The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which was established on August 8th, 1967 contains 10 nations in the Southeast Asian area. One of few organizations that survived the Cold War era, ASEAN possesses an interesting history and unique characters that attract attention from many political scientists. Yet, as Shaun Narine, an ASEAN expert, asserted it was not easy to fully understand this institution’s functions and its influence upon the increasingly complex globalized Asia1. Among these mainstreams of international relation theories, realism and constructivism have paid the excessive attention to ASEAN. Different perspectives surely lead to different conclusions. In comparison between the two schools of thought, realists outdo their constructivism colleagues in clarifying ASEAN’s main issues and suggesting the justified direction for its future. The contentious argument between two sides, however, presents a rather meticulous insight into the big picture of ASEAN.ASEAN’s rich history is intertwined with that of the region. Forty-four years ago, five nations: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand agreed on forming a community that could share the common values and support each other. ASEAN’s primary purposes were stated, “To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations.”2 More specifically, keeping a “peaceful community” required two distinct tasks: to decrease or erase tensions among ASEAN countries and between ASEAN countries with external actors such as the communist states rising at that time. Moreover, all conflicts should be resolved without the use of force. To emphasize this specific point, in 1971, ASEAN labeled itself as “Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality.” For the first decade, ASEAN’s achievement however was minimal. It didn’t receive much support or recognition in the region or the world stage. Determining to recreate a better image, ASEAN had reformed its structure a few years after the end of Cold War. It went through quite a period of revolution since 1992. The outstanding event was the first meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum held in Bangkok in 1994, aiming toward mutual dialogue, consultation, and confidence-building2. From 1995 to 1999, the expansion of memberships stated with the recruitment of a communist country, Vietnam, and four other countries after that. Analysts actually considered this event an accomplishment as ASEAN turned itself into a larger and more diverse institution. In 1978, ASEAN also received the worldwide acclamation in opposing Vietnam’s evasion in Campuchia3. Recently, stability and cooperation have thrived in the region, leading to a positive change in socio-economic indicators such as the increase in the total trade value or total GPD of all members. ASEAN, however, still has to cope with numerous obstacles. One of the distinctive characters of ASEAN is its non-intervention principle which gives states the highest level of autonomy in solving their issues. This principle, however, limits ASEAN’s power and its capacity to respond to urgent or dangerous situations. Problems also stem from the developing stage of its members. Most ASEAN countries are still experiencing the unstable economic and political development torn by corruption, religion conflicts, and in some states, the immature democracy. Generally, a shared value isn’t synonymous with a common identity that strongly ties up the relationship among members. Last but not least, ASEAN has a very limited influence over the larger region. In contrast, its behaviors are sometimes influenced by these emerging nearby powers such as China, India or the bigger hegemonies such as the United States and Japan.
Yet, ASEAN is going through one of the most exciting stages in its history. It has become an attractive topic of international relation studies, especially to two schools of thought: realism and constructivism. Both of them hold very strong opinions grounded with convincing evidences about ASEAN’s operation and its position in the world stage.
Realism is the most oldest and dominant theory in global politics. Realist believes the only concern of state should be power maximization. “The states find themselves in the shadow of anarchy with the result that their security cannot be taken for granted. In such circumstances it’s rational for states to compete for power and security.” (Baylis, 163) Based on this rationale, the state of peace or war is determined by “the balance-of-power”, the circumstance when states build up their armed strength to guarantee the balance with the competing force. According to the principle, ASEAN’s establishment could be interpreted as an act of balancing the region with external powerful actors. As ASEAN countries locate between two huge states India and China; cooperation among those small, vulnerable countries in such a strategic location could definitely reduce worries and uncertainties about the external threat. Realist also looks at the mutual trust and cooperation among nations with the skepticism. To them, it is impossible for self-interested states to join any group without assuring about their benefits. Realist goes further by claiming the real motive of cooperation is for the hegemonic power to extend its control over the region. (Baylis, 381) Consequently, the international organizations never work for an altruism cause. ASEAN, under the scrutiny of realists, is an indisputable proof of the weakness of any institution. First, while economic cooperation is the most primary goal of ASEAN, the institution achieves little in its economy despite the concerted effort. A compelling example is ASEAN’s inability to tackle the Asian financial crisis that started in Thailand during 1997 and quickly spread out in the region. The crisis wrenched the unstable economy of ASEAN, also creating lots of ramifications in different social issues to deal with. ASEAN also received a lot of criticisms for its “limited success” in the Free Trade Area Agreement, which was signed in Singapore in 1992.3 The progress to obtain the non-tariff objective was at a very slow pace while most of its members didn’t give serious attention and commitment to the agreement. Economic growth in the region doesn’t reach the high level as expected. More than that, other issues such as pollution, inequality, the huge gap of GDP per capita between developing state such as Cambodia ($783 in 2010)4 and more developed one such as Singapore ($43,867 in 2010)4 pose more obstacles to the economic cooperation.
Regarding ASEAN’s aim to create a stable political regime, realist remains the same pessimistic and skeptical outlook toward its efficacy. ASEAN is a sum of all the political fragments rather than a whole coherent and healthy political body. Realist labels the organization as an internal collective security arrangement.3 ASEAN lacks an integrated political identity that connects each member; the problem eventually leads to a low capacity and a confusing political role in the region. One of the most primary purposes of ASEAN is to reduce the inferior conflict. Yet, tensions among members in Southeast Asia continue to drag on. Thailand and Myanmar have stayed as enemy for centuries. Also, there is a prolonged border conflict between Thailand and Malaysia. Religious difference also created tension between Malaysia and Singapore while the former accused the latter of mistreating its Muslims minority5. The political tragedy in Burma, the second largest country in Southeast Asia, still exists. All those examples illustrate a powerless and passive ASEAN whose vision of cooperation and tight relationship among its members is too unrealistic. Realists don’t find it surprising. Through the realism’s perspective, states have little incentives to commit to a group without knowing their benefits. According to the rationale of self-interest and self-help, each state in ASEAN is more willing to pursue their independent policy to enhance their own security rather than to comply a set of rules established by the organization. In short, realists consider ASEAN a weak institution with little influence on its member’s economic and political situations as well as little ability to deal with conflicts where “crashing interest cannot be avoided.”6
Another mainstream of global politics, however, criticizes realism’s view for being too pessimistic, and bounding too much on materialistic concepts such as power, territory, and wealth. This mainstream is constructivism. Even in the international relation study, constructivism is a fairly new approach. In contrary to realism, constructivism emphasizes the importance and interactions of norms, values, and identities. According to constructivists, society constructs how the system works. As organizations operate, they embody and promote a certain type of norms that are determined by the region’s history and culture. Norms is a variable. As a result, realists’ approach of applying Western criterion to judge an Eastern organization like ASEAN is inappropriate and meaningless.
Constructivist considers ASEAN as an effective institution. First, ASEAN succeeded in building up the so-called ‘ASEAN way’ which emphasizes compromising, consensus among states, the principle of non-intervention, and regional autonomy. More than that, its behaviors is consistent with its own norms. These norms stem from the region’s history. As all of those countries were colonized by European countries and gained independence in the beginning of 20th century, they have a strong sense of nationalism. Therefore, letting states obtain the highest level of autonomy even when they are members of an international regime like ASEAN is totally reaso
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