It is important to emphasize that t

It is important to emphasize that the ranges of PDI
scores were practically identical between the healthy and
the deluded groups. Thus, nearly 10 percent of the healthy
sample scored above the mean of the deluded group. This
is noteworthy because the deluded individuals were all
floridly psychotic inpatients in an inner city, acute psychiatric
unit. Similar findings were observed on the STA and
the Mgl, despite the fact that the deluded group overall
scored significantly higher on all three scales. Thus, this
finding cannot be explained by the psychotic sample scoring
lower than expected, due to defensiveness on their
part, for example (see Claridge 1981). Indeed, most of the
patients were unusually open in their willingness to discuss
their experiences and beliefs in detail. Neither can it be readily attributed to lack of concentration or motivation
because the experimenter sat with these patients in an
attempt to ensure correct completion of the questionnaires.
These overlapping distributions between clinical and
healthy groups is interesting on two fronts. First, it is consistent
with the notion of continuity between mental
health and ill health and further strengthens the concept of
psychosis-proneness. Second, it echoes recent developments
in the delusion literature that emphasizes the multidimensional
aspect of delusional beliefs (e.g., Garety and
Hemsley 1987). There are obviously some differences
between the 1 in 10 healthy individuals with higher PDI
scores than the psychotic mean and the deluded patients,
^differences that enable the former to function adequately
in society, while the latter suffered a severe breakdown
and required hospitalization. Thus, what determines
whether a person will become overtly deluded rests on
more than just having had some kind of experience or
mental event (i.e., the endorsement of an item), but also
will partly depend on the strength of the interpretation, its
emotional impact, and how much one thinks about it.
Indeed, the deluded subjects had significantly higher
scores on the three dimensions of distress, preoccupation,
and conviction. Rated significantly higher on the distress
rating were 27 individual items (with a trend for 3 items),
and 30 items on both the preoccupation and conviction
ratings (with a trend for another 5 items on both scales).
For example, item 9 (—Do_you ever feel as if some people
are not what they seem to be?") was actually endorsed
more often in the healthy population (although not significantly).
However, deluded patients who answered Yes to
item 9 were significantly more distressed about it, spent
more of their time thinking about it, and were more convinced
of its veracity. In a similar vein, a comparable percentage
of deluded and healthy individuals felt that they
were very special or unusual people. Although neither
group was particularly distressed by this idea, the delusional
group was significantly more preoccupied with it,
and had a significantly higher conviction in this belief.
This, therefore, confirms the utility of adopting a
multidimensional approach to measuring delusional
beliefs. Although the incorporation of the distress, preoccupation,
and conviction dimensions adds to the difficulty
and length of the inventory, the present data substantiated
the claim that their analysis may in fact be more revealing
than the content of belief alone for placing an individual
on the continuum from health to psychopathology. This
also fits in with the conceptualization of delusions proposed
by Garety and Hemsley (1994), who suggest that
delusional beliefs are more than statements of experience,
but rather evaluations of mental events.
The factor structure of the PDI was investigated
using a principal components analysis (PCA). Four items
with endorsement frequencies of less than 10 percent
were removed before conducting this analysis. These
items were concerned with more idiosyncratic beliefs
(items 28 and 29) or more overtly psychotic symptomatology
(items 3 and 39). No item had an endorsement rate
greater than 90 percent.
A total of 11 components were extracted from a PCA
with varimax rotation. A scree plot (Cattell 1966) would
have suggested a three- or five-component solution.
However, the purpose of the PDI was not to measure a
limited number of well-defined subscales with high internal
reliability, but rather to sample as wide a variety of
delusions as possible. Therefore, the 11 components were
retained, rather than forcing a three- or five-component
solution, despite the fact that some of the components
were not easily interpretable.
The 11 components obtained were closely linked to
the original PSE groupings, although they were by no
means exact replicas. Paranoia seemed to be a central
issue, with three of the components converging on this
theme. Thus, Component 2 was labeled "persecution,"
Component 6 "suspiciousness," and Component 9 "para

Kết quả (Việt) 1:

It is important to emphasize that the ranges of PDIscores were practically identical between the healthy andthe deluded groups. Thus, nearly 10 percent of the healthysample scored above the mean of the deluded group. Thisis noteworthy because the deluded individuals were allfloridly psychotic inpatients in an inner city, acute psychiatricunit. Similar findings were observed on the STA andthe Mgl, despite the fact that the deluded group overallscored significantly higher on all three scales. Thus, thisfinding cannot be explained by the psychotic sample scoringlower than expected, due to defensiveness on theirpart, for example (see Claridge 1981). Indeed, most of thepatients were unusually open in their willingness to discusstheir experiences and beliefs in detail. Neither can it be readily attributed to lack of concentration or motivationbecause the experimenter sat with these patients in anattempt to ensure correct completion of the questionnaires.These overlapping distributions between clinical andhealthy groups is interesting on two fronts. First, it is consistentwith the notion of continuity between mentalhealth and ill health and further strengthens the concept ofpsychosis-proneness. Second, it echoes recent developmentsin the delusion literature that emphasizes the multidimensionalaspect of delusional beliefs (e.g., Garety andHemsley 1987). There are obviously some differencesgiữa 1 trong 10 cá nhân lành mạnh với cao PDICác điểm số hơn có nghĩa là tâm thần và các bệnh nhân lừa dối,^ sự khác biệt cho phép các cựu để chức năng đầy đủtrong xã hội, trong khi phải chịu một sự cố nghiêm trọngvà yêu cầu nhập viện. Vì vậy, những gì xác địnhcho dù một người sẽ trở thành công khai lừa dối dựa trêncó nhiều hơn là chỉ một số loại kinh nghiệm haytổ chức sự kiện tâm thần (tức là, sự ủng hộ của một mục), nhưng cũng cómột phần phụ thuộc mạnh giải thích, của nótác động đến tình cảm, và bao nhiêu nó suy nghĩ về nó.Thật vậy, các đối tượng lừa dối có đáng kể cao hơnđiểm số trên ba chiều của đau khổ, sự lo lắng,và niềm tin. Xếp hạng cao hơn đáng kể vào sự đau khổđã là xếp hạng 27 mục cá nhân (với một xu hướng cho các mục 3),và các mặt hàng 30 trên sự lo lắng và niềm tinXếp hạng (với một xu hướng cho một 5 bài về cả quy mô).Ví dụ: mục 9 (— Do_you bao giờ cảm thấy như thể một số ngườicó không phải những gì họ có vẻ không?") trên thực tế đã được xác nhậnthường xuyên hơn trong dân số khỏe mạnh (mặc dù không đáng kể).Tuy nhiên, lừa dối bệnh nhân trả lời có chomục 9 đã được đáng kể nhiều đau khổ về nó, dànhhơn nữa của thời gian suy nghĩ về nó, và đã được thuyết phục hơncủa tính chính xác của nó. Trong tĩnh mạch tương tự, một tỷ lệ so sánhcác cá nhân lừa dối và khỏe mạnh cảm thấy rằng họlà những người rất đặc biệt hoặc bất thường. Mặc dù khôngNhóm đặc biệt là đau khổ bởi ý tưởng này, các ảo tưởnggroup was significantly more preoccupied with it,and had a significantly higher conviction in this belief.This, therefore, confirms the utility of adopting amultidimensional approach to measuring delusionalbeliefs. Although the incorporation of the distress, preoccupation,and conviction dimensions adds to the difficultyand length of the inventory, the present data substantiatedthe claim that their analysis may in fact be more revealingthan the content of belief alone for placing an individualon the continuum from health to psychopathology. Thisalso fits in with the conceptualization of delusions proposedby Garety and Hemsley (1994), who suggest thatdelusional beliefs are more than statements of experience,but rather evaluations of mental events.The factor structure of the PDI was investigatedusing a principal components analysis (PCA). Four itemswith endorsement frequencies of less than 10 percentwere removed before conducting this analysis. Theseitems were concerned with more idiosyncratic beliefs(items 28 and 29) or more overtly psychotic symptomatology(items 3 and 39). No item had an endorsement rategreater than 90 percent.A total of 11 components were extracted from a PCAwith varimax rotation. A scree plot (Cattell 1966) wouldhave suggested a three- or five-component solution.However, the purpose of the PDI was not to measure alimited number of well-defined subscales with high internalreliability, but rather to sample as wide a variety ofdelusions as possible. Therefore, the 11 components wereretained, rather than forcing a three- or five-componentsolution, despite the fact that some of the componentswere not easily interpretable.The 11 components obtained were closely linked tothe original PSE groupings, although they were by nomeans exact replicas. Paranoia seemed to be a centralissue, with three of the components converging on thistheme. Thus, Component 2 was labeled "persecution,"Component 6 "suspiciousness," and Component 9 "para