For the United States, the era of a

For the United States, the era of a "rising China" is a novel challenge. For Vietnam, it's the reprise of a thousand year old theme. China's quest for hegemony over the South China Sea has eroded the legitimacy of Hanoi's communist government. Coincidentally it has accelerated movement toward a strategic entente between Hanoi and Washington.

The U.S.-Vietnam relationship now evolving has an air of belated geopolitical inevitability. Though still controversial in precincts of Vietnam's all-powerful Communist Party (CPV), among non-members (96 percent of Vietnam's 93 million people) the notion of an intimate connection with the U.S. is highly popular. The nation's present and future prosperity depends greatly on access to the markets of America and its allies and to their technology and capital. However, Vietnam itself must find the political will to reform domestic institutions that limit its ability to turn access into wealth.

Forty years after its end, the "American War" no longer stirs up strong feelings in Vietnam. Almost without exception, Vietnamese insist that they don't bear grudges, a notion dating officially from 1988 when Hanoi adopted the foreign policy goal of making "more friends and fewer enemies." The regime had no real choice then; post-unification efforts to collectivize agriculture, build heavy industry from scratch and allocate goods according to a central plan had failed, just as Vietnam's Soviet advisors had predicted. At that time the Soviet bloc itself was crumbling, and with it the fraternal assistance that kept Vietnam's economy barely afloat in the face of a U.S.-sponsored trade embargo.

Internally, Hanoi embarked on "doi moi," or economic reform. Party congresses cleared Vietnam's way to the 'socialist market economy,' something that came to look a lot like capitalism. Indeed, vibrant capitalist impulses surfaced to fill the economic spaces that were poorly served by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, the state enterprise sector was not dismantled, nor – though agriculture was de-collectivized – was ownership of land actually returned to farmers.

That half-finished socio-economic transition sufficed for a couple of decades. Year after year Vietnam's economy grew by about seven percent. Exports of rice, fish, coffee and cashew nuts soared. Investors from South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan provided the know-how and capital for thriving garment and footwear assembly industries. Nearly everyone was better off. Although wealth disparities were increasingly evident, they mainly prompted the desire to get rich also.

By 2007, the year Vietnam was admitted to the World Trade Organization (WTO), it had become a pillar of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and per capita income had reached US $1000, ten times the 1989 level. The Hanoi regime had forged dozens of constructive foreign relationships. Especially significant were deepening and broadening ties with the United States and China.

Though pragmatism drove Vietnam's relationships with China and with the U.S., ideology conditioned them.

Always uncomfortably close by and insistent on the deference that a younger brother owes to an elder, China has been a central problem for Vietnamese statecraft for over a thousand years. Much of that time, the two nations have gotten along well enough. Elite contacts with China shaped Vietnamese culture. Ho Chi Minh's battalions could not have worn down French and American armies without fraternal aid from Mao's China. Later on, when Hanoi belatedly opted to follow Beijing on "the capitalist road," its leaders assigned high priority to engaging Chinese counterparts at all levels of the Party and government.

Often, however, relations with Beijing have been testy. A recurring theme of Vietnamese history is dogged and ultimately successful resistance against invaders. As every schoolboy learns, most often those invading armies have been Chinese. As recently as 1979, Deng Xiao Ping sought – and failed – to "teach Vietnam a lesson" for deposing the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia.

After diplomatic relations were restored in 1995, the United States became a lucrative market for Vietnamese-made goods. Still, the CPV continued to perceive a threat. Though the ruling party had shed most of its Marxism, it was still profoundly Leninist in its determination to keep a tight grip on Vietnam's political life. To the officials responsible for internal security in Vietnam, the U.S. had not abandoned its hostile intentions. The Americans had simply grown more subtle, said the party media, propagating the "concept of civil society" and "masterminding the peaceful evolution forces."

As long as Vietnam's economy boomed and China could credibly assure its neighbors that its rise to great power status would be peaceful, the Hanoi regime's tilt to China and the public's preference for warmer relations with the U.S. was a manageable disagreement.

Just a few years later, however, the Hanoi regime fumbled the Great Global Recession. As the nation's export markets shrank in 2008, Vietnam's leaders resolved to pump up domestic demand until foreign buyers returned. They did this chiefly by directing credit to the state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector. Remarkably little effort was made to supervise these firms' use of the State Bank's largesse. Much of the windfall went into property development schemes unrelated to the SOEs' normal business. More went into their acquisition or creation of new banks that would then create more credit and lend it back to their shareholders.

In 2010, the property bubble burst. Borrowers defaulted in droves, and the nation's banks were stuck with a huge percentage of non-performing loans. Regulators claim that these now amount to less than four percent of the banking system's assets; sovereign credit rating agencies insist that the true figure is near 15 percent.

Further, the shipbuilding conglomerate Vinashin, into which Hanoi had pumped US $4 billion, required rescuing. Next to fall into bankruptcy was the state-owned ocean shipper and port operator, Vinalines. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung had touted both firms as a new model for state enterprises.

In 2009, meanwhile, Beijing resurrected a claim to Chinese hegemony "since ancient times" over the South China Sea. Off Vietnam's long coast, Chinese vessels stepped up harassment of Vietnamese fishermen and interference with oil and gas exploration.

An internet-enabled public speaks up

These events coincided with an information revolution. Though there has long been a dissident fringe in Vietnam, it didn't have a means of reaching a large audience until the explosive growth of internet access.[1] From 200,000 users in 2000, internet penetration in Vietnam has grown to 40 million, roughly 55 percent of Vietnamese over age 14.

As more and more citizens logged on, they found a heady broth of alternative opinion on topics that Vietnam's licensed media were forbidden to address. Now, beyond the reach of regime censors, blogs that address serious public issues receive millions of daily hits. Facebook accounts, which over 30 million Vietnamese access regularly, are full of political chatter.

Net surfers in 2008 learned, for example, that the government had issued permits for the China Aluminum Company to strip-mine bauxite in Vietnam's south central highlands. Early discussion emphasized social and environmental impacts of the project, but soon morphed into unprecedentedly public debate over the party-state's alleged subservience to China at the expense of national security.

Meanwhile, Vietnam’s economic crisis deepened. In 2011 the regime was forced to tighten credit. Economists concluded that the dynamism liberated by the doi moi policies was exhausted. The public mood was sour, and non-party Vietnamese were openly venting their discontent to each other. Perhaps police agents were listening, but dissenters sensed safety in numbers, and there was plenty to deplore: the bankruptcies of hundreds of thousands of small businesses and investors, petty corruption, police brutality, inequitable access to health care and education, rolling power cuts and the regime's conciliatory posture toward China's offshore provocations.

Gridlock

The CPV was clearly in trouble, too. Few of the nation's best and brightest any longer were choosing party careers. Those who went into public service generally had little interest in ideology; their primary objectives had become promotion and profit. According to analyst Alexander Vuving, many of the CPV's senior cadres are neither conservatives nor modernizers, but simply opportunists who have found the status quo very comfortable.[2] Vuving explains it this way: capitalism offers opportunities to make profit, while communism offers a monopoly of power. A mixture of the two creates conditions for using money to buy power and using power to make money.

Possibly because too many of its leaders were invested in the status quo, the CPV had long been unable to resolve certain issues. As seen already, one such issue was Vietnam's stance toward China, on one hand, and Western countries on the other. Another was the state's role in the economy – should it be a participant, through control of many large enterprises, or should it privatize SOEs and concentrate on providing the conditions that allow private enterprise to flourish? There was, in addition, continuing intra-party debate on management of information (while, over the past decade, the state's ability to control it has slipped away) and on whether party actions should be bound by law and subject to review by independent judges.

At party congresses in 2001, 2006 and 2011, though there was much hand-wringing about widespread corruption, mismanagement and the Party's ebbing legitimacy, consensus on decisive reforms had been beyond reach. Each time, positions were redistributed mainly with a view to maintaining factional and regional balance. Old cadre

Kết quả (Việt) 1:

Đối với Hoa Kỳ, thời đại của một "Trung Quốc tăng" là một thách thức tiểu thuyết. Đối với Việt Nam, nó là reprise một ngàn năm tuổi chủ đề. Nhiệm vụ của Trung Quốc cho quyền bá chủ trên biển Nam Trung Quốc đã xói mòn tính hợp pháp của chính phủ cộng sản của Hà Nội. Thật trùng hợp, nó đã tăng tốc các phong trào Hướng tới một chiến lược Quốc giữa Hà Nội và Washington.Mối quan hệ Mỹ-Việt Nam phát triển bây giờ có một không khí của belated về địa chính trị không thể tránh được. Mặc dù vẫn còn gây tranh cãi trong khu vực của Việt Nam toàn năng cộng sản Đảng (CPV), trong số không thành viên (96 phần trăm của Việt Nam 93 triệu người) các khái niệm của một kết nối thân mật với Hoa Kỳ là rất phổ biến. Sự thịnh vượng hiện tại và tương lai của quốc gia phụ thuộc nhiều vào việc truy cập vào các thị trường Mỹ và đồng minh của nó và của công nghệ và thủ đô. Tuy nhiên, Việt Nam chính nó phải tìm sẽ chính trị để cải cách tổ chức trong nước hạn chế khả năng của mình để truy cập vào sự giàu có.Bốn mươi năm sau khi kết thúc của nó, "Chiến tranh Mỹ" không khuấy động lên các cảm xúc mạnh mẽ tại Việt Nam. Hầu như không có ngoại lệ, Việt Nam đã nhấn mạnh rằng họ không mang mối hận thù, một khái niệm hẹn hò chính thức từ năm 1988 khi Hanoi thông qua mục tiêu chính sách đối ngoại của làm cho "bạn bè nhiều hơn và ít hơn kẻ thù." Chế độ không có thực sự lựa chọn sau đó; thống nhất đất nước sau khi cố gắng collectivize nông nghiệp, xây dựng công nghiệp nặng từ đầu và phân bổ các hàng hóa theo một kế hoạch Trung tâm đã thất bại, cũng giống như cố vấn Xô viết của Việt Nam đã dự đoán. Tại thời điểm đó khối Xô viết chính nó đổ nát, và với nó hỗ trợ anh em mà giữ nền kinh tế Việt Nam hiếm khi nổi khi đối mặt với một lệnh cấm vận thương mại tài trợ U.S..Nội bộ, Hanoi bắt tay vào "đổi mới", hoặc kinh tế. Đại hội Đảng rời Việt Nam cách để ' xã hội chủ nghĩa kinh tế thị trường,' một cái gì đó mà đến để trông rất giống như chủ nghĩa tư bản. Thật vậy, sôi động tư bản xung bề mặt để điền vào các không gian kinh tế kém đã được phân phối bởi các doanh nghiệp nhà nước (nhà). Tuy nhiên, khu vực doanh nghiệp nhà nước không được tháo dỡ, cũng -mặc dù nông nghiệp đã được de-collectivized-quyền sở hữu đất thực sự quay trở lại nông dân.Rằng một nửa đã hoàn thành quá trình chuyển đổi kinh tế xã hội sufficed cho một vài thập kỷ. Năm này qua năm kinh tế của Việt Nam tăng khoảng 7%. Xuất khẩu gạo, cá, cà phê và hạt tăng vọt. Nhà đầu tư từ Hàn Quốc, Nhật bản và Đài Loan cung cấp các bí quyết và vốn cho phát triển mạnh quần áo và giày dép hội ngành công nghiệp. Gần như tất cả mọi người là tốt hơn hết. Mặc dù sự giàu có chênh lệch đã ngày càng rõ ràng, họ chủ yếu là nhắc nhở những mong muốn để làm giàu cũng.Năm 2007, Việt Nam năm được gia nhập tổ chức thương mại thế giới (WTO), nó đã trở thành một trụ cột của các Hiệp hội của đông nam á gia (ASEAN), và thu nhập bình quân đầu người đã lên tới US $1000, mười lần mức 1989. Chế độ Hanoi có giả mạo hàng chục xây dựng mối quan hệ nước ngoài. Đặc biệt là đáng kể đã được sâu sắc và mở rộng quan hệ với Hoa Kỳ và Trung Quốc.Mặc dù chủ nghĩa thực dụng lái xe mối quan hệ của Việt Nam với Trung Quốc và với Hoa Kỳ, tư tưởng có điều kiện họ.Luôn luôn hẹp không tiện nghi gần đó và van lơn ngày phụ thuộc một đứa em trai nợ để một người cao tuổi, Trung Quốc đã là một vấn đề Trung tâm cho statecraft Việt Nam trong hơn một nghìn năm. Nhiều thời gian đó, hai nước đã nhận cùng cũng đủ. Ưu tú liên hệ với Trung Quốc hình văn hóa Việt Nam. Tiểu đoàn thành phố Hồ Chí Minh có thể không có mòn xuống quân đội Pháp và Mỹ đều không có anh em viện trợ từ Trung Quốc của Mao. Về sau, khi Hanoi bị công bố muộn đã lựa chọn để làm theo Beijing trên "đường tư bản", các nhà lãnh đạo gán ưu tiên cao để tham gia các đối tác Trung Quốc ở mọi cấp của Đảng và chính phủ.Often, however, relations with Beijing have been testy. A recurring theme of Vietnamese history is dogged and ultimately successful resistance against invaders. As every schoolboy learns, most often those invading armies have been Chinese. As recently as 1979, Deng Xiao Ping sought – and failed – to "teach Vietnam a lesson" for deposing the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia.After diplomatic relations were restored in 1995, the United States became a lucrative market for Vietnamese-made goods. Still, the CPV continued to perceive a threat. Though the ruling party had shed most of its Marxism, it was still profoundly Leninist in its determination to keep a tight grip on Vietnam's political life. To the officials responsible for internal security in Vietnam, the U.S. had not abandoned its hostile intentions. The Americans had simply grown more subtle, said the party media, propagating the "concept of civil society" and "masterminding the peaceful evolution forces."As long as Vietnam's economy boomed and China could credibly assure its neighbors that its rise to great power status would be peaceful, the Hanoi regime's tilt to China and the public's preference for warmer relations with the U.S. was a manageable disagreement.Just a few years later, however, the Hanoi regime fumbled the Great Global Recession. As the nation's export markets shrank in 2008, Vietnam's leaders resolved to pump up domestic demand until foreign buyers returned. They did this chiefly by directing credit to the state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector. Remarkably little effort was made to supervise these firms' use of the State Bank's largesse. Much of the windfall went into property development schemes unrelated to the SOEs' normal business. More went into their acquisition or creation of new banks that would then create more credit and lend it back to their shareholders.In 2010, the property bubble burst. Borrowers defaulted in droves, and the nation's banks were stuck with a huge percentage of non-performing loans. Regulators claim that these now amount to less than four percent of the banking system's assets; sovereign credit rating agencies insist that the true figure is near 15 percent.Further, the shipbuilding conglomerate Vinashin, into which Hanoi had pumped US $4 billion, required rescuing. Next to fall into bankruptcy was the state-owned ocean shipper and port operator, Vinalines. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung had touted both firms as a new model for state enterprises.In 2009, meanwhile, Beijing resurrected a claim to Chinese hegemony "since ancient times" over the South China Sea. Off Vietnam's long coast, Chinese vessels stepped up harassment of Vietnamese fishermen and interference with oil and gas exploration.An internet-enabled public speaks upThese events coincided with an information revolution. Though there has long been a dissident fringe in Vietnam, it didn't have a means of reaching a large audience until the explosive growth of internet access.[1] From 200,000 users in 2000, internet penetration in Vietnam has grown to 40 million, roughly 55 percent of Vietnamese over age 14.As more and more citizens logged on, they found a heady broth of alternative opinion on topics that Vietnam's licensed media were forbidden to address. Now, beyond the reach of regime censors, blogs that address serious public issues receive millions of daily hits. Facebook accounts, which over 30 million Vietnamese access regularly, are full of political chatter.Net surfers in 2008 learned, for example, that the government had issued permits for the China Aluminum Company to strip-mine bauxite in Vietnam's south central highlands. Early discussion emphasized social and environmental impacts of the project, but soon morphed into unprecedentedly public debate over the party-state's alleged subservience to China at the expense of national security.Meanwhile, Vietnam’s economic crisis deepened. In 2011 the regime was forced to tighten credit. Economists concluded that the dynamism liberated by the doi moi policies was exhausted. The public mood was sour, and non-party Vietnamese were openly venting their discontent to each other. Perhaps police agents were listening, but dissenters sensed safety in numbers, and there was plenty to deplore: the bankruptcies of hundreds of thousands of small businesses and investors, petty corruption, police brutality, inequitable access to health care and education, rolling power cuts and the regime's conciliatory posture toward China's offshore provocations.GridlockThe CPV was clearly in trouble, too. Few of the nation's best and brightest any longer were choosing party careers. Those who went into public service generally had little interest in ideology; their primary objectives had become promotion and profit. According to analyst Alexander Vuving, many of the CPV's senior cadres are neither conservatives nor modernizers, but simply opportunists who have found the status quo very comfortable.[2] Vuving explains it this way: capitalism offers opportunities to make profit, while communism offers a monopoly of power. A mixture of the two creates conditions for using money to buy power and using power to make money.Possibly because too many of its leaders were invested in the status quo, the CPV had long been unable to resolve certain issues. As seen already, one such issue was Vietnam's stance toward China, on one hand, and Western countries on the other. Another was the state's role in the economy – should it be a participant, through control of many large enterprises, or should it privatize SOEs and concentrate on providing the conditions that allow private enterprise to flourish? There was, in addition, continuing intra-party debate on management of information (while, over the past decade, the state's ability to control it has slipped away) and on whether party actions should be bound by law and subject to review by independent judges.At party congresses in 2001, 2006 and 2011, though there was much hand-wringing about widespread corruption, mismanagement and the Party's ebbing legitimacy, consensus on decisive reforms had been beyond reach. Each time, positions were redistributed mainly with a view to maintaining factional and regional balance. Old cadre