After the 1994 TSS reform, healthcare expenditures were shifted from the central government to sub-national governments. The officials of sub-national governments have been pursuing GDP-centered economic growth for the pur- pose of being promoted, at the cost of public healthcare investment. Based on the relevant government regulations, the healthcare expenditure responsibility is jointly assumed by central, provincial, prefectural, and county levels of gov- ernments.3 In fact, the expenditures of central government on healthcare havebeen minimized. It is provincial and sub-provincial level governments that shoulder the task. Specifically, sub-national governments have assumed 97% of healthcare expenditures in recent years while the central government shares only 3%. However, the major part of sub-national government revenues has been used to initiate large-scale infrastructure construction and investment projects in addition to funding administrative expenses. The remaining public funds available for healthcare are minimal. In contrast with the average 9% growth rate of nominal GDP annually, total healthcare expenditures as a per- centage of nominal GDP decreases— from about more than 1% in 1981 to less than 1% in 2006.4 Furthermore, the share of healthcare expenditures in total government expenditures also decreased from more than 5% in 1981 to less than 5% in 2006 (see Figure 3).Figure 2. Compositions of total healthcare expenditures, 1978-2006 Due to the reduction in government expenditures for healthcare and the in- creasing marketization of medical services, the overall performance of health-3 For example, The State Council Document No. 3, ―The Decision on Public Health Reform and Development‖, issued in January 1997, requires that public spending on health care at both the central government and sub-national governments increase at a higher rate of growth than general budgetary expenditures.4 See http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/2006/Jan/1087140.htm care is unsurprisingly deteriorating. Reduced government healthcare expendi- tures directly restrain the healthcare capital accumulation, which could result in deteriorating healthcare outcomes such as stagnating IMR reduction in the 1990s and 2000s. In a health fairness assessment conducted by the WHO in 2002, China was ranked 144th among the 191 countries in the world. Besidesoverall poor performance, the disparities in healthcare expenditures are also widening. Government healthcare expenditures have shifted from rural areas to urban areas in order to train professional medical staff, purchase capital- intensive medical facilities, and finance advanced medical research. The gap between urban and rural areas on healthcare expenditures is ever increasing in terms of healthcare expenditures per capita (see Figure 4). Hillier and Shen (1996) estimate that the gap of healthcare expenditures per capita between urban and rural areas increased four folds in 1981 and six folds in the 1990s.Figure 3. Shares of total health expenditures in total government expenditures and nominal GDP, 1981-2006 Through many years’ trials, China has now endeavored to realize a com- prehensive healthcare system. In urban areas, it is combined from socially accumulated funds and personal accounts with minimum compulsory medical insurance, employer’s compensatory medical insurance, and individual com- mercial medical insurance. In rural areas, a new rural cooperative medical sys- tem has been carried out with joint funding from rural residents, sub-national governments, and the central government.Although the 1978 economic reforms have brought remarkable economic growth in China, the healthcare delivery has not seen much improvement. The IMR reduction has stagnated after 1980, as shown in Figure 1. Meanwhile, the life expectancy has remained roughly the same from 68 in 1982 to 69 in 1993 (Hsiao & Liu, 1996). Furthermore, as Bloom and Gu (1997) and Liu et al. (1999) reported, almost every single healthcare indicator is better for urban residents than for rural residents after the economic reforms. For example, infant mortality in urban areas has been consistently dropping albeit at a slow- er rate compared to the speed before 1978 while the IMR in rural areas has been constantly increasing since the 1990s.Figure 4. Total health expenditures per capita in urban and rural areas Notes: (1) The total health expenditures include government budgetary expenditures on health, extra-budgetary expenditures on health and personal health expenditures; (2) the measurement unit is yuan per person.3. LITERATURE REVIEWInfant mortality and life expectancy are frequently chosen as measure- ments of the level of overall health in current literatures. In contrast with life expectancy’s being influenced more by personal health investment, accumula- tion of positive or negative factors during one’s life and individual living ha- bits, infant mortality is impacted more by income level, public spending, and local medical facilities. Accordingly, to quantify the impact of income and public healthcare expenditures, this study focuses on infant mortality only.Infant mortality can be a result of both direct and indirect causes. The for- mer is mainly medical including immediate causes (such as immaturity, birth injury, genetic disease, and congenital anomaly) and chronic causes (such as malnutrition, prenatal care, availability of all vaccines, and infection). The indirect causes of infant mortality consist of social, economic and environ- mental factors that cause infants to be more exposable and sensitive to direct causes. These factors include, but are not limited to, income level, income distribution, public healthcare expenditures, healthcare human capital, health- care physical capital, women’s labor force participation, urbanization, ethno- linguistic fractionalization, quality of governance, public sanitation and other issues dealing with infrastructure such as access to safe water and electricity, and so forth. Among them, public healthcare expenditures are direct input, whereas healthcare human capital (such as the number of doctors or nurses per one thousand persons) and physical capital (such as the number of hospital beds per one thousand persons) are healthcare direct output. The overall ef- fects of fiscal decentralization on the healthcare outcome include direct effects such as cost saving in production and delivery of healthcare services as well as indirect effects such as increased healthcare expenditures or improved health- care capital.Although historically IMRs fluctuate with wars, famines, epidemics and social turmoil, as the general welfare of a society improves its IMR declines. Therefore, rich countries tend to have a lower IMR than poor ones.Flegg (1982) conducts a cross-underdeveloped-country study over the pe- riod of 1968-1972 and uses OLS estimations controlling for income inequality, female fertility rate, female illiteracy rate, and healthcare human capital (measured by the number of doctors per 1,000 persons and the number of nurses per 1,000 persons). The result shows that the impact of per capita real GDP on IMR is not statistically significant, which suggests that income level (measured by per capita real GDP) is not a direct determinant of infant mortal- ity and may affect infant mortality only indirectly through such factors as healthcare human capital. In fact, using the WHO’s cross-country data in 2004, Anand and Barnighausen (2004) have confirmed the significantly positive relationship between healthcare human capital and infant mortality reduction.Previous studies also find that public healthcare expenditures have a posi- tive impact on infant mortality. For example, Corman, Grossman, and Joyce (1987) use the 1977 cross-county neonatal mortality rates in the U.S. and find that poverty-related public health expenditure programs play an important role in reducing neonatal mortality. The World Bank (1995) also documents the significant effect of public health expenditure on infant mortality reduction in backward areas of the Philippines. Using demographic and health survey data from over 60 low-income countries between 1990 and 1999, Wang (2003) finds that infant mortality in rural areas is substantially higher than in urban areas. A recent study by Bokhari, Gai, and Gottret (2007) estimates the elastic- ity of under-five-year-old child mortality with respect to both income and government health expenditures using instrumental variable techniques and finds that mortality is affected by government health expenditure but not by economic growth.
On the other hand, some studies have produced opposing results. For ex- ample, Filmer and Pritchett (1999) use the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and World Bank cross-country data with IV estimation and find that the effects of public health expenditures on infant mortality are both sta- tistically and economically insignificant. Musgrove (1996) summarizes that among the determinants of infant mortality, the income variable is always sig- nificant while healthcare expenditure share in GDP, healthcare expenditures in total government expenditures, and the government expenditure share in GDP are all insignificant. Using a cross-sectional sample containing 117 countries in 1993 and a model correcting for heteroscedasticity, Zakir and Wunnava (1999) find that government healthcare expenditure and its share of GNP do not play a role in determining infant mortality. Berger and Messer (2002) also argue that the reverse relationship between healthcare expenditures and IMR reduction by previous studies does not hold based on their analysis of 1960- 1992 data across 20 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop- ment (OECD) countries using OLS estimation. On the contrary, they find that an increase in public healthcare expenditures is associated with an increase
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