Shared NeighbourhoodDR GOPALJI MALV

Shared Neighbourhood
DR GOPALJI MALVIYA
The perception exists that after the North Korean nuclear weapons test of October 9, 2006, China is now surrounded by nuclear-weapons States all round. Yet, China is the only nation to which North Korea was talking all along even after the ‘Six-Nation Initiative’ was launched in 2003 to dissuade Pyongyang from going nuclear. China has been encouraging, pampering, cultivating Pyongyang as a counterweight to the US on the ‘Taiwan issue’. It may issue some mildly critical statement against Pyongyang, but has been following a ‘nod-and-wink’ policy on North Korea. China already has a friendly Pakistan as another nuclear weapons State in the neighbourhood and has made amends with Russia, with the result Beijing is the ultimate beneficiary from the North Korean nuclear test.
In this situation, the Japanese are likely to flex their muscle and even modify Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, to go in for nuclear weapons. If that happens, the US would be cornered. The Americans already have a problem on hand with Taiwan. In the perception of some Chinese scholars, the US is a declining military power, given the American experience in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. It is also a declining economy domestically, and the American technological excellence too may not last long. In this background, China would want to take on the US after a couple of decades, and prides itself as the ‘rising power’. Given the US-Japan relations and the Taiwan question, China will have to be assertive - in a visible, yet passive, way. Or, so goes the perception.
With China changing, there is an imperative need for making ‘continental bridges, continental connectivity’, as the momentum for the global power-centre is likely to emerge in Asia. India has to look at China not as a challenge but as an opportunity, be it economic, geo- politic or geo-strategic, as per the ‘Rajamandala theory’ of Kautaliya. The present-day geo-political situation warrants that China, not the US, should be the best bet for India. If the India-US ‘civilian nuclear deal’ comes through, China may play the ‘Pakistan card’ more vigorously against India. We have not been able to counter the prolonged Chinese support of Pakistan, we have not done enough to see that this clique is broken and the threat in this sector eliminated. This has to be addressed and is possible only with greater engagement with China.
Starting with the path-breaking visit of then External Affairs Minister A. B. Vajpayee in 1979, China has maintained the twin-promises of not supporting insurgencies in India’s north-eastern States, and not backing Pakistan on the ‘Kashmir issue’. Unlike the US, China does not refer to the ‘Kashmir issue’ any more— and, in fact, told Pakistan to respect the Line of Control (LoC) ahead of the Kargil War, which was not the case in the past. The Chinese have displayed positive gestures, and the confidence-building measures (CBMs), of keeping the differences on the shelf and improving ties in other areas, a strategy worthy of being replicated on the India- Pakistan front. India should not adopt a rigid stand on the sanctity of the McMohan Line, as in the past. China has since recognised Sikkim as part of India, and India has acknowledged Tibet as an Autonomous Region of China.
Deng Xiaoping sought to make China a modern military machine, but quantity is not a reflection on the quality. Deng’s deadline has been pushed backwards from 2005 to 2015, or 2020, and the pace is decidedly slow. Despite successive tinkering, the Chinese still follow the ‘People’s War’ ideology of Mao, given the large territory, but they are also gradually reducing manpower and increasing machine power. They may have 7000 tanks, but most of them are museum pieces. Just because the Chinese won against India in 1962 does not make them a great military power. From Vietnam in 1978, they came back bruised and broken. The world has never seen the Chinese Air Force, with its Soviet-designed MiGs, in action, particularly under the Himalayan conditions. The real capabilities of their Han class and the Xia class nuclear submarines are also unknown. India is also on the rise, and there is no reason to panic - but the Chinese definitely are a bigger military power. India and China have not had a nuclear dialogue so far, and any discussions in this regard could be path-breaking.
The Chinese have their India-related concerns with the Dalai Lama and Karmapa being stationed here; India’s Ganga-Mekong initiative, its 'tilt’ towards the US, which occupies China’s mind while conducting business with India. Similarly, India has its problems with China, its all¬weather friendship with Pakistan, China’s involvement in and ability to woo other South Asian neighbours against India, through trade, weapons supply, and small arms proliferation. Through vibrant foreign policy and trade, India needs to make China a better friend so that some of these concerns could be neutralised.

Kết quả (Việt) 1:

Shared NeighbourhoodDR GOPALJI MALVIYAThe perception exists that after the North Korean nuclear weapons test of October 9, 2006, China is now surrounded by nuclear-weapons States all round. Yet, China is the only nation to which North Korea was talking all along even after the ‘Six-Nation Initiative’ was launched in 2003 to dissuade Pyongyang from going nuclear. China has been encouraging, pampering, cultivating Pyongyang as a counterweight to the US on the ‘Taiwan issue’. It may issue some mildly critical statement against Pyongyang, but has been following a ‘nod-and-wink’ policy on North Korea. China already has a friendly Pakistan as another nuclear weapons State in the neighbourhood and has made amends with Russia, with the result Beijing is the ultimate beneficiary from the North Korean nuclear test.Trong tình huống này, quân Nhật có khả năng để flex cơ bắp của họ và thậm chí sửa đổi bài viết 9 của Hiến pháp Nhật bản, để đi ở cho vũ khí hạt nhân. Nếu điều đó xảy ra, Mỹ sẽ được dồn. Người Mỹ đã có một vấn đề trên tay với Đài Loan. Trong nhận thức của một số học giả Trung Quốc, Hoa Kỳ là một sức mạnh quân sự từ chối, được đưa ra kinh nghiệm người Mỹ tại Iraq, Afghanistan và các nơi khác. Nó cũng là một nền kinh tế suy giảm trong nước, và sự xuất sắc công nghệ Mỹ quá có thể không kéo dài. Trong nền tảng này, Trung Quốc sẽ muốn có trên Hoa Kỳ sau khi một vài thập kỷ, và tự hào 'tăng cường'. Đưa ra các mối quan hệ Hoa Kỳ-Nhật bản và các câu hỏi Đài Loan, Trung Quốc sẽ cần phải quyết đoán - một cách có thể nhìn thấy được thụ động. Hoặc, do đó đi nhận thức.With China changing, there is an imperative need for making ‘continental bridges, continental connectivity’, as the momentum for the global power-centre is likely to emerge in Asia. India has to look at China not as a challenge but as an opportunity, be it economic, geo- politic or geo-strategic, as per the ‘Rajamandala theory’ of Kautaliya. The present-day geo-political situation warrants that China, not the US, should be the best bet for India. If the India-US ‘civilian nuclear deal’ comes through, China may play the ‘Pakistan card’ more vigorously against India. We have not been able to counter the prolonged Chinese support of Pakistan, we have not done enough to see that this clique is broken and the threat in this sector eliminated. This has to be addressed and is possible only with greater engagement with China.Starting with the path-breaking visit of then External Affairs Minister A. B. Vajpayee in 1979, China has maintained the twin-promises of not supporting insurgencies in India’s north-eastern States, and not backing Pakistan on the ‘Kashmir issue’. Unlike the US, China does not refer to the ‘Kashmir issue’ any more— and, in fact, told Pakistan to respect the Line of Control (LoC) ahead of the Kargil War, which was not the case in the past. The Chinese have displayed positive gestures, and the confidence-building measures (CBMs), of keeping the differences on the shelf and improving ties in other areas, a strategy worthy of being replicated on the India- Pakistan front. India should not adopt a rigid stand on the sanctity of the McMohan Line, as in the past. China has since recognised Sikkim as part of India, and India has acknowledged Tibet as an Autonomous Region of China.Đặng Tiểu Bình đã tìm cách để làm cho Trung Quốc máy quân sự hiện đại, nhưng số lượng không phải là một sự phản ánh về chất lượng. Hạn chót của Đặng Tiểu Bình đã được dời về phía sau từ năm 2005 đến năm 2015, hoặc đến năm 2020, và tốc độ là decidedly chậm. Mặc dù liên tiếp tinkering, Trung Quốc vẫn theo 'Chiến tranh nhân dân' hệ tư tưởng của Mao, cho lãnh thổ lớn, nhưng họ cũng dần dần giảm nguồn nhân lực và tăng sức mạnh máy. Họ có thể có 7000 xe tăng, nhưng đa số là miếng bảo tàng. Chỉ vì Trung Quốc chiến thắng chống lại Ấn Độ vào năm 1962 không làm cho họ một sức mạnh quân sự tuyệt vời. Từ Việt Nam vào năm 1978, họ đã trở lại thâm tím và bị hỏng. Thế giới chưa bao giờ thấy quân Trung Quốc, nhưng lại với MiG Xô viết thiết kế của nó, trong hành động, đặc biệt là trong điều kiện Himalaya. Các khả năng thực sự của lớp Han và tàu ngầm hạt nhân lớp hạ được cũng không rõ. Ấn Độ cũng đang gia tăng, và không có lý do để lo lắng - nhưng Trung Quốc chắc chắn là một sức mạnh quân sự lớn hơn. Ấn Độ và Trung Quốc đã không có một cuộc đối thoại hạt nhân cho đến nay, và bất kỳ cuộc thảo luận về vấn đề này có thể là con đường-breaking.The Chinese have their India-related concerns with the Dalai Lama and Karmapa being stationed here; India’s Ganga-Mekong initiative, its 'tilt’ towards the US, which occupies China’s mind while conducting business with India. Similarly, India has its problems with China, its all¬weather friendship with Pakistan, China’s involvement in and ability to woo other South Asian neighbours against India, through trade, weapons supply, and small arms proliferation. Through vibrant foreign policy and trade, India needs to make China a better friend so that some of these concerns could be neutralised.