1. This case was originally published by the American Accounting Association in Issues in Accounting Education, Vol. 15, May 2000, 237-255. I would like to thank Tracey Sutherland, Executive Director of the American Accounting Association, for granting permission to include this case in this edition of Contemporary Auditing: Real Issues and Cases.2. T. Serju, “Rite Aid Puts on a Bright, New Face, The Detroit News (November 14), B1.3. This and all subsequent quotations, unless indicated otherwise, were taken from Securities and Exchange Commission, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1037, 19 May 1998. 4. Sources used in developing this case did not disclose the actual dollar amount of the differences noted in earlier years between Perry’s book and physical inventories. In Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1037, the SEC simply reported that, “the amount of these discrepancies (book-to-physical differences for individual Perry stores during fiscal 1992) was far in excess of discrepancies identified in prior fiscal years.”5. During late 1992, Perry began installing a chain-wide, electronic perpetual inventory system. Such a system allows a business to update its inventory records instantaneously when employees enter in a computer terminal a sale, sales return, purchase or other transaction affecting inventory. This installation was completed in late 1993. As noted earlier in the case, Perry’s major competitors had previously installed such systems. No doubt, Perry’s executives realized that to compete effectively with those firms, they had to obtain the cost savings and strategic benefits yielded by an electronic inventory system. The new inventory system included point-of-sale terminals, electronic surveillance technology to detect theft, and a computer-based distribution network to provide for timely and accurate shipments from Perry’s warehouses to its retail outlets. Most important, the new electronic inventory system allowed Perry’s store managers to closely monitor the sales volume of individual products.6. The SEC’s enforcement releases did not indicate how Arthur Andersen applied this materiality standard. Most likely, Arthur Andersen intended that any error or collective errors that reduced Perry’s net income by $700,000 or more would be considered material. 7. Recall that Stone had retained Arthur Andersen’s computer risk management group earlier in 1992 to investigate the source of the large inventory shortage. As previously noted, that group’s study concluded that computer breakdowns were not the cause of the shortage. The audit procedures discussed in this section of the case were performed entirely by the Arthur Andersen audit engagement team assigned to the 1992 audit of Perry Stores.8. Perry Drug Stores issued a news release on October 12, 1993, to announce the fourth-quarter write-down of inventory (PR Newswire, “Perry Reports Noncash Charge for Inventory Adjustment,” October 12, 1993). In that news release, Perry management reported that the gross profit margin percentages used in the past by the company to estimate its inventories had apparently differed from the company’s actual gross profit margin percentages. The news release speculated that these differences were likely due to several factors, including an unanticipated negative impact on Perry’s gross profit margins of various sales promotions carried out by the company. 9. Securities and Exchange Commission, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release #1015, March 10, 1998.10. “The independent auditor’s direct personal knowledge, obtained through physical examination, observation, computation, and inspection, is more persuasive than information obtained indirectly.” (AU Section 326.21.)
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