International Finance
Almost eight years, The single currency has been detrimental to the ambitious European goals of invigorating growth, job creation and achieving more balanced budget. Due to collective action problems, the Eurozone is stuck in a sub-optimal macro policy mix of too expansionary fiscal policy and too restrictive monetary policy. Although the Lisbon strategy pays lip service to macroeconomic policy coordination, no mechanisms, institutions or effective rules are established in order to overcome the collective action problem. Empirically, the failure is demonstrated by comparing the Eurozone policy mix with the US policy mix and attributing it to the low investment performance which resulted in low average GDP growth and low average productivity growth ? contrary to the aims of the Lisbon strategy to make the EU the world's most dynamic economy. In order to overcome these difficulties, a proper government for the EU is needed. More delegation to the European level is legitimate only if European citizens can exert their democratic rights.
Costs from negative external effects. If one or more member countries
run sizeable budget deficits, and accumulate unsustainable debts, the pecuniary externalities will
ripple through the currency area. The debt may be monetized, putting a strain on the interest rate
of the union. International confidence in the union's currency may plummet, resulting in
speculative flows against the union's currency. Every member would suffer in this scenario,
particularly those that previously had stable currencies and were perhaps collecting revenue from
the international use and holding of their currencies.
That nominal exchange rate changes may have an insulating role with respect to price changes originating
abroad. If Country A now endured uncertain foreign prices (such as higher energy prices) originating in Country C (that is an oil exporter to Country A), it would be better off by insulating itself -- to the extent possible -- by undertaking an exchange rate appreciation. For instance, Country A would be protecting itself from inflation imported from Country B.Evidently, in this latter example Countries A and B would not be suitable candidates to form a monetary union.
However, in countries with a public risk sharing facility, the latter has
contributed to reducing the disadvantages for regions or states of tying exchange rates.
• The euro area is proceeding without this facility but is very attentive in securing that the
national automatic stabilisers can be used fully while complying with the Stability and
Growth Pact.
• In addition, EMU members will have to rely almost entirely on their own resources and
on the operation of other adjustment channels in the wake of shocks including the wealth,
deflation, and price and wage channels. Consequently, fiscal discipline will be even more
crucial in the EMU than in most other monetary unions. In addition, other forms of
adaptability to counter shocks will need to be strengthened.
However, if asymmetric shocks will become more likely and more intense, for example due to the operation of the Krugman concentration hypothesis, the lack of a supranational shock- absorbing facility may be significant.
Some observations on the studies investigating regional developments
a. When shocks occur in Europe, inter-regional migration, both within and between
countries, is not substantial, particularly in the short run. Even worse, labour mobility has fallen in Europe with respect to the 1950’s and 60s (Bertola (1999)).
b. EMU is more likely to reduce relative price volatility and real exchange volatility.This is consistent with the already cited paper by Beck and Weber (2001) that monetary integration greatly reduced cross-borders real exchange rate volatility across some selected European sites.
c. Very importantly, integration is proceeding at a higher pace between some regions of different European countries. Several studies show that the most industrialised regions of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and northern Europe in general, enjoy a high level of reciprocal trade in goods and services, and high factor market integration. Labour mobility is low even within this relatively homogeneous pan-European “core”.
d. As European countries do not have an inter-state transfer system -- e.g., through a supranational budget -- and exhibit very low labour mobility, securing high wage flexibility will be fundamental to foster adjustments in relative shocks (Blanchard and Katz (1992)).
e. This suggests that financial market integration may eventually lead to stronger international risk sharing in the euro area through the functioning of financial markets and
institutions.
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