In this paper, we study how the interactions between central bank transparency and
fiscal policy affect macroeconomic performance and volatility, in a framework where
productivity-enhancing public investment could improve future growth potential. We
analyze the effects of the central bank’s opacity (lack of transparency) according to the
marginal effect of public investment by considering the Stackelberg equilibrium, where
the government is the first mover and the central bank the follower. We show that
the optimal choice of tax rate and public investment, when the public investment is
highly productivity enhancing, eliminates the effects of distortionary taxation and fully
counterbalance both the direct and the fiscal-disciplining effects of opacity, on the level
and variability of inflation and the output gap. In the case where the public investment is
not sufficiently productivity enhancing, opacity could still have some disciplining effects
as in the benchmark model, which ignores the effects of public investment.
Central bank transparency (opacity)
Fiscal-disciplining effect
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