Another feature of bilateral investment treaties is that they are made between unequal
partners. They entrench an inequality that has always attended this area of international
law. They are usually agreed between a capital-exporting developed state and a developing state keen to attract capital from that state. The observation that developing countries make such treaties among themselves does not obscure the fact that one of these countries is an exporter of capital vis-à-vis the other. The rationale for the treaty itself is the promise of protection for the capital that is so received. Though the treaty contemplates a two-way flow of investments between the states parties to the treaty, it is usually only a one-way flow that is contemplated and feasible in reality in the context of the disparities of wealth and technology between the two parties. There is an insufficient quid pro quo in that the two-way flow that is openly stated as the basis of the treaties is often a fiction. There are interesting problems that arise as a result of this inequality of bargaining power. It is unrealistic to expect some of the developing countries which are
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