The theory of speech acts is genera

The theory of speech acts is generally recognized to have begun with the work
of the phlosopher John Austin (Austin, 1962). He noted that a certain class of
natural language utterances - hereafter referred to as speech acts - had the characteristics of actions, in the sense that they change the state of the world in a way analogous to physical actions. It may seem strange to think of utterances changing the world in the way that physical actions do. If I pick up a block from a table (to use an overworked but traditional example), then the world has changed in an obvious way. But how does speech change the world? Austin gave as paradigm
examples declaring war and saying 'I now pronounce you man and wife'. Stated
in the appropriate circumstances, these utterances clearly change the state of the
world in a very tangible way1.
Austin identified a number of performative verbs, whch correspond to various
different types of speech acts. Examples of such performative verbs are request,
inform, and promise. In addition, Austin distinguished three different aspects of
speech acts: the locutionary act, or act of making an utterance (e.g. saying 'Please
make some tea'), the illocutionary act, or action performed in saying something
(e.g. 'He requested me to make some tea'), and perlocution, or effect of the act
(e.g. 'He got me to make tea').
Austin referred to the conditions required for the successful completion of performatives
as felicity conditions. He recognized three important felicity conditions.
(1) There must be an accepted conventional procedure for the performative,
and the circumstances and persons must be as specified in the procedure.
(2) The procedure must be executed correctly and completely.
(3) The act must be sincere, and any uptake required must be completed, insofar
as is possible.