to link and recognize, which make v

to link and recognize, which make voluntary information disclosure start to be popular.
The promotion of stock market supervisory organization. The responsibility of stock market
supervisory organization is to uphold the market’s principle of “fairness, impartiality and openness”
to be effectively carried out. Stock market supervisory organization is entitled to require listed
companies to disclose their accounting information according to relevant regulations, which has two
main purposes: one is to standardize the content and pattern of listed companies’ accounting
information disclosure, making the caliber, scope and content of each listed company’s accounting
information disclosure accord with one another; the other is to force listed companies to disclose their
information timely, comprehensively and truthfully according to relevant regulations, to improve the
quality of information disclosure, to prevent them from disclosing only a selection of information so
as to reduce external information users’ cost of acquiring listed companies’ information, and to
prevent ill competition among listed companies in the stock market simultaneously.
Internal influencing factors.
Company scale is an important factor influencing listed companies’ voluntary information
disclosure.There is no unified conclusion about the relation between company scale and voluntary
information disclosure in previous studies, which is correlated with various countries’ difference in
political, economical and cultural background. As far as China’s listed companies are concerned,
companies with larger scale generally take on more social responsibilities and more supervision.
Company scale has positive effect on voluntary information disclosure. Listed companies in China,
especially large-and-medium-sized state-owned enterprises, prefer equity financing, which is decided
by the imbalance of the development of China’s financial market and by the discriminatory policy of
stock market. Small companies can only choose bank loans as the main financing channel. In addition,
overseas direct and indirect investments give preference to large-scale companies. Therefore, large
listed companies will choose the way of voluntary information disclosure to transmit strategic
information to the market to enhance investors’ faith, improve the companies’ market value, and
reduce the companies’ equity financing cost.
Company governance structure is also an influencing factor of voluntary information
disclosure. Voluntary information disclosure helps a lot of large and small shareholders to obtain
more information that is related to the companies’ management. There is a principal-agent relation
between shareholders and the management. Because of the separation of ownership from control
power, information asymmetry occurs between the investors and operators. Shareholders (principals)
are unable to observe all of managers’ actions, and they cannot fully understand the management’s
operating capacity. Instead, they can only judge the operators’ effort by means of relevant operating
information of the companies. When there is big difference between investors’ and companies’
anticipated profit, companies will have motivation to carry on voluntary information disclosure to
eliminate stock price fluctuation such information asymmetry brings, which is also a means of
communication between investors and the companies’ operating management. To obtain a kind of
domination profit, listed companies can only transmit signals to their competent departments
continuously by means of voluntary information disclosure to show the management’s effort and the
companies’ operating performance.
Company performance also affects the degree of voluntary information disclosure.
According to the theory of investment behavioral uncertainty, the stock market investment reward
rate is uncertain. Full disclosure of listed companies’ voluntary information can change the subjective
probability distribution of the investment reward rate, attract more investors to concern and support
the companies’ development so that the operating risk is reduced. Therefore, companies with good
operating performance have initiative disclosure motive, while companies with bad operating
performance also have to disclose to maintain their consistent prestige in the capital market and to
avoid lawsuit risk. Many listed companies expect to highlight their competitive advantage, to show
their image, and to improve their attraction for investors by means of voluntary information
disclosure. In order to show their advantage in operating efficiency as well as their own value, some
institutional investors, which has strong ability to perceive and analyze information. Moreover, the
information which institutional investors demand is not limited to that given in the financial
statements. Instead, they base more on the different information listed companies voluntarily disclose