without his voice shaking; and perh

without his voice shaking; and perhaps he cannot suppress certain gestures. If there are such characteristic sensations and behavioral manifestations for a moral feeling, these do not constitute the feeling of guilt, shame, indignation, or whatever. Such characteristic sensations and manifestations are neither necessary nor sufficient in particular instances for someone to feel guilty, ashamed, or indignant. This is not to deny that some characteristic sensations and behavioral manifestations of disturbance may be necessary if one is to be overwhelmed by feelings of guilt, shame, or indignation. But to have these feelings it is often sufficient that a person sincerely say that he feels guilty, ashamed or indignant, and that he is prepared to give an appropriate explanation of why he feels as he does (assuming of course that he accepts this explanation as correct).

This last consideration introduces the main question in distinguishing the moral feelings from other emotions and from each other, namely: (d) What is the definitive type of explanation required for having a moral feeling, and how do these explanations differ from one feeling to another? Thus when we ask someone why he feels guilty, what sort of answer do we want? Certainly not any reply is acceptable. A reference merely to expected punishment is not enough; this might account for fear or anxi-ety, but not for guilt feelings. Similarly, mention of harms or misadven-tures that have fallen upon oneself as a consequence of one’s past actions explains feelings of regret but not those of guilt, and much less those of remorse. To be sure, fear and anxiety often accompany feelings of guilt for obvious reasons, but these emotions must not be confused with the moral feelings. We should not suppose, then, that the experience of guilt is somehow a mixture of fear, anxiety, and regret. Anxiety and fear are not moral feelings at all, and regret is connected with some view of our own good, being occasioned, say, by failures to further our interests in sensible ways. Even such phenomena as neurotic guilt feelings, and other devia-tions from the standard case, are accepted as feelings of guilt and not simply as irrational fears and anxieties because of the special type of explanation for the departure from the norm. It is always supposed in such cases that a deeper psychological investigation will uncover (or has uncovered) the relevant similarity to other guilt feelings.

In general, it is a necessary feature of moral feelings, and part of what distinguishes them from the natural attitudes, that the person’s explana-tion of his experience invokes a moral concept and its associated princi-ples. His account of his feeling makes reference to an acknowledged right or wrong. When we question this, we are likely to offer various forms of guilt feelings as counterexamples. This is easy to understand since the


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earliest forms of guilt feelings are those of authority guilt, and we are unlikely to grow up without having what one may call residue guilt feelings. For example, a person raised in a strict religious sect may have been taught that going to the theater is wrong. While he no longer believes this, he tells us that he still feels guilty when attending the theater. But these are not proper guilt feelings, since he is not about to apologize to anyone, or to resolve not to see another play, and so on. Indeed, he should say rather that he has certain sensations and feelings of uneasiness, and the like, which resemble those which he has when he feels guilty. Assuming, then, the soundness of the contract view, the explanation of some moral feelings relies on principles of right that would be chosen in the original position, while the other moral feelings are related to the concept of goodness. For example, a person feels guilty because he knows that he has taken more than his share (as defined by some just scheme), or has treated others unfairly. Or a person feels ashamed because he has been cowardly and not spoken out. He has failed to live up to a conception of moral worth which he has set himself to achieve (§68). What distinguishes the moral feelings from one another are the principles and faults which their explanations typically invoke. For the most part, the characteristic sensations and behavioral manifestations are the same, being psychological disturbances and having the common features of these.

It is worthwhile to note that the same action may give rise to several moral feelings at once provided that, as is often the case, the appropriate explanation for each one can be given (§67). For example, a person who cheats may feel both guilty and ashamed: guilty because he has violated a trust and unfairly advanced himself, his guilt being in answer to the injuries done to others; ashamed because by resorting to such means he has convicted himself in his own eyes (and in those of others) as weak and untrustworthy, as someone who resorts to unfair and covert means to further his ends. These explanations appeal to different principles and values, thus distinguishing the corresponding feelings; but both explanations frequently apply. We may add here that for a person to have a moral feeling, it is not necessary that everything asserted in his explanation be true; it is sufficient that he accepts the explanation. Someone may be in error, then, in thinking that he has taken more than his share. He may not be guilty. Nevertheless, he feels guilty since his explanation is of the right sort, and although mistaken, the beliefs he expresses are sincere.

Next, there is a group of questions concerning the relation of moral attitudes to action: (e) What are the characteristic intentions, endeavors,


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and inclinations of a person experiencing a given feeling? What sorts of things does he want to do, or find himself unable to do? An angry man characteristically tries to strike back, or to block the purposes of the person at whom he is angry. When plagued by feelings of guilt, say, a person wishes to act properly in the future and strives to modify his conduct accordingly. He is inclined to admit what he has done and to ask for reinstatement, and to acknowledge and accept re-proofs and penalties; and he finds himself less able to condemn others when they behave wrongly. The particular situation will determine which of these dispositions are realized; and we may also suppose that the family of dispositions which may be elicited varies according to the morality of the individual. It is clear, for example, that the typical expressions of guilt and the appropriate explanations will be quite different as the ideals and roles of the morality of association become more complex and demanding; and these feelings in turn will be distinct from the emotions connected with the morality of principles. In justice as fairness, these variations are accounted for in the first instance by the content of the corresponding moral view. The structure of precepts, ideals, and principles shows what sorts of explanations are required.

Further, we can ask: (f) What emotions and responses does a person having a particular feeling expect on the part of other persons? How does he anticipate that they will react toward him, as this is shown, say, in various characteristic distortions in his interpretation of others’ conduct toward him? Thus, one who feels guilty, recognizing his action as a transgression of the legitimate claims of others, expects them to resent his conduct and to penalize him in various ways. He also assumes that third parties will be indignant with him. Someone who feels guilty, then, is apprehensive about the resentment and indignation of others, and the un-certainties which thereby arise. By contrast, someone who feels ashamed anticipates derision and contempt. He has fallen short of a standard of excellence, given in to weakness, and shown himself unworthy of association with others who share his ideals. He is apprehensive lest he be cut off and rejected, made an object of scorn and ridicule. Just as the feelings of guilt and shame have different principles in their explanations, they lead us to anticipate different attitudes in other persons. In general, guilt, resentment, and indignation invoke the concept of right, whereas shame, contempt, and derision appeal to the concept of goodness. And these remarks extend in the obvious way to feelings of duty and obligation (if there are such), and to proper pride and a sense of one’s own worth.

Finally, we can ask: (g) What are the characteristic temptations to


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actions that give rise to the moral feeling and how is the feeling typically resolved? Here again there are marked differences between the moral emotions. Feelings of guilt and shame have different settings and are overcome in distinct ways, and these variations reflect the defining principles with which they are connected and their peculiar psychological bases. Thus, for example, guilt is relieved by reparation and the forgive-ness that permits reconciliation; whereas shame is undone by proofs of defects made good, by a renewed confidence in the excellence of one’s person. It is also clear, for example, that resentment and indignation have their characteristic resolutions, since the first is aroused by what we regard as wrongs done to ourselves, the second is concerned with wrongs done to others.

Yet the contrasts between the feelings of guilt and shame are so striking that it is helpful to note how they fit in with the distinctions made between different aspects of morality. As we have seen, a breach of any virtue may give rise to shame; it suffices that one prizes the form of action among one’s excellences (§67). Analogously, a wrong can always occasion guilt whenever others are in some way harmed, or their rights violated. Thus guilt and shame reflect the concern w