Several plausible explanations are provided in the literature. One aspect concerns alternative
financing and governance mechanisms. One of the most important of these mechanisms is
reputation and relationships (see Allen et al., 2005). This literature indicates that traders’
organizations in the 11th Century were able to overcome problems of asymmetric information
and the lack of legal and contract enforcement mechanisms (Greif, 1989; 1993). This is so
because they developed institutions based on reputation, implicit contractual relations and
coalitions. China’s private sector closely resembles certain aspects of these traders’
organizations, especially in terms of how firms raise funds and contract with investors and
business partners. Greif (1994) and Stulz and Williamson (2003) have also pointed out the
importance of cultural and religious beliefs to the development of institutions, legal origins and
investor protections.
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