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results. For long-lived FHCs (column 4), for profitable FHCs (column 5), and non-
jumping FHCs (column 6), the same results hold: no obvious diversification gains,
but a strong negative link with the non-interest income share.
These panel estimates cast doubt on the notion that continued shifts toward non-
interest income will improve performance. Within FHCs – the dimension that indi-
vidual FHC managers are most interested in – we find no link between changes in
diversification and changes in performance, but a large negative link between perfor-
mance and the non-interest share. The strength and robustness of the relationship
suggests that the high volatility of certain non-interest activities like fees and trading
makes these activities less profitable (on a risk-adjusted basis) than interest-generat-
ing activities.
5. Conclusions
This paper examines the link between revenue diversification and risk-adjusted
performance. Our main conclusion is that diversification benefits between FHCs
are more than offset by increased exposure to non-interest activities, which are quite
volatile but not more profitable than lending activities. Within FHCs, marginal in-
creases in revenue diversification are not associated with performance, which may
reflect either a change in managerial focus or simply reflect the endogenous nature
of the diversification decision. In contrast, marginal increases in non-interest income
are still associated with declines in risk-adjusted profits, suggesting a very robust
relationship.
This is the darkside of diversification as FHCs move into activities that are inher-
ently more volatile, which has implications for a range of FHC stakeholders. Regu-
lators, for example, should be concerned with more volatile revenue streams that
affect default probability, while shareholders should be aware of the potential impli-
cations for firm value due to the potential for missed investment opportunities and
increased costs. Similarly, managers and borrowers could be hurt by wide swings in
realized revenue due to inefficient or restricted allocation of credit. This is likely to be
particularly true for small firms that are dependent on small banks.
This conclusion begs the question of why are FHCs moving into these activities.
One might initially think that normal competitive forces have simply eliminated
profits. While this explains the lack of excess returns for diversified FHCs, it is hard
to reconcile with the finding that more diversified FHCs have consistently higher vol-
atility and lower risk-adjusted profits and suggests that other factors are at work.
One explanation is that FHCs may have simply gotten the diversification idea
wrong. Many FHCs, for example, have pointed to ‘‘cross-selling’’ as a key strategic
means to lower costs, increase income, and diversify revenue. If FHCs are really try-
ing to diversify revenue by selling many products to the same customers, then this
may simply expose multiple businesses to the same shocks, increase the correlation
across revenue streams, and reduce potential diversification benefits. Moreover,
FHCs are shifting into precisely those activities that are the most volatile, which off-
sets any diversification benefits.
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