To examinethisempiricalissue,wecoll

To examinethisempiricalissue,wecollectinterimreportingfrequencydataforthetimeperiod1951–1973.TheSEC
required annualfinancialreportingin1934andraisedtherequiredreportingfrequencytosemi-annualreportingin1955.
Not until1970didtheSECmandatequarterlyreporting.However,priorto1970asubstantialproportionoffirmsreported
more frequentlythanrequiredbytheSEC.1 For example, Butler etal.(2007) document thatatleast70%offirmsreported
quarterly intheperiodweexamine.Byofferingsubstantialcross-sectionalandtime-seriesvariationinreporting
frequency, oursampleperiodprovidesanidealsettingtoinvestigateourresearchquestion.Itisdifficulttostudyour
research questionusingmorerecentdataintheU.S.because,since1970,almostallfirmshavefollowedtheSEC’s
requirement ofquarterlyreporting,resultinginalackofvariationinreportingfrequency.
During oursampleperiod,asignificantproportionoffirmsvoluntarilychoosetoreportmorefrequentlythantheSEC
requires. Theirdecisiononreportingfrequencyisnotlikelytoberandom.Thus,itispossiblethatsomeunobservablefirm
characteristics, suchasthefirm’sriskiness,affectbothobservedreportingfrequencyandinformationasymmetry/costof
equity, givingrisetoanendogeneityconcern.Toalleviatethisconcern,inadditiontoasimpleOLSregression,weusethe
following threeapproaches—a firmfixedeffectsmodel,atwo-stageleastsquaresestimationprocedure(2SLShereafter),
and amatchedcontrolsample.

Kết quả (Việt) 1:

Để examinethisempiricalissue,wecollectinterimreportingfrequencydataforthetimeperiod1951–1973.TheSEC
required annualfinancialreportingin1934andraisedtherequiredreportingfrequencytosemi-annualreportingin1955.
không until1970didtheSECmandatequarterlyreporting.However,priorto1970asubstantialproportionoffirmsreported
more frequentlythanrequiredbytheSEC.1 ví dụ, Butler etal.(2007) tài liệu thatatleast70% offirmsreported
intheperiodweexamine hàng quý.Byofferingsubstantialcross-sectionalandtime-seriesvariationinreporting
tần số, oursampleperiodprovidesanidealsettingtoinvestigateourresearchquestion.Itisdifficulttostudyour
nghiên cứu questionusingmorerecentdataintheU.S.because,since1970,almostallfirmshavefollowedtheSEC's
requirement ofquarterlyreporting,resultinginalackofvariationinreportingfrequency.
trong oursampleperiod, asignificantproportionoffirmsvoluntarilychoosetoreportmorefrequentlythantheSEC
đòi hỏi. Theirdecisiononreportingfrequencyisnotlikelytoberandom.Thus,itispossiblethatsomeunobservablefirm
characteristics, suchasthefirm'sriskiness, affectbothobservedreportingfrequencyandinformationasymmetry/costof
vốn chủ sở hữu, givingrisetoanendogeneityconcern.Toalleviatethisconcern, inadditiontoasimpleOLSregression, weusethe
sau threeapproaches — một firmfixedeffectsmodel, atwo-stageleastsquaresestimationprocedure (2SLShereafter),
và amatchedcontrolsample.

Kết quả (Việt) 2:

Để
annualfinancialreportingin1934andraisedtherequiredreportingfrequencytosemi-annualreportingin1955.
Không
frequentlythanrequiredbytheSEC.1 Ví dụ, Butler etal. (2007) tài liệu thatatleast70% offirmsreported
quý ofquarterlyreporting, resultinginalackofvariationinreportingfrequency. Trong suchasthefirm'sriskiness, affectbothobservedreportingfrequencyandinformationasymmetry / costof vốn chủ sở hữu, threeapproaches-một firmfixedeffectsmodel, atwo-stageleastsquaresestimationprocedure (2SLShereafter), và amatchedcontrolsample.