In addition to an assessment on the net benefit accru-ing to passengers, regulatory agencies will also assess the net effect of alliances on national carriers. Alliances may alter the competitive balance and outcomes among domestic carriers. USGAO (1995) concluded, mainly based on interviews with representatives from govern- ments and airlines, that alliances between US and foreign airlines have generated large gains for the participating carriers in terms of passengers and revenues. An exam- ination of stock price reactions to the BA/USAir alliance (see Oum et al. 2000) showed that the alliance tended to increase the (expected) profitability of allying carriers while decreasing the profitability of non-allied carriers. The study suggested that international alliances ap- peared to improve the partners' competitiveness and in turn threatens the rivals' competitive positions. From a national policy viewpoint, the net effect of alliances on all domestic carriers combined is likely to be of prime importance in weighing their desirability.
In sum, the above discussions indicate that interna- tional alliances can provide cost-effective ways for carriers to enter new markets, expand their operations and obtain additional traffic to flow over their existing networks. In addition, alliances, especially those of the complementary type, can benefit consumers by providing additional service options, increasing flight frequencies and enhancing competition in international markets. It appears that competition problems do not really arise for connecting passengers, because there is a strong competi- tion between alliances such that passengers have a choice of more than one hub to connect through. Regulatory agencies should, however, be very careful in granting antitrust immunity to would-be parallel alliance partners.
3. International coordination of regulations
National competition policies play an important role in the international aviation market. For many countries, international operations represent a vital source of their total aviation revenues. Domestic mergers are often justified by the argument that they would help im-prove domestic firms international competitiveness as international aviation is gradually being liberalized. The importance of this argument rests on the importance of economies of scale and oligopoly market structure (hence, imperfect competition). Clougherty (1996) ana- lyzed empirically the influence of merger among domestic airlines on the international airline market. Using cases from North American airline mergers, he found that the increase of market concentration in the domestic market did contribute to an increase in domestic firms' market share in the international market.
When there is an asymmetry in merger/competition policy across countries, cautions should be taken in lib- eralizing air transport markets. Suppose that the foreign country does not have a strong competition policy (or does not enforce it rigorously) while the home country does. Then an unconditional liberalization by the home country may lead to a situation where domestic firms are driven out of market. This is because the merged foreign firm is able to extend its reach to domestic market and realizes economies of scope and density, thereby driving its unit cost down. At the same time, the home firms may not be able to merge and have to be confined within the home market. As home firms exit from the market, merged foreign firms would become the dominant firms, putting an upward pressure on prices. As a result, unilat- eral liberalization may not even achieve its original intention of promoting competition in the home market, let alone it hurts home firms. Unilateral liberalization is not likely, therefore, to be pursued under asymmetric national competition policies. In effect, unilateral liberalization may even reduce world welfare, if the merged firms of the closed country drive out of market the open country firms that happen to be more effcient when they are given equal scale and scope of operations. This could happen because of the access to a larger market by the former (but not the latter) and because of the existence of scale and network economies in the airline business. This will not happen, however, if both markets are open and both countries adopt the same set of competition policies.
Asymmetries in domestic regulatory policy would also make direct application of GATS concepts to air services problematic. Under the GATS negotiation framework, countries negotiate on whether to allow foreign services providers to enter domestic markets (referred to as "mar- ket access"). Once market access is allowed, they negoti-ate on whether foreign firms to be treated the same as indigenous firms (referred to as national treatment). Since domestic regulations remain largely as national affairs, the national treatment principle would effectively increase market access for airlines from nations with closed domestic markets without expanding access for airlines whose domestic markets have already been deregulated (Kasper and Hindley, 1999). As a case in point, national treatment would be sufficient to assure foreign airlines access to the internal markets of de-regulated countries such as the US, Canada, European Union, and Australia. However, it would not help the US, Canadian, EU, and Australian carriers obtain access in foreign markets where, for instance, regulatory limits on entry apply to both own and foreign carriers. As our analysis shows, substantial economies of scope and density make effective access to other markets an essential competitive factor. With the existence of nations still practicing restrictive domestic regulatory systems, there-fore, the application of market access and national treatment does not help resolve the problem of equal access to all markets. Another key GATS principle is the most favored nation (MFN) clause, meaning that the concession that one country yields to another country extends automatically to all other WTO members. In the case of air services, it is not clear that liberalization would be speeded up by the application of such unconditional MFN to traffic rights. In particular, the application may permit `free riding by countries that are unwilling to open their own markets. As a result, large blocs of more liberal nations including US, Canada and EU member states would have probably not been able to agree among themselves on substantially liberal terms were uncondi- tional MFN in place. It appears that even the most liberal nations find it necessary to discriminate in grant- ing traffic rights in order to o!set severe restraints experienced by their own airlines in foreign markets.
The above discussions point to the need to coordi-nate/harmonize competition policies among trading partners in tandem with liberalization of trade in air services. Recent general examples include the promotion of transparency of restrictive business practices policies, extending national laws beyond national borders (i.e., `extraterritoriala application of competition policy), and the harmonization of national rules and procedures. The benefits and costs of a system of internationally coor- dinated competition have received increasing attention in academic literature over the past decade.! Examination of such a system in the context of international aviation is lacking however. Below we discuss briefly the coordina- tion issue for international airline alliances.
As indicated in Section 2, both the US and EU appear to have adopted the policy of specifying remedies that create the conditions for an approval of proposed allian-ces. For alliances in the North Atlantic market, these remedies must be available on both sides of the Atlantic. Regarding the question of slots, for instance, we cannot simply request slots in European airports without being sure that appropriate slots will be available in the US airports for US and EU airlines. Generally, international traffic involves (at least) two hub (or gateway) airports, one in each country. Each country, by its competition policy, may be able to regulate and monitor one hub. Naturally, at the national level each would focus on its own national interest rather than the interest of international aviation markets as a whole. Coordinating the regulation of both hubs would be better however, at the international level. This may require coordination between the regulatory agencies of the two countries involved, or creating a supernational regulatory body.
The need for such coordination arises from two other considerations. First, as mentioned earlier, there exist asymmetries in regulatory policy across countries. Even in countries where competition laws exist, there are variations in them. Second, aviation has traditionally been a regulated industry and, consequently, has been treated somewhat differently when competition policy is concerned. In the US, for instance, aviation has been given limited exemption from antitrust laws. The granting of such antitrust immunity to several strategic alliances is an example of this at the international level. The EU has given block or individual exemptions to tariff conference activities that would otherwise violate Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty. Exemptions also exist in Japan. To the extent where such exemptions do exist, inconsistencies in the rules applied may occur. In some cases, there may be problems associated with transparency and implementation of the rules between countries.
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