In the Chinese ownership system, there are many block shareholders. Alllisted companies must be set up by promoters, who are institutions holdingsignificant proportion of shares from the start and the shares that they holdcannot be traded openly on the official stock markets, thus causing effectivelockouts. The shareholdings by the State thus dominate, accounting foraround 70 percent of the total outstanding shares (Green, 2003). The Stateshareholdings are typically delegated to two institutions: governmentalagencies which only represent the owners, and state-owned institutions whoactively intervene in the business operations of the listed companies, normally through the presence of board members and sometimes even theChairman. There are also other domestic institutional shareholders, whichare normally privately capitalised companies. We introduce four ownershipvariables related to the degree of institutional shareholding: (a) the percentage of shares held by State asset management agencies (STATE); (b) thepercentage of shares held by State-controlled institutions (SINST); (c) thepercentage of shares held by domestic institutions (DINST); and (d) the totalpercentage institutional shareholding (INST = STATE + SINST +DINST). We predict negative signs for the coefficients of all four variables,because of the effects of the private benefits of control and of entrenchment
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