”, China has sent unmistakably strong signals that it wants to kick the U.S. out of the Western Pacific and exercise China’s Monroe Doctrine in Asia.
Whither the United States?
While balancing the U.S. against China seems to be the most natural choice for countries threatened by the rise of China, it is necessary to look into Asia’s contemporary history and the prospective correlation of power between the U.S. and China to predict whether this strategy will work in the long run or not.
Firstly, the balancing strategy only works in the manipulator’s best interest in a state of a controlled strategic competition between the balancer and the balanced. In the other two extreme scenarios of conflict/confrontation or concession/collusion between the balancer and the balanced, it is very detrimental to the interest of the manipulator. In 1978, Vietnam signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. Yet the Soviet Union failed to come to Vietnam’s rescue when the latter was attacked by China in the 1979 border war. As the Chinese saying goes, “distant waters cannot put out a nearby fire”. In the same year, the decade-long collusion between the U.S. and China to contain the Soviet Union culminated in the U.S.’s decision to cut its diplomatic ties with Taiwan and establish diplomatic relations with communist China. These are bitter lessons for (small) countries balancing one great power against another. As the overall interests of the great powers in their relations with each other often outweigh those in their relations with the smaller states, the possibility of a sell-out is always present.
History has also shown that a much weaker and isolated China without nuclear weapons still decided to confront the U.S. militarily in the 1950-1953 Korean War when it felt its security or buffer zone breached. Today’s powerful China may be less hesitant. Fueled by the pride in its magnificent civilization, the resentment towards the West accumulated in “the century of humiliation” and the new-found strength after three decades of breakneck economic growth, China’s nationalism has been on the rise, which makes it much harder for Chinese leaders to make concessions or pursue a rational foreign policy, especially on territorial and maritime issues. This is exactly the dilemma facing the U.S.: the more the U.S. tries to contain China and prevent it from becoming a regional hegemon, the more determined and hard-line China becomes to protect its perceived security interests. That is why the China-Philippines standoff over the Scarborough shoal ended with China’s de facto control of the shoal despite the Philippines’ outcry and repeated calls for the U.S.’s assistance.
Secondly, in both economic and military power, the U.S. is in relative decline as compared with China and the rest of the world. After the WWII, The U.S.’s GDP accounted for nearly %50 of the world economy. Today, it stands at a meager %23, and will continue to fall further in tandem with China’s rise. Although the U.S.’s current defense budget still equals that of 14 next biggest spenders combined, the USD 500 billion cut by the Pentagon in the next 10 years will make serious dents in the U.S.’s power projection capability. On the contrary, China’s defence spending is expected to overtake that of the U.S. in 2030. The coming end of the American Era as Stephen Walt predicted means that the U.S. will be no longer capable of exercising hegemony in the Asia-Pacific as it did. While President Clinton could send two aircraft carrier groups to the Taiwan Straits in 1996 when China intimidated Taiwan during the island’s elections, such an act is today unimaginable in view of the changing correlation of power between China and the U.S. China may not yet be able to confront the U.S. directly, but its state-of-the-art military hardware and anti-access and area-denial (AA/AD) strategy can surely inflict some unacceptable costs on the U.S should it intervene militarily in China’s sphere of influence. The ongoing standoff between the United States threatens eventually to shift in China's favor in East Asia, largely due to China's geographical centrality to the region. It is therefore inevitable that China will try to revise the norms and rules of the game in the Asia-Pacific instead of accepting an order imposed by the U.S.
Thirdly, China has surpassed the U.S. to become the largest trading partner of almost every country in the Asia-Pacific (including U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia), with 124 countries in the world now considering China their largest trading partner and only 76 having that relationship with the U.S. As their economic interdependence with (or dependence on) China grows, countries in the region will find it harder and harder to accommodate the U.S’s strategic interests at the expense of their much needed economic relations with China. Highly nationalistic and indignant with the Chinese heavy-handed measures as it is, Japan still has to bite the bullet, tiptoeing between defending its sovereignty over the Senkakus and keeping China’s huge market. Within ASEAN, this reality also explains why Thailand, a non-NATO treaty ally of the U.S., has tilted more towards China over the past few years and Cambodia almost sold out its 2012 ASEAN Chairmanship to China over the South China Sea issue.
Finally, the U.S. is by no means ready for a conflict in Asia. Faced by the “fiscal cliff” and a highly divisive partisan politics, the gap between the U.S.’s regional commitments and its ability to deliver is widening to a dangerous extent. It would be very hard for the U.S. to intervene militarily in the region or come to the rescue of the U.S.’s allies if its vital and strategic interests are not (believed to be) at stake. A decade of costly and unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has made the tired American public allergic to foreign intervention, thus further complicating politicians’ ability to stand up to China on foreign p
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INTP442Chủ đề bài luận: "Nước dựa vào Hoa Kỳ để cân bằng sức mạnh của Trung Quốc đang bị ràng buộc phải thất vọng trong thời gian dài". Thảo luận về.Kể từ những năm đầu của thế kỷ 21 trở đi, không có gì có rattled các quốc gia ở Châu á nhiều hơn sự nổi lên của Trung Quốc. Từ phía Nam và phía đông Trung Quốc biển Trung Quốc từ xa - biên giới Ấn Độ, căng thẳng gắn kết mới đã dẫn nhiều nước trong khu vực để tìm kiếm một số hình thức của cân bằng với một xét lại và Trung Quốc ngày càng quyết đoán. Dễ hiểu, như Hoa Kỳ pivots chính nó đến Châu á trong hai năm qua, nó đã thấy rằng chiến lược công khai hoặc tacitly chấp nhận bởi nhiều quốc gia trong khu vực, không kém những mired trong tranh chấp lãnh thổ và hàng hải với Trung Quốc. Trong khi khái niệm và thực hành của cân bằng là như cũ như trên thế giới, sự nổi lên không thể tránh khỏi của Trung Quốc và sự suy giảm tương đối của Hoa Kỳ đã đưa ra các câu hỏi nghiêm trọng như để cho dù chiến lược này sẽ làm việc trong thời gian dài hay không. Trong tiểu luận này, tôi sẽ tranh luận rằng trong khi nó có thể không trong lợi ích tốt nhất của bất kỳ quốc gia sử dụng một xa và giảm quyền lực để cân bằng với một cư dân và tăng, tùy chọn đối diện cho phép Trung Quốc để thiết lập quyền bá chủ trong Asia-Pacific sẽ là thảm họa bằng nhau. Và câu trả lời cho các nước đang tìm kiếm một chiến lược khả thi và một kiến trúc an ninh khu vực bền vững và ổn định có thể nằm một nơi nào đó giữa những hai thái cực.Cân bằng là một hành vi tự nhiên trong quyền lực chính trịCân bằng là tùy chọn chính sách đặt thực hành cho các nước phải đối mặt với tiến thoái lưỡng nan an ninh. Theo truyền thống thực tế, trong một thế giới anarchic, quốc gia thường xuyên cảm thấy bị đe dọa bởi khách hàng tiềm năng của các quyền bá chủ áp đặt bởi một sức mạnh tăng nhanh. Như là một chính sách, sự cân bằng quyền lực cho thấy rằng kỳ truy cập bất kỳ mối đe dọa cho an ninh của họ bởi liên minh với các tiểu bang bị đe dọa (cân bằng bên ngoài) hoặc tăng khả năng quân sự của riêng của họ (cân bằng nội bộ). Nói cách của Waltz, "quyền bá chủ dẫn để cân bằng... thông qua tất cả các thế kỷ chúng ta có thể chiêm ngưỡng". Trong nhiều trường hợp, sự cân bằng quyền lực đã giúp các tiểu bang bị đe dọa ngăn chặn một sức mạnh rất lớn từ trở thành một đạo. Thất bại của Athena bởi một liên minh do Sparta trong chiến tranh Peloponnesus, sự sụp đổ của Đế chế Habsburg được thúc đẩy bởi một liên minh của Thụy Điển, Anh, Pháp và Hà Lan trong chiến tranh ba mươi năm, đánh bại Đức và Nhật bản trong Đệ nhị bởi đồng minh và sự sụp đổ của Liên Xô sau chiến tranh lạnh là nổi bật ví dụ, để đặt tên nhưng một vài. Trung Quốc chính nó cũng theo chiến lược cân bằng trong thập niên 1970: nó colluded với Hoa Kỳ để cân bằng chống lại Liên Xô. Tóm lại, "quyền hạn tuyệt vời tìm kiếm quyền bá chủ được luôn luôn chống lại- và đánh bại-bởi những nỗ lực countering của các tiểu bang". Lý do để cân bằng ở Châu á-TBDAaron Friedberg chỉ ra một quy tắc không thể tránh khỏi: "việc mở rộng bên ngoài của Anh và Pháp, Đức và Nhật bản, Liên Xô và Hoa Kỳ cùng lúc với các giai đoạn công nghiệp hóa dữ dội và phát triển kinh tế". Ở Châu á, Trung Quốc rất tên (Trung Quốc), bành trướng lịch sử của nó và sức mạnh mới tìm thấy sau ba thập kỷ qua hai con số tăng trưởng kinh tế đề nghị rằng nếu trái đánh dấu, Trung Quốc sẽ giải quyết cho không có gì ít hơn một khu vực, nếu không toàn cầu, quyền bá chủ trong thập kỷ sắp tới. Theo John Mearsheimer, như điện của Trung Quốc tiếp tục phát triển, "Trung Quốc, như tất cả trước đó tiềm năng bá, sẽ được mạnh mẽ nghiêng để trở thành một đạo thực sự". Trung Quốc là sức mạnh tuyệt vời chỉ trong Asia-Pacific có khả năng và sẽ unseat Hoa Kỳ như khu vực đạo. Từ EP-3 sự cố năm 2001, sự hoàn hảo trong năm 2009 và đặt thông báo của Trung Quốc ngày 27 tháng 11 năm 2011 từ tháng 1 năm 2013 1 trở đi, Hainan bảo vệ bờ biển sẽ hội đồng quản trị hoặc chiếm nước ngoài tàu rằng Trung Quốc sẽ xem xét bất hợp pháp vào các vùng lãnh hải đảo bên trong "chín tiêu tan đường", Trung Quốc đã gửi tín hiệu mạnh mẽ unmistakably nó muốn đá Hoa Kỳ ra khỏi Tây Thái Bình Dương và tập thể dục học thuyết Monroe của Trung Quốc ở Châu á. Đi đâu Hoa Kỳ?Trong khi cân bằng Hoa Kỳ chống lại Trung Quốc có vẻ là sự lựa chọn tự nhiên nhất cho quốc gia bị đe dọa bởi sự nổi lên của Trung Quốc, nó là cần thiết để xem xét lịch sử hiện đại của Châu á và sự tương quan tiềm năng lượng giữa Hoa Kỳ và Trung Quốc để dự đoán cho dù chiến lược này sẽ làm việc trong thời gian dài hay không.Thứ nhất, các chiến lược cân bằng chỉ hoạt động trong lợi ích tốt nhất của manipulator trong trạng thái của một đối thủ cạnh tranh chiến lược kiểm soát giữa là cân bằng và sự cân bằng. Trong các khác hai cực tình huống của cuộc xung đột/đối đầu hoặc giảm giá/thông đồng giữa là cân bằng và sự cân bằng, nó là rất bất lợi cho sự quan tâm của manipulator. Năm 1978, Việt Nam đã ký một hiệp ước hữu nghị, hợp tác và hỗ trợ lẫn nhau với Liên Xô. Được Liên Xô không đến để cứu hộ của Việt Nam khi sau này bị tấn công bởi Trung Quốc trong chiến tranh biên giới năm 1979. Như người Trung Quốc nói đi, "vùng biển xa xôi không thể đưa ra một ngọn lửa gần đó". Cùng năm đó, thông đồng thập kỷ dài giữa Hoa Kỳ và Trung Quốc để chứa Liên Xô lên đến đỉnh điểm trong việc Hoa Kỳ công nhằm cắt đứt quan hệ ngoại giao của mình với Đài Loan và thiết lập quan hệ ngoại giao với cộng sản Trung Quốc. Đây là bài học cay đắng cho quốc gia (nhỏ) cân bằng một sức mạnh rất lớn đối với nhau. Như lợi ích tổng thể của các cường quốc trong quan hệ của họ với nhau thường lớn hơn những người trong mối quan hệ của họ với các tiểu bang nhỏ hơn, khả năng của một người bán ra là luôn luôn hiện nay.Lịch sử cũng chỉ ra rằng một nhiều Trung Quốc yếu và bị cô lập mà không có vũ khí hạt nhân vẫn quyết định đối đầu với Hoa Kỳ quân sự trong những năm 1950 - 1953 chiến tranh Triều tiên khi nó cảm thấy an ninh hoặc vùng đệm vi phạm của nó. Ngày hôm nay của Trung Quốc mạnh mẽ có thể ít do dự. Thúc đẩy bởi niềm tự hào trong nền văn minh tráng lệ, oán hận về phía tây tích lũy trong "thế kỷ của sự sỉ nhục" và sức mạnh mới tìm thấy sau ba thập kỷ tăng trưởng kinh tế chóng mặt, chủ nghĩa dân tộc của Trung Quốc đã tăng lên, mà làm cho nó nhiều hơn cho các lãnh đạo Trung Quốc để thực hiện nhượng bộ hoặc theo đuổi một chính sách ngoại giao hợp lý, đặc biệt là về các vấn đề lãnh thổ và hàng hải. Điều này là chính xác tiến thoái lưỡng nan phải đối mặt với Mỹ: càng Mỹ cố gắng bao gồm Trung Quốc và ngăn không cho nó trở thành một đạo khu vực, hơn được xác định và ngũ Trung Quốc sẽ trở thành để bảo vệ lợi ích nhận thức bảo mật của mình. Đó là lý do tại sao Trung Quốc-Philippines trên Scarborough shoal standoff kết thúc với kiểm soát trên thực tế của Trung Quốc của shoal mặc dù Philippines' lời phản đối và lặp đi lặp lại cuộc gọi để được hỗ trợ của Hoa Kỳ. Thứ hai, trong sức mạnh quân sự và kinh tế, Hoa Kỳ là suy giảm tương đối so với Trung Quốc và phần còn lại của thế giới. Sau thế chiến II, The US GDP chiếm gần % 50 của nền kinh tế thế giới. Hôm nay, nó là viết tắt của một khiêm tốn % 23, và sẽ tiếp tục rơi tiếp tục song song với rise của Trung Quốc. Mặc dù ngân sách quốc phòng hiện tại của Mỹ vẫn còn tương đương của 14 spenders lớn nhất tiếp theo kết hợp, USD 500.000.000.000 cắt của Lầu năm góc trong 10 năm tiếp theo sẽ làm cho buôn nghiêm trọng trong khả năng chiếu điện của Hoa Kỳ. Trái lại, Trung Quốc của chi tiêu quốc phòng dự kiến sẽ vượt qua của Hoa Kỳ vào năm 2030. Tới cuối thời kỳ người Mỹ như Stephen Walt có nghĩa là dự đoán rằng Hoa Kỳ sẽ không còn có khả năng thực hiện quyền bá chủ ở á-Thái Bình Dương như nó đã làm. Trong khi Tổng thống Clinton có thể gửi hai chiếc đội tàu sân bay đến eo biển Đài Loan vào năm 1996 khi Trung Quốc đe dọa Đài Loan trong cuộc bầu cử của hòn đảo, một hành động như vậy là vào ngày hôm nay không thể tưởng tượng theo quan điểm của sự thay đổi tương quan sức mạnh giữa Trung Quốc và Trung Quốc Hoa Kỳ có thể không được có khả năng đối đầu với Hoa Kỳ trực tiếp, nhưng nhà nước-of-the-nghệ thuật phần cứng quân sự và chống truy cập của nó và chiến lược khu vực-từ chối (AA/quảng cáo) có thể chắc chắn gây ra một số chi phí không được chấp nhận vào Mỹ nên nó can thiệp quân sự trong của Trung Quốc ảnh hưởng của. Căng thẳng liên tục giữa Hoa Kỳ đe dọa cuối cùng để thay đổi trong lợi của Trung Quốc ở đông á, chủ yếu là do trí trung tâm địa lý của Trung Quốc đến vùng. Nó là do đó không thể tránh khỏi rằng Trung Quốc sẽ cố gắng sửa đổi tiêu chuẩn và quy tắc của trò chơi trong Asia-Pacific thay vì chấp nhận đơn đặt hàng áp đặt bởi Hoa KỳThứ ba, Trung Quốc đã vượt qua Mỹ để trở thành kinh doanh đối tác lớn nhất của hầu như tất cả các nước trong Asia-Pacific (bao gồm cả Hoa Kỳ đồng minh như Nhật bản, Hàn Quốc và Úc), với 124 quốc gia trên thế giới bây giờ xem xét Trung Quốc của họ đối tác thương mại lớn nhất và duy nhất 76 có rằng mối quan hệ với Hoa Kỳ Như của kinh tế phụ thuộc lẫn nhau với (hoặc sự phụ thuộc vào) Trung Quốc phát triển, các quốc gia trong vùng sẽ tìm thấy nó khó khăn hơn và khó khăn hơn để phù hợp với lợi ích chiến lược của Hoa Kỳ tại các chi phí kinh tế của tiền cần thiết của mối quan hệ với Trung Quốc. Cao dân tộc và sức bất bình với các biện pháp nặng tay Trung Quốc vì nó là, Nhật bản vẫn còn phải cắn đạn, ngắc giữa bảo vệ chủ quyền của mình trên các Senkakus và giữ thị trường rộng lớn của Trung Quốc. Bên trong ASEAN, thực tế này cũng giải thích tại sao Thái Lan, một đồng minh không thuộc NATO Hiệp ước của Hoa Kỳ, đã nghiêng nhiều hơn đối với Trung Quốc trong quá khứ vài năm và Campuchia gần như bán ra của nó chủ tịch ASEAN 2012 Trung Quốc về vấn đề biển đông. Cuối cùng, Hoa Kỳ là do không có nghĩa là sẵn sàng cho một cuộc xung đột ở Châu á. Phải đối mặt với vách đá"tài chính" và một cao chia rẽ đảng phái chính trị, khoảng cách giữa của Hoa Kỳ cam kết khu vực và khả năng cung cấp mở rộng đến một mức độ nguy hiểm. Nó sẽ là rất khó khăn cho Hoa Kỳ để can thiệp quân sự trong vùng hoặc đến để cứu các đồng minh của Hoa Kỳ nếu lợi ích quan trọng và chiến lược không (cho là) bị đe dọa. Một thập kỷ của tốn kém và không được ưa chuộng chiến tranh tại Iraq và Afghanistan đã làm cho sự mệt mỏi khu vực bị dị ứng với nước ngoài can thiệp Hoa Kỳ, do đó tiếp tục những phức tạp của chính trị gia có thể đứng lên đến Trung Quốc vào nước ngoài p
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Essay topic: “Countries relying on the United States to balance China’s power are bound to be disappointed in the long run”. Discuss.
Since the initial years of the 21st century onwards, nothing has rattled countries in Asia more than the rise of China. From the South and East China Seas to the remote China - India borders, mounting tensions have recently led many countries in the region to seek some form of balancing against a revisionist and increasingly assertive China. Understandably, as the United States pivots itself to Asia in the past two years, it has found that strategy openly or tacitly embraced by many countries in the region, not least those mired in territorial and maritime disputes with China. While the concept and practice of balancing is as old as the world, the inevitable rise of China and the relative decline of the United States have raised serious questions as to whether this strategy will work in the long run or not. In this essay, I will argue that while it may not be in any country’s best interest to use a far-away and declining power to balance against a resident and rising one, the opposite option of allowing China to establish hegemony in the Asia-Pacific would be equally catastrophic. And the answer for countries seeking a viable strategy and a sustainable and stable regional security architecture may lie somewhere between those two extremes.
Balancing as a natural behavior in power politics
Balancing is the most practised policy option for countries facing a security dilemma. According to traditional realism, in an anarchic world, countries often feel threatened by the prospect of hegemony imposed by a fast rising power. As a policy, balance of power suggests that states counter any threat to their security by allying with other threatened states (external balancing) or increasing their own military capabilities (internal balancing). In Waltz’s words, “hegemony leads to balance… through all of the centuries we can contemplate”. In many cases, balance of power has helped the threatened states prevent a great power from becoming a hegemon. The defeat of Athens by an alliance led by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War, the fall of the Habsburg Empire driven by a coalition of Sweden, England, France and the Netherlands in the Thirty Years’s War, the defeat of Germany and Japan in WWII by the Allies, and the fall of the Soviet Union after the Cold War are striking examples, to name but a few. China itself also followed the strategy of balancing in the 1970s: it colluded with the U.S. to balance against the Soviet Union. In sum, “great powers that seek hegemony are always opposed – and defeated – by the countering efforts of other states”.
The rationale for balancing in the Asia-Pacific
Aaron Friedberg pointed out an inevitable rule: “the external expansion of the UK and France, Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States coincided with phases of intense industrialization and economic development”. In Asia, China’s very name (the Middle Kingdom), its expansionist history and new-found strength after three decades of double-digit economic growth suggest that if left unchecked, China would settle for nothing less than a regional, if not global, hegemony in the upcoming decades. According to John Mearsheimer, as China’s power continues to grow, “China, like all previous potential hegemons, will be strongly inclined to become a real hegemon”. China is the only great power in the Asia-Pacific that possesses both the capability and the will to unseat the U.S. as the regional hegemon. From the EP-3 incident in 2001, the Impeccable incident in 2009 and the most recent announcement by China on November 27th 2012 that from January 1st 2013 onwards, Hainan coast guards will board or seize foreign ships that China considers illegally entering its territorial waters of the islands within the “nine-dashed lines”, China has sent unmistakably strong signals that it wants to kick the U.S. out of the Western Pacific and exercise China’s Monroe Doctrine in Asia.
Whither the United States?
While balancing the U.S. against China seems to be the most natural choice for countries threatened by the rise of China, it is necessary to look into Asia’s contemporary history and the prospective correlation of power between the U.S. and China to predict whether this strategy will work in the long run or not.
Firstly, the balancing strategy only works in the manipulator’s best interest in a state of a controlled strategic competition between the balancer and the balanced. In the other two extreme scenarios of conflict/confrontation or concession/collusion between the balancer and the balanced, it is very detrimental to the interest of the manipulator. In 1978, Vietnam signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. Yet the Soviet Union failed to come to Vietnam’s rescue when the latter was attacked by China in the 1979 border war. As the Chinese saying goes, “distant waters cannot put out a nearby fire”. In the same year, the decade-long collusion between the U.S. and China to contain the Soviet Union culminated in the U.S.’s decision to cut its diplomatic ties with Taiwan and establish diplomatic relations with communist China. These are bitter lessons for (small) countries balancing one great power against another. As the overall interests of the great powers in their relations with each other often outweigh those in their relations with the smaller states, the possibility of a sell-out is always present.
History has also shown that a much weaker and isolated China without nuclear weapons still decided to confront the U.S. militarily in the 1950-1953 Korean War when it felt its security or buffer zone breached. Today’s powerful China may be less hesitant. Fueled by the pride in its magnificent civilization, the resentment towards the West accumulated in “the century of humiliation” and the new-found strength after three decades of breakneck economic growth, China’s nationalism has been on the rise, which makes it much harder for Chinese leaders to make concessions or pursue a rational foreign policy, especially on territorial and maritime issues. This is exactly the dilemma facing the U.S.: the more the U.S. tries to contain China and prevent it from becoming a regional hegemon, the more determined and hard-line China becomes to protect its perceived security interests. That is why the China-Philippines standoff over the Scarborough shoal ended with China’s de facto control of the shoal despite the Philippines’ outcry and repeated calls for the U.S.’s assistance.
Secondly, in both economic and military power, the U.S. is in relative decline as compared with China and the rest of the world. After the WWII, The U.S.’s GDP accounted for nearly %50 of the world economy. Today, it stands at a meager %23, and will continue to fall further in tandem with China’s rise. Although the U.S.’s current defense budget still equals that of 14 next biggest spenders combined, the USD 500 billion cut by the Pentagon in the next 10 years will make serious dents in the U.S.’s power projection capability. On the contrary, China’s defence spending is expected to overtake that of the U.S. in 2030. The coming end of the American Era as Stephen Walt predicted means that the U.S. will be no longer capable of exercising hegemony in the Asia-Pacific as it did. While President Clinton could send two aircraft carrier groups to the Taiwan Straits in 1996 when China intimidated Taiwan during the island’s elections, such an act is today unimaginable in view of the changing correlation of power between China and the U.S. China may not yet be able to confront the U.S. directly, but its state-of-the-art military hardware and anti-access and area-denial (AA/AD) strategy can surely inflict some unacceptable costs on the U.S should it intervene militarily in China’s sphere of influence. The ongoing standoff between the United States threatens eventually to shift in China's favor in East Asia, largely due to China's geographical centrality to the region. It is therefore inevitable that China will try to revise the norms and rules of the game in the Asia-Pacific instead of accepting an order imposed by the U.S.
Thirdly, China has surpassed the U.S. to become the largest trading partner of almost every country in the Asia-Pacific (including U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia), with 124 countries in the world now considering China their largest trading partner and only 76 having that relationship with the U.S. As their economic interdependence with (or dependence on) China grows, countries in the region will find it harder and harder to accommodate the U.S’s strategic interests at the expense of their much needed economic relations with China. Highly nationalistic and indignant with the Chinese heavy-handed measures as it is, Japan still has to bite the bullet, tiptoeing between defending its sovereignty over the Senkakus and keeping China’s huge market. Within ASEAN, this reality also explains why Thailand, a non-NATO treaty ally of the U.S., has tilted more towards China over the past few years and Cambodia almost sold out its 2012 ASEAN Chairmanship to China over the South China Sea issue.
Finally, the U.S. is by no means ready for a conflict in Asia. Faced by the “fiscal cliff” and a highly divisive partisan politics, the gap between the U.S.’s regional commitments and its ability to deliver is widening to a dangerous extent. It would be very hard for the U.S. to intervene militarily in the region or come to the rescue of the U.S.’s allies if its vital and strategic interests are not (believed to be) at stake. A decade of costly and unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has made the tired American public allergic to foreign intervention, thus further complicating politicians’ ability to stand up to China on foreign p
Essay topic: “Countries relying on the United States to balance China’s power are bound to be disappointed in the long run”. Discuss.
Since the initial years of the 21st century onwards, nothing has rattled countries in Asia more than the rise of China. From the South and East China Seas to the remote China - India borders, mounting tensions have recently led many countries in the region to seek some form of balancing against a revisionist and increasingly assertive China. Understandably, as the United States pivots itself to Asia in the past two years, it has found that strategy openly or tacitly embraced by many countries in the region, not least those mired in territorial and maritime disputes with China. While the concept and practice of balancing is as old as the world, the inevitable rise of China and the relative decline of the United States have raised serious questions as to whether this strategy will work in the long run or not. In this essay, I will argue that while it may not be in any country’s best interest to use a far-away and declining power to balance against a resident and rising one, the opposite option of allowing China to establish hegemony in the Asia-Pacific would be equally catastrophic. And the answer for countries seeking a viable strategy and a sustainable and stable regional security architecture may lie somewhere between those two extremes.
Balancing as a natural behavior in power politics
Balancing is the most practised policy option for countries facing a security dilemma. According to traditional realism, in an anarchic world, countries often feel threatened by the prospect of hegemony imposed by a fast rising power. As a policy, balance of power suggests that states counter any threat to their security by allying with other threatened states (external balancing) or increasing their own military capabilities (internal balancing). In Waltz’s words, “hegemony leads to balance… through all of the centuries we can contemplate”. In many cases, balance of power has helped the threatened states prevent a great power from becoming a hegemon. The defeat of Athens by an alliance led by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War, the fall of the Habsburg Empire driven by a coalition of Sweden, England, France and the Netherlands in the Thirty Years’s War, the defeat of Germany and Japan in WWII by the Allies, and the fall of the Soviet Union after the Cold War are striking examples, to name but a few. China itself also followed the strategy of balancing in the 1970s: it colluded with the U.S. to balance against the Soviet Union. In sum, “great powers that seek hegemony are always opposed – and defeated – by the countering efforts of other states”.
The rationale for balancing in the Asia-Pacific
Aaron Friedberg pointed out an inevitable rule: “the external expansion of the UK and France, Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States coincided with phases of intense industrialization and economic development”. In Asia, China’s very name (the Middle Kingdom), its expansionist history and new-found strength after three decades of double-digit economic growth suggest that if left unchecked, China would settle for nothing less than a regional, if not global, hegemony in the upcoming decades. According to John Mearsheimer, as China’s power continues to grow, “China, like all previous potential hegemons, will be strongly inclined to become a real hegemon”. China is the only great power in the Asia-Pacific that possesses both the capability and the will to unseat the U.S. as the regional hegemon. From the EP-3 incident in 2001, the Impeccable incident in 2009 and the most recent announcement by China on November 27th 2012 that from January 1st 2013 onwards, Hainan coast guards will board or seize foreign ships that China considers illegally entering its territorial waters of the islands within the “nine-dashed lines”, China has sent unmistakably strong signals that it wants to kick the U.S. out of the Western Pacific and exercise China’s Monroe Doctrine in Asia.
Whither the United States?
While balancing the U.S. against China seems to be the most natural choice for countries threatened by the rise of China, it is necessary to look into Asia’s contemporary history and the prospective correlation of power between the U.S. and China to predict whether this strategy will work in the long run or not.
Firstly, the balancing strategy only works in the manipulator’s best interest in a state of a controlled strategic competition between the balancer and the balanced. In the other two extreme scenarios of conflict/confrontation or concession/collusion between the balancer and the balanced, it is very detrimental to the interest of the manipulator. In 1978, Vietnam signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. Yet the Soviet Union failed to come to Vietnam’s rescue when the latter was attacked by China in the 1979 border war. As the Chinese saying goes, “distant waters cannot put out a nearby fire”. In the same year, the decade-long collusion between the U.S. and China to contain the Soviet Union culminated in the U.S.’s decision to cut its diplomatic ties with Taiwan and establish diplomatic relations with communist China. These are bitter lessons for (small) countries balancing one great power against another. As the overall interests of the great powers in their relations with each other often outweigh those in their relations with the smaller states, the possibility of a sell-out is always present.
History has also shown that a much weaker and isolated China without nuclear weapons still decided to confront the U.S. militarily in the 1950-1953 Korean War when it felt its security or buffer zone breached. Today’s powerful China may be less hesitant. Fueled by the pride in its magnificent civilization, the resentment towards the West accumulated in “the century of humiliation” and the new-found strength after three decades of breakneck economic growth, China’s nationalism has been on the rise, which makes it much harder for Chinese leaders to make concessions or pursue a rational foreign policy, especially on territorial and maritime issues. This is exactly the dilemma facing the U.S.: the more the U.S. tries to contain China and prevent it from becoming a regional hegemon, the more determined and hard-line China becomes to protect its perceived security interests. That is why the China-Philippines standoff over the Scarborough shoal ended with China’s de facto control of the shoal despite the Philippines’ outcry and repeated calls for the U.S.’s assistance.
Secondly, in both economic and military power, the U.S. is in relative decline as compared with China and the rest of the world. After the WWII, The U.S.’s GDP accounted for nearly %50 of the world economy. Today, it stands at a meager %23, and will continue to fall further in tandem with China’s rise. Although the U.S.’s current defense budget still equals that of 14 next biggest spenders combined, the USD 500 billion cut by the Pentagon in the next 10 years will make serious dents in the U.S.’s power projection capability. On the contrary, China’s defence spending is expected to overtake that of the U.S. in 2030. The coming end of the American Era as Stephen Walt predicted means that the U.S. will be no longer capable of exercising hegemony in the Asia-Pacific as it did. While President Clinton could send two aircraft carrier groups to the Taiwan Straits in 1996 when China intimidated Taiwan during the island’s elections, such an act is today unimaginable in view of the changing correlation of power between China and the U.S. China may not yet be able to confront the U.S. directly, but its state-of-the-art military hardware and anti-access and area-denial (AA/AD) strategy can surely inflict some unacceptable costs on the U.S should it intervene militarily in China’s sphere of influence. The ongoing standoff between the United States threatens eventually to shift in China's favor in East Asia, largely due to China's geographical centrality to the region. It is therefore inevitable that China will try to revise the norms and rules of the game in the Asia-Pacific instead of accepting an order imposed by the U.S.
Thirdly, China has surpassed the U.S. to become the largest trading partner of almost every country in the Asia-Pacific (including U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia), with 124 countries in the world now considering China their largest trading partner and only 76 having that relationship with the U.S. As their economic interdependence with (or dependence on) China grows, countries in the region will find it harder and harder to accommodate the U.S’s strategic interests at the expense of their much needed economic relations with China. Highly nationalistic and indignant with the Chinese heavy-handed measures as it is, Japan still has to bite the bullet, tiptoeing between defending its sovereignty over the Senkakus and keeping China’s huge market. Within ASEAN, this reality also explains why Thailand, a non-NATO treaty ally of the U.S., has tilted more towards China over the past few years and Cambodia almost sold out its 2012 ASEAN Chairmanship to China over the South China Sea issue.
Finally, the U.S. is by no means ready for a conflict in Asia. Faced by the “fiscal cliff” and a highly divisive partisan politics, the gap between the U.S.’s regional commitments and its ability to deliver is widening to a dangerous extent. It would be very hard for the U.S. to intervene militarily in the region or come to the rescue of the U.S.’s allies if its vital and strategic interests are not (believed to be) at stake. A decade of costly and unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has made the tired American public allergic to foreign intervention, thus further complicating politicians’ ability to stand up to China on foreign p
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