In contrast to the United States, European and Japanese central banks and governments did nottry to return to the high growth rates, with low unemployment and inflation, which characterized theirspectacular quarter century of postwar reconstruction and prosperity 1947–1972. They did not eventry to recover the real economic ground they lost in the 1970s and early 1980s. Instead they concentratedon eliminating the slightest chance of any resurgence of inflation. European unemploymenthas risen to 12 percent in 1997, compared to 4.7 percent in the United States. Inflation in Europe isno lower than in America.Japanese unemployment numbers are chronically low, because redundant workers are kept onpayrolls; but the increase in under-utilization of workers is comparable to Europe. Indeed Japan hasmanaged to have a full-blown depression for the past four years, with periods of negative growth andnegative inflation. As a result of lack of demand, not because of deliberate expansionary monetarypolicy, short interest rates have fallen virtually to zero. Thus monetary policy has become impotent,5even if the central bank should want to use it to rescue the economy. Thus has Keynes’s liquidity trap,thought even by Keynes himself to be an anomalous and rare curiosity confined to severe depressions,come to life once more. The Finance Ministry, unwilling to fill the breach in aggregate demand anddistressed by the fiscal cosmetics of a stagnant economy, acts perversely to raise taxes and cutspending. Japanese savers move the funds no one wants to borrow at home into dollars, causing theyen to depreciate (losing 40 percent of its dollar value since 1995), generating an ever larger tradesurplus, welcome within Japan as needed demand but unwelcome to the U.S. and other tradingpartners. It would be hard to find a case of worse macro-economic policy. As terribly costly as it hasbeen to Japan itself, it has been much more disastrous to other economies of East Asia, as events inlate 1997 have shown.
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