In a sense, EU-wide competition pol

In a sense, EU-wide competition policy provides such a super-national mechanism that covers all industries. But it is concerned only with the potential e!ects of an alliance within the EU. Similarly, the current bilateral ASAs may be viewed as a form of internationally coordinated competition policy once entry matters have been determined (Findlay, Forsyth and Bora, 1996). However, the system has not resulted in free trade multilaterally, and, in fact, may have facilitated anticompetitive behavior by allowing the two countries flag carriers to dominate the bilateral markets.
As the world airline industry is undergoing changes through consolidation at both national and international levels, it is important that the restructuring be guided by an appropriate regulatory structure. The desirable international regulatory structures on strategic alliances should have some of the following features. First, national competition policies and enforcement practices for all industries are in place and are transparent. Further, they should converge to an adequate, common standard across countries. Second, as the pace of deregulation and liberalization continues in many countries, airline alliances and their competitive e!ects should be treated within the general framework of competition policy. Third, where relevant, international coordination of national regulatory agencies should be activated towards alliances related matters such as slot control at each country's hub airports, disclosure of the operating carriers of code shared flights on CRS display, and antitrust immunity granted by each country. An interesting question here is whether a super-national competition policy and a super-national regulatory body may be more effective in dealing with some of these matters than mere international coordination. While recognizing the potential benefits, we note that there is no precedent in other industries for such super-national competition policies and associated regulatory bodies. As indicated by Warran and Findley (1998), one of the strongest arguments against the development of a multilateral competition policy is the possibility that such an arrangement will be captured and used by various interests for illiberal ends (Low, 1996).a We believe that there is a need for further study on this issue.
The current regulatory system, including bilateral ASAs, poses impediments to structural changes in international aviation. The immunized alliance is one limited way of dealing with the restrictions inherent in the bilateral system. The initiation of regional and more liberalized bilateral, or open -skies, agreements has removed some of the impediments. This suggests that the coordination/harmonization of competition policies among countries and the liberalization of international aviation reinforce each other and should therefore be pursued simultaneously.
4. Conclusion
Our assessment based on economic incentives is that, while continued pressure for liberalization is expected, it is likely that restrictions imposed by the bilateral system and national ownership laws will continue to a!ect the development of global airline networks. In the near term, alliances would remain as a dominant form of inter airline relationship in international air transport. How to regulate alliances, therefore, becomes an important policy issue. Generally, international traffic involves (at least) two hub airports, one in each country. Controlling both hubs may require coordination of regulatory agencies of the two countries. The need for such coordination arises from the considerations that there exist asymmetries in regulatory policy across countries and that, where antitrust exemptions to aviation do exist, inconsistencies in the rules applied may occur across countries.
The desirable international regulatory structures on international alliances should include convergence of national competition policies and enforcement practices to achieve common standards and treatment of airline alliances within the general framework of competition policy. Furthermore, where relevant, international coordination of national regulatory agencies should be activated towards alliances related matters. The establishment of such coordination regulatory structures and the liberalization of international aviation reinforce each other and should be pursued simultaneously.

Kết quả (Việt) 1:

Trong ý nghĩa một, EU-rộng đối thủ cạnh tranh chính sách cung cấp một cơ chế siêu quốc gia bao gồm tất cả các ngành công nghiệp. Nhưng nó là có liên quan chỉ với e tiềm năng! ects của một liên minh trong EU. Tương tự, song phương ASAs hiện tại có thể được xem như là một hình thức của chính sách phối hợp quốc tế cạnh tranh một khi mục vấn đề đã là xác định (Findlay, Forsyth và Bora, 1996). Tuy nhiên, Hệ thống đã không dẫn đến tự do thương mại đa, và, trong thực tế, có thể đã tạo điều kiện anticompetitive hành vi bằng cách cho phép hai nước cờ tàu sân bay để thống trị thị trường song phương.As the world airline industry is undergoing changes through consolidation at both national and international levels, it is important that the restructuring be guided by an appropriate regulatory structure. The desirable international regulatory structures on strategic alliances should have some of the following features. First, national competition policies and enforcement practices for all industries are in place and are transparent. Further, they should converge to an adequate, common standard across countries. Second, as the pace of deregulation and liberalization continues in many countries, airline alliances and their competitive e!ects should be treated within the general framework of competition policy. Third, where relevant, international coordination of national regulatory agencies should be activated towards alliances related matters such as slot control at each country's hub airports, disclosure of the operating carriers of code shared flights on CRS display, and antitrust immunity granted by each country. An interesting question here is whether a super-national competition policy and a super-national regulatory body may be more effective in dealing with some of these matters than mere international coordination. While recognizing the potential benefits, we note that there is no precedent in other industries for such super-national competition policies and associated regulatory bodies. As indicated by Warran and Findley (1998), one of the strongest arguments against the development of a multilateral competition policy is the possibility that such an arrangement will be captured and used by various interests for illiberal ends (Low, 1996).a We believe that there is a need for further study on this issue.The current regulatory system, including bilateral ASAs, poses impediments to structural changes in international aviation. The immunized alliance is one limited way of dealing with the restrictions inherent in the bilateral system. The initiation of regional and more liberalized bilateral, or open -skies, agreements has removed some of the impediments. This suggests that the coordination/harmonization of competition policies among countries and the liberalization of international aviation reinforce each other and should therefore be pursued simultaneously.4. ConclusionOur assessment based on economic incentives is that, while continued pressure for liberalization is expected, it is likely that restrictions imposed by the bilateral system and national ownership laws will continue to a!ect the development of global airline networks. In the near term, alliances would remain as a dominant form of inter airline relationship in international air transport. How to regulate alliances, therefore, becomes an important policy issue. Generally, international traffic involves (at least) two hub airports, one in each country. Controlling both hubs may require coordination of regulatory agencies of the two countries. The need for such coordination arises from the considerations that there exist asymmetries in regulatory policy across countries and that, where antitrust exemptions to aviation do exist, inconsistencies in the rules applied may occur across countries.The desirable international regulatory structures on international alliances should include convergence of national competition policies and enforcement practices to achieve common standards and treatment of airline alliances within the general framework of competition policy. Furthermore, where relevant, international coordination of national regulatory agencies should be activated towards alliances related matters. The establishment of such coordination regulatory structures and the liberalization of international aviation reinforce each other and should be pursued simultaneously.