Tóm tắtNgân hàng thống trị Trung Quốc hệ thống tài chính,cung cấp khoảng ba phần năm số tất cả các tín dụng cho cácBãi đỗ riêng sector.1 Đây không phải là quá khác nhau từ châu Âucấp, nhưng tương phản với hệ thống Hoa Kỳ,nơi thị trường tài chính và phi ngân hàng cho vaycung cấp cho các tín dụng một cách đáng kể thêm hơn ngân hàng. CácHệ thống ngân hàng Trung Quốc là khá tập trung,với các ngân hàng năm tách gần một nửa các khoản cho vay tất cảthị trường, 2 đó là một chút ít tập trunghơn nhiều thị trường quốc gia ở châu Âu nhưng nhiều hơn nữatập trung hơn ở Hoa Kỳ.Một sự khác biệt lớn với nhiều hơn nữa phát triển tài chínhHệ thống, Tuy nhiên, là mức độ cao của quyền sở hữu nhà nướcvà kiểm soát. Các ngân hàng Trung Quốc lớn nhất nămđược phần lớn thuộc sở hữu của chính phủ Trung ươngvà có cổ phần đáng kể chính phủ trongnhiều người trong số các ngân hàng khác. Hơn nữa, chính phủcan thiệp tích cực hơn trong ngân hàng quyết địnhhơn ở phía tây. Quan trọng nhất, ngân hàng Trung ươngmột cách rõ ràng đặt ra lãi suất tối đa cho tiền gửivà tối thiểu lãi suất tỷ giá cho vay, và thườngbộ nhắm mục tiêu cấp độ cho khối lượng cho vay.Nhà lãnh đạo chính phủ và đảng có thể phát huy đáng kểảnh hưởng đằng sau hậu trường, thường đẩyCác khoản vay để cụ thể công ty, lĩnh vực, hoặc các khu vực đểtiếp tục chương trình nghị sự chính trị. Các mối liên kết chặt chẽgiữa chính phủ và ngân hàng, cũngnhư là sức mạnh phổ biến của Đảng Cộng sản,làm cho điều này có thể. Không giống như ở phía tây, các cơ hội nghề nghiệpCác ngân hàng quan trọng nhất được xác định bởithe Party and many of them move in and out ofthe banking sector along the course of their careers.The big banks lend principally to large, stateownedenterprises (SOE’s), although the proportionhas declined substantially in recent years.One of the great outstanding questions is whythis occurs and how it might change in the future.There are at least five broad reasons for thislending bias, some of which also apply in Westernmarkets.Strong business positions. Some of the majorborrowers are simply very good credit risks becauseof their strong business positions, resultingfrom monopolistic or oligopolistic power, superiorbusiness models, or other factors. (In recentyears, firms with majority state ownership reportedlyrepresented 35% of business activity inChina, but earned 43% of the profits.3) Firms mayalso have grown large because of their strengths.Further, size can bring a degree of diversificationthat in its own right reduces credit risk and makesthem more attractive borrowers. In all of thesecases, there is no particular mystery as to whythese SOE’s would be favored customers.Implicit government guarantees. There is a widelyheld perception that the government would notlet a large state-owned enterprise formally defaulton their loans. This implicit guarantee is potentiallyof great value, although it does not precludethe lender suffering economic losses by beingforced to accept modifications to the loan termsthat fall short of default. There are also degrees
in the strength of these implicit guarantees. For
example, SOE’s that are owned, or controlled in
practice, by powerful central ministries have a
greater certainty of support than entities owned
by less powerful government bodies.
Career safety. The large state-owned banks are
now sufficiently commercial in their outlooks that
loan officers do risk their jobs if their borrowers
default. However, there is a clear perception that
lending to a large SOE will never be a career-ending
decision, whereas lending to private borrowers
could be.
Personal relationships. Senior officials at large
SOE’s are in a position to favor bank officers, including
through their Party influence, and there
The Chinese Financial System: An Introduction and Overview
John L. Thornton China Center at BROOKINGS
4
will often be social relationships as well, such as
school connections.
Direct government or Party influence. Sometimes
an influential official will strongly urge a
loan to be made, essentially circumventing normal
credit procedures. This is apparently less common
than in the past, and there is more likelihood
of resistance, but it certainly still occurs today to
an extent that is hard to quantify. One reason it
is hard to measure is because there are legal limits
on how strongly one can push a loan officer to
make a specific loan, intended precisely to reduce
the extent to which such pressure is exerted.
Government and party leaders have recognized
that it is too easy for large SOE’s to acquire loans
and too hard for many smaller, purely private
firms to compete. As a result, leaders are encouraging
the banking sector to lend more to smaller
firms and have also become more open to other
avenues of credit provision, such as the informal
sector. One of the analytical debates about China
is the extent to which the large banks will be able
to change their behavior toward smaller firms. On
the one hand, China’s leaders have proven adept
over the years at generating the changes that they
wish to see. On the other hand, it is not clear that
the key incentives described above will change.
Some analysts also believe that the big banks simply
do not have the culture and systems necessary
to lend successfully to small, private firms.
There is also much analytical debate about the
sources of bank profit. Pessimists contend that the
large banks are fat and happy, benefitting from a
combination of a ceiling on interest rates for deposits,
(their main source of funding), and credit
quotas set by the Chinese central bank, which allow
banks to charge higher lending rates for those
loans they do make. These government interest
rates and credit quotas are becoming increasingly
flexible, and may even disappear, over time. Even
now, they can be circumvented in various ways,
such as through the use of certain “wealth management”
products that are deposit-like, but pay
higher rates. If the pessimists are right, banks
could have serious problems as their net interest
margins become squeezed. This could lead them,
like some Savings & Loans in the US in the 1970s
and 1980s, to take unreasonable risks to restore an
acceptable level of profitability. It could also lead
to a slowdown in loan growth, as banks’ internal
capital generation slows and external capital
sources find the banking industry less attractive.
Optimists believe the large banks will be considerably
more flexible and intelligent in their responses,
and that the government and Party will
sensibly manage the process of change with an eye
towards avoiding these potential problems.
Bond markets are another source of credit for
companies, particularly larger firms. However,
the Chinese corporate bond market is smaller
and less sophisticated than in the US and Europe,
and at present the banks are the largest holders
of these corporate bonds. But, the corporate bond
market is growing rapidly. Net issuance of corporate
bonds increased by 65% in 2012, according to
the PBOC’s figures on the size of various components
of finance, and now represents about 16% of
net new credit.4
In addition to serving as competition
to the banks, and an alternative way for them
to invest, the development of the corporate bond
market may also take some pressure off the banks
to act as a quasi-fiscal arm of the government.
Chinese stock markets provide another source of
funding for businesses. However, there are several
problems that hold these markets back from
reaching their full potential. First, the markets
are dominated by speculators to a far greater extent
than in Western nations. There are multiple
reasons for this, the most fundamental of which
is that Chinese law, regulation and governance
patterns considerably constrain the control that
shareholders can exercise over management.
These problems are exacerbated for the many
publicly traded firms where the government owns
a majority stake. Lacking the ability to influence
business choices and dividend levels, or to sell the
The Chinese Financial System: An Introduction and Overview
John L. Thornton China Center at BROOKINGS
5
firm as a whole, shareowners place less reliance
on underlying firm value and focus more on likely
stock price movements in the short run. Many
Chinese also attribute speculation to a national
love of gambling, but it is very hard to know
whether this stereotype applies and the extent to
which it affects investment decisions.
Another factor contributing to the speculation,
and holding back the stock markets in its own
right, is the relative dearth of institutional investors,
who may make more informed and reasoned
decisions than individuals. Even if they were no
more rational in their behavior, their absence
reduces the potential size of the stock markets
and therefore the ability to generate new capital
through sales of stock by firms.
Chinese regulators also limit the size of the stock
markets through very close control of Initial Public
Offerings. Western nations generally allow a
new issuance as long as appropriate documentation
is provided to investors to allow them to
make informed decisions, whereas China only
allows an IPO to proceed with specific approval
that takes into account, on an ad hoc basis, a wider
range of considerations. Regulators apparently
maintain informal quotas that hold down issuance
volumes.
Other parts of the regulated financial system remain
fairly undeveloped in China, although they
are generally growing strongly from low levels.
The insurance industry is about two-fifths of
the size of the US market, relative to the size of
its economy. The asset management industry is
even smaller in relative terms at a mere fraction
of American or European levels. Trust companies
are an increasingly large part of the overall system,
but the sector remains relatively smaller than
the non-bank lending sector in the US.
In response to the gaps and rigidities in the formal
financial system, China, in line with many developing
countries, has a large and diverse informal
financial sector. Lenders in this sector include
loan
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