Abstract Euro Disneyland a theme pa

Abstract
Euro Disneyland a theme park comprised of an updated, state of the art Disney's Magic Kingdom, is a subsidiary of the
Walt Disney Company located outside Paris, France, and has experienced numerous complications from its inception.
This article introduces the fretful of Euro Disney, analyzes the reasons why it goes to wrong and give the
recommendation to overcome the rattrap.
Keywords: Euro Disneyland, Cultural differences, Management hubris
1. Introduction
Many companies throughout the United States and beyond are resorting to developing their business abroad. The Walt
Disney Company was one of the American organizations to expand on foreign soil. Its first foreign venture Tokyo
Disneyland proved to be so successful that the decision was made to further expand abroad. This next foreign expansion
experience, named Euro Disneyland all hopes were high, with Michael Eisner, the chairperson of Walt Disney
promising to make Euro Disney the “most lavish project that Disney had ever built”. He had an obsession with
maintaining Disney’s high reputation, as Disney had already seen the success of California and Florida Disneyland.
While Euro Disney did not prove to be the successful venture that had been anticipated by its creators.
Euro Disneyland a theme park comprised of an updated, state of the art Disney's Magic Kingdom, is a subsidiary of the
Walt Disney Company located outside Paris, France, and has experienced numerous complications from its inception.
Because the Walt Disney Company executives were determined to adhere to American philosophies, they did not
thoroughly investigate all aspects of the European environment.
As a company planning on expanding abroad, it is helpful to study the history of companies, which previously have
developed in other countries. For example, studying the Walt Disney Company's venture into France will allow other
companies to learn from the Walt Disney Company's experiences. Recognizing, understanding and avoiding their
mistakes will allow a company entering a new country increased opportunity to succeed. Reviewing the Euro
Disneyland venture from the site research investigation to the present day operation will be beneficial to a company
considering expansion abroad.
2. Where Euro Disney went wrong
Disney made a number of mistakes in relation to planning for Euro Disney. While there was extensive research and
planning, Disney may have disregarded some of the most important cultural aspects, including environmental and
location factors, labor laws, competition, financing, cultural differences and management hubris.
2.1 Environmental and location factors
While over 200 locations in Europe were examined before selecting the outside of Paris, Disney relied on Europe’s
biggest appeal for tourism. It was viewed that millions of people could easily access Euro Disney, as the French
government was spending hundreds of millions of dollars to provide infrastructure such as railroad so people could
access the theme park. The opening to the Channel Tunnel in 1993 would make the trip from London to Euro Disney
approximately three hours and ten minutes. However, the location was on the east Paris, not the west, despite the advice
of the French. The French advised that if it were placed on the west, there would be no long-term population in the east.
Erisner also considered the weather impacts and because France has colder weather than California and Florida, waiting
areas and moving side walks would be covered, protecting visitors from wind and rain. Because there is only six months
of the year that is pleasant, visitors were not encouraged on a year round basis. Although accommodation were made, in
fact that off-season visit had to be heavily discounted had promoted to group to get even reasonable attendance still
represented a major problem that needed to be corrected. Whether through pricing charges or development of other
attraction or other marketing and promotional vehicles, attendance in the off-park months had to be increased. Vol. 1, No. 2 International Journal of Marketing Studies
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2.2 Cultural differences
The firm’s senior marketing strategist presented the second part of the report, which focused on culture and marketing
difference between U.S and European markets. The first phase of the analysis had uncovered a number of obvious
problems some of which had already been rectified. The purpose in identifying these problems, the consultant said, was
to be able to sensitive and identify other possibly more subtle and marketing problems. Although European public
acceptance of the theme park itself has not been a problem for Euro Disneyland there has been a different type of
cultural clash. Most Europeans believe there is cultural imperialism. Europeans have not taken to the "...brash,
frequently insensitive and often overbearing style of Mickey's American corporate parent". Disney executives'
contentious attitudes exacerbated the difficulties it encountered by alienating people with whom it needed to work. "Its
answer to doubts or suggestions invariably was: Do as we say, because we know best".
There were various errors made in the operations of Euro Disneyland, which affected the French culture. An example if
this is the Walt Disney Company's policy of serving no alcohol in its parks in California, Florida, and Tokyo, which it
extended to France. However by implementing this American strategy, it caused astonishment and rebellion in France
where a glass of wine for lunch is a given. It failed to recognize that alcohol is viewed as a regular beverage with meals
and a part of daily life. After much consideration, in May 1993, the Walt Disney Company changed its policy and
allowed wine and beer in the Euro Disneyland theme park.
Another failure is the Walt Disney Company's misunderstanding European breakfast norms. The initial thinking was
that Europeans did not generally eat a big breakfast and, as result restaurant were planned to seat only a small number
of breakfast guests. This proved incorrect with large numbers of people showing up for substantial breakfasts. Disney
was told Europeans did not eat sit-down breakfasts. This resulted in Disney downsizing their restaurants before Euro
Disneyland opened. Once it opened the restaurants were bombarded with breakfast eaters.
In much the same vein, the Walt Disney Company had difficulty realizing that the Europeans were accustomed to eat at
a set time every day. Where Americans are content to wander around the parks with lunch in their hands, a large
majority of the European guests would converge on the restaurants at 12:30 p.m. expecting to be seated for a leisurely
lunch. This caused the lines to be very long. To complicate matters further, once the Europeans reached the front of the
line they were told they could not have wine or beer with their lunch. Thus, the Europeans did not have a positive
"Disney experience" while eating their meals. In addition, it was difficult for Euro Disneyland's managers to staff for
these one or two hour "rush hours."
The forth example of a cultural error is the Europeans approach to vacation time. Disney also thought that because the
French and Germans typically have five weeks’ vacation, compared to American, who on average has two-three weeks,
it would be an advantage to them. The Europeans prefer a few longer holidays rather than several short breaks.
Attendance at the Euro Disney was also seasonal; with parents normally waiting for the school summer holidays to go.
Therefore, there were not a lot of people during the non-vocational months. This was compared to American parents,
who would take their children out of school to go on holidays. The Europeans are reluctant to take their children from
school for a vacation in mid-session whereas Americans do it frequently. Also, The Walt Disney Company was
convinced that it would be able to "Americanize" the European habits. Unfortunately for the Walt Disney Company, this
was not the case.
While attendance was strong when the park first opened, Euro Disneyland involved the computer stations at the hotels.
Euro Disneyland executives assumed guests would stay at the park for several days. This in fact did not happen. Many
guests arrived early in the morning, spent the day at the park, checked into the hotel late that night, and then checked
out early the next morning before heading back to the park. In comparison to the United States, the average stay was
four nights. They felt that this was because in Florida and California, there are multiple theme parks, not just one as in
France. Since there were so many guests’ checking-in and checking-out, additional computer stations had to be installed
at the hotels in order to decrease the amount of time the guests stood in line.
Finally, in the initial design of the project, it was assumed that Europeans would be like Americans in term of
transportation around the park and form the hotels to the park attractions. In the United States, a variety of trains, boats,
and tramways carried visitors from hotel to the park. Although it was possible to walk, most Americans choose to ride.
Europeans on the other hand choose to walk rather than ride, leaving the vehicles significantly underutilized. While not
directly affecting revenues, the capital as well as ongoing costs for this transportation was considerable. Parking
facilities were built accordingly as were facilities for bus drivers who would transport passengers to the park. Once
again, the initial planning vastly underestimated the proportion of visitors who would arrive by bus as part of school,
community or other group. Facilities for the bus drivers to park their buses and rest were inadequate. The problem
initial solved.
2.3 Financing and the initial business plan
Euro Disney’s key financial plan w